Peugnet v. Berthold

• Decision Date: 20 June 1904
• Citation: 81 S.W. 874,183 Mo. 61
• Parties: PEUGNET v. BERTHOLD et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

81 S.W. 874

183 Mo. 61

PEUGNET v. BERTHOLD et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 20, 1904.

WILLS — CONSTRUCTION — TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS — RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY UNDER INTESTATE LAWS.

1. A testator gave half of his estate to his only child. The other half he gave to a trustee for the use of the child, empowering the trustee to manage the same during the life of the child, declaring that only the income thereof should be paid to the child, and conferring on the child power to dispose of the trust property at his death by will or otherwise. Held, that as the child acquired the remainder of the trust property in fee, under the law of descent, as undisposed-of property, he was entitled to the same freed from the restrictions of the trust.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Warwick Hough, Judge.

Suit by Maurice B. Peugnet against John B. S. Berthold, trustee under the will of Armand Peugnet, deceased, and others. From a judgment dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Fred Wislizenus, for appellant. Kehr & Tittman, for respondents.

VALLIANT, J.

This is a suit in equity to discharge a trust created by the will of plaintiff's father, relating to property devised to a trustee for plaintiff's use. Armand Peugnet, the plaintiff's father, a resident of St. Louis, and owner of real estate in St. Louis and New York, died in 1894, leaving a will, which has been duly probated. The estate has, under the will, been fully administered, and final settlement and distribution made in the probate court in 1897. The only thing remaining to be done, according to the plaintiff's petition, is to turn over to him his share of the property that came to him under the third clause of the will, and by inheritance as the sole heir of his father. The testator left surviving him his widow, Virginia S. Peugnet, and the plaintiff, his only child.

The will contained the following clauses, which are all of it that bear on this case:

"Second. I recognize that I have but one child, a son named Maurice B. Peugnet, and to that said child I give and bequeath one-half of my entire estate, real, personal or mixed and of every kind and to hold in such manner as he deems best.

"Third. The remaining one-half of said estate I give and bequeath to John B. Sarpy Berthold, as trustee without bond, for my son Maurice and for the sole use and benefit of said son and at death of said son this trust shall cease.

"Fourth. The said trustee shall have full power to buy, sell, mortgage, invest, improve and manage, all of the said one-half interest or proceeds thereof held in trust during the life of said Maurice B. Peugnet.

"Fifth. It being my intention that only the income derived from said one-half interest held in trust be paid over to my son Maurice, by said trustee, as said trustee may think proper.

"Sixth. My said son Maurice is to have the power to dispose of at his death, by will or otherwise, of the entire one-half interest held by said trustee or his successors.

"Seventh. In the event of the death or disability of said trustee I direct that a successor shall be appointed by the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, in accordance with the statutes in such cases provided."

The testator's widow has conveyed to the plaintiff, her son, all her interest in the property in St. Louis in question. The trustee, the widow, and the plaintiff's children, all of whom are minors, are the defendants. The prayer of the petition is that the plaintiff be allowed to release the power, and that the trust be discharged.

The answer of the widow admits the truth of all the statements in the petition, and disclaims all right to the property named, except her dower right to the New York property, which the plaintiff does not question. The answer of the trustee admits the truth of all the statements in the petition. The children answer by their guardian ad litem that they are too young to be advised of their rights in the premises, and pray the court to protect their interests.

At the hearing the foregoing facts were proven by the plaintiff. The defendants introduced no evidence. The court rendered judgment for the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's bill. The plaintiff appeals.

This court has often said that in construing a will, and adjudging the rights of parties growing out of it, the intention of the testator, as derived from the will itself, must govern. So our statute declares, and so we would have to declare, in obedience to the common law, if there were no statute on the subject. So unqualified is this rule of construction that we are unwilling to say that it yields to any exception. But we make no exception to the rule when we say that the testator's intention appearing on the face of the will cannot be carried out if it is contrary to law — for example, if the will gives an estate in fee to a devisee, but imposes the condition that it shall never be subject to execution for his debts, or if it attempts to limit an estate in violation of the rule against perpetuities. Though we may gather from the face of the will that the testator had a certain purpose in view, yet, unless he has expressed that purpose in terms that the court can enforce without violation of established principles of law, the testator's intention cannot be carried out. Harbison v. Swan, 58 Mo. 147.

The testator devised this property to the trustee for the sole use of his son for life, and...