Peyton v. Delnay, 71

Decision Date01 October 1956
Docket NumberNo. 71,71
Citation348 Mich. 238,83 N.W.2d 204
PartiesGeraldine J. PEYTON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. George A. DELNAY and Helen L. Delnay, Defendants and Appellants. ,
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Kelly, Kelly & Kelly, Jackson, for defendants and appellants.

Dahlem & Dahlem, Jackson, for plaintiff and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench, except BOYLES, J.

EDWARDS, Justice.

This is a negligence action brought under the guest passenger statute. Plaintiff below prevailed in a jury verdict and court judgment of $8,000, with defendants appealing.

The principal questions presented for our review are (1) whether or not the evidence supports a jury finding that defendant driver was guilty of gross negligence, and (2) if so, whether or not the owner of the car can be held liable for the driver's gross negligence under the owner liability act.

The setting for this case differs from most guest passengers cases in that all parties were on the evening in question participants in a church activity.

The Ganson Street Baptist Church, of Jackson, had a youth activity called the Youth Hour. Mr. and Mrs. George Delnay were adult sponsors thereof. The Youth Hour decided to stage a treasure hunt wherein clues would be planted at various locations in advance, and the young people, in automobiles, would seek to see which could first solve the clues and reach the treasure. As will appear, the young ladies of our current concern did not reach the treasure but did reach the hospital.

Plaintiff Geraldine Peyton and defendant Helen Delnay were close friends and members of the Youth Hour. Helen was given permission by her father, defendant George Delnay, to drive his car on the treasure hunt. Defendant Helen Delnay drove away from the church with plaintiff Geraldine Peyton in the front seat beside her and 3 other girls in the back seat. After several stops to locate clues, the car ended up overturned 80 feet off a dirt road at a 90-degree turn which Helen had failed to negotiate. Plaintiff and one or more of the other girls were injured.

Concerning the above facts, there is no disagreement. About what happened between the departure from the church and the point of the accident, there is no agreement whatsoever.

Since we deal here with an appeal from the trial judge's denial of motions for a directed verdict and for judgment non obstante veredicto, we review the disputed facts from the view favorable to plaintiff which the jury apparently took of them. Hulett v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 Mich. 59, 299 N.W. 807; Anderson v. Kearly, 312 Mich. 566, 20 N.W.2d 728; Titus v. Lonergan, 322 Mich. 112, 33 N.W.2d 685; Cramer v. Dye, 328 Mich. 370, 43 N.W.2d 892.

Samples of plaintiff's testimony tell her story of the ride from place to place up to the point of the accident:

'As I got into the car she says, 'Boy, am I ever mad.' She says, 'I first--I thought I was going to have to work tonight but I called up and told them I was ill,' she said, 'because I wanted to go out with a group of girls and take the car, but may folks told me I couldn't have the car unless I drove on the treasure hunt,' she said, 'so here I am, but I would certainly like to turn down a few signposts tonight.'

* * *

* * *

'We were going past the house where her folks were at a Halloween party; that is the Henning residence. We went by so fast I just kind of glanced over and I didn't know which house, but as we passed the house, she said, 'My folks.' She said, 'I guess I better slow down. I am only doing 80 and my folks are there at a Halloween party, and I would hate to see my mother's face if I turned this crate over tonight'; and we did slow down. I would say, about 10 miles an hour, about down to 70. We did slow down, and she was doing 80 because I noticed the speedometer. I looked after she made that remark. That's what called my attention to the fact that she was doing 80. That was about a mile and a half from Francis street. We were going kind of fast when we got to Francis street, but she did stop. We kind of slid out into the road. I remember that because I kind of looked to see if there was any oncoming traffic, but there wasn't. That is a dual highway there; 2 lanes. And I am speaking of running out into the westerly lane.

* * *

* * *

'I saw that yellow line on the right side of the center line of that curve up the hill. Going up, as we approached that curve, we started to pass a car that was in front of us, and as we got halfway up I happened to notice there was a yellow line there and I said, 'Helen, wasn't that a yellow line?' Nothing was said. We kept right on going. We didn't slow down.

