Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co.
| Decision Date | 07 January 1942 |
| Docket Number | 15349. |
| Citation | 18 S.E.2d 331,198 S.C. 476 |
| Parties | PFAEHLER v. TEN CENT TAXI CO. (two cases). |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Waring & Brockinton, of Charleston, for appellant.
Hagood Rivers & Young, of Charleston, for respondent.
These two actions were tried in the Civil and Criminal Court of Charleston, and were heard together as they grew out of the same state of facts. The plaintiffs in the actions are husband and wife. The action of Edward A. Pfaehler is to recover damages for injury to his automobile and to his person; and that of Mrs. Annie C. Pfaehler is for injuries to the person. There were verdicts for each plaintiff. Briefly stated, the facts upon which the actions were tried, as alleged in the complaints, were these:
Mr. and Mrs. Pfaehler were driving their automobile on Meeting Street, in Charleston, on the 21st of June, 1936, when an automobile, the property of the defendant, was, as is alleged, carelessly, negligently and recklessly driven into and upon their automobile, which did great damage to it, and inflicted personal injuries to both of the occupants.
The defendant, by its answer, admitted the ownership of the automobile, but denied the other allegations of the complaint, and stood, on the trial, upon the ground that the automobile was not in its possession, nor being operated for its benefit, when the collision occurred.
As stated, the verdicts were for the plaintiffs. Upon the appeