Pezzello Bros. Fruit and Produce Co., Inc. v. Armenakes, 95-295-M

• Decision Date: 13 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-295-M,95-295-M
• Citation: 677 A.2d 907
• Parties: PEZZELLO BROS. FRUIT AND PRODUCE CO., INC., d.b.a Coastal Fruit and Produce, v. James ARMENAKES et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 907

677 A.2d 907

PEZZELLO BROS. FRUIT AND PRODUCE CO., INC., d.b.a Coastal Fruit and Produce, v. James ARMENAKES et al.

No. 95-295-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 13, 1996.

Michael R. Hagopian, Cranston, for Plaintiff.

Edward Newman, Westerly, for Defendant.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

This case comes before us on a petition for certiorari by James and George Armenakes.

On May 13, 1992, a Connecticut court judgment was entered by default against James Armenakes and George Armenakes (defendants) for $3,872.42 for goods sold and delivered to them by the plaintiff, Pezzello Bros. Fruit and Produce Co., Inc. d.b.a Coastal Fruit and Produce (Coastal). On January 29, 1993, Coastal filed a civil action and complaint in the Rhode Island Fourth Division District Court, seeking to enforce the terms and provisions of the Connecticut judgment pursuant to the full faith and credit provision of the United States Constitution, Article IV, section 1. Coastal's complaint also included a claim based directly upon the goods-sold-and-delivered-contract debt. Once again, a default judgment was entered against the defendants in the Fourth Division District Court action. The defendants then filed their appeal to the Superior Court.

On May 12, 1994, Coastal filed a motion for summary judgment in the Superior Court appeal action. That motion, after due notice and hearing, was granted on May 20, 1994. Implied in that grant of summary judgment was the trial justice's rejection of the defendants' Connecticut court jurisdictional contention. Shoor-Elias Glass Co. v. Raymond Construction, 114 R.I. 714, 716, 339 A.2d 250, 252 (1975). Final judgment was later entered and remained unsatisfied. As a result, on November 16, 1994, a writ of execution was requested and issued. Some six months later, on May 8, 1995, while the execution was still outstanding, an automobile owned by the defendant George Armenakes was discovered by the constable and levied upon, pursuant to the writ of execution. Notice of an execution sale of the automobile was thereafter duly published in the Providence Journal on May 13, 1995, and May 25, 1995.

Prior to the scheduled sale of the automobile, the defendants filed a motion in the Superior Court to vacate the execution levy upon the automobile as well as a motion to stay the sale of the automobile. Both motions were heard and denied. From the orders entered denying their motions, the defendants filed their petition for writ of certiorari in this Supreme Court. They allege therein that the Connecticut court lacked personal jurisdiction over them when it entered the Connecticut default judgment. Accordingly they contend that the Connecticut judgment as well as the resulting levy and execution in this state following default judgment in the Fourth Division District Court were defective by reason of failing to provide them adequate due process. This Court pending hearing on the defendants' petition stayed the execution sale.

In regard to the defendants' first claim of error, we find that the Connecticut jurisdictional issue raised by them is not properly before this Court. The allegations in the defendants' affidavit filed in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in the Superior Court included challenges by the defendants to the Connecticut court's personal jurisdiction over them. The defendants were given full opportunity in the Superior Court to contest and argue the Connecticut court's personal jurisdiction issue in the course of the Superior Court hearing on Coastal's summary judgment motion. The defendants' claim regarding the Connecticut court's personal jurisdiction was considered by the trial justice, who then granted summary judgment in favor of Coastal. Final judgment was entered on May 20, 1994, in accordance with that finding. That final summary judgment was left unappealed. Because the trial justice's ruling on the summary judgment motion was unappealed, it ripened into a final judgment from which the jurisdictional issue determined therein cannot now be raised again...