* * *

* * *

'A little ways before we got to where I told her to stop for the sign, she had remarked that--she said 'Girls I am doing 85. I guess I better slow down.' Then she made the remark about she would hate to see her mother's face if she turned the crate over; the same remark she had previously made. Words to the same effect. She would hate to see--I think she said--her folks' faces. Something like that. She said, 'My father would have a fit.' I remember that.

* * *

* * *

'As she approached Cady Road I looked at the speedometer. She was still doing about 50. Before we approached the jog at Cady Road I remember Beatrice saying something but, as to what she said, I don't remember. But I told Helen that there was a sharp jog down there and that she had better slow down, and she told me that she knew there was and that she was down at that many times before and knew all about it. I just said, 'Helen, you better slow down. There is a sharp jog ahead.' She made her response kind of flippy like. We slowed down to some extent. She took her foot off the accelerator but she didn't brake. I remember we took the--when we got down there, we kind of just more or less swerved around. We kind of went to the left side of them and just turned again quite sharp.

* * *

* * *

'I say the speed at which Helen Delnay was approaching the end of the pavement was 80 miles an hour. After I called her attention to the fact that a turn was ahead and before we were onto that dirt road, I had time to observe a car in front of us. He was on top of the hill at the time I looked up, and he was flashing his brake lights on and off, and we still hadn't approached the top of the hill yet because he was there.

* * *

* * *

'I don't remember whether or not she applied her brakes. When the car hit the gravel, it zigzagged. I remember her doing nothing. I remember her--she had her hands on the steering wheel. She wasn't moving the steering wheel. She had her hands on it. It probably was moving but I don't think she was moving it. When we hit that dirt road, to me we were zigzagging around, and sliding from here to here. She looked kind of petrified. I believe she was frightened at that time.'

Other of plaintiff's witnesses tended to corroborate most of the testimony quoted, while defendant and her witnesses tended to contradict it.

The trial judge's opinion summarized the testimony bearing on wanton and wilful negligence thus:

'The record is replete with testimony concerning claimed speeds attained by the car at various points on the trip ranging up to 85 miles per hour. There is testimony of numerous claimed protests to the driver by various occupants of the car. There is also testimony of claimed slowing down of the car by the driver following protests and of claimed resumption of higher speeds following. There is testimony of claimed jouncing about of passengers in the car, caused by the speed and claimed unusual movements of the car. There is testimony of claimed angry, defiant, or petulant statements by the car driver during the trip. There is also testimony of claimed voluntary statements by the car driver indicative of awareness of driving conditions about her and of taking means to meet such conditions.

'The above brief outline of the range of proofs in the case clearly shows that, with possibly 2 exceptions, the incidents relied upon for recovery by the plaintiff are those commonly found in some combination in virtually every guest case appearing in Michigan Reports. The notable absent elements are drinking and profanity. Because of the background and training of these young, church-group girls, naturally neither latter element would normally appear.'

The statute under which this action is brought provides in part as follows:

'Provided, however, that no person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in cace of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle and unless such gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.' C.L.S.1954, § 257.401 (Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 9.2101).

The jury in the instant case considered and answered 3 special questions as follows:

'Question 1: 'Did defendant Helen L. Delnay wilfully and wantonly drive into a place of danger?'

'The answer: 'Yes.'

'Question 2: 'Did defendant Helen L. Delnay wantonly and wilfully endanger the passengers in her car, including herself?'

'The answer: 'Yes.'

'Question 3: 'Was defendant Helen L. Delnay negligent in failing to make the turn where the accident happened?'

'The answer: 'Yes.'

We believe that the testimony quoted and the facts recited by the trial judge warranted the submission of the issue of wilful and wanton misconduct to the jury. There was testimony from which the jury could have found that defendant driver had exhibited on the night in question 'an affirmatively reckless state of mind with intent to depart from careful driving.' Sorenson v. Wegert, 301 Mich. 497, 511, 3 N.W.2d 857, 862; Greimel v. Fischer,...

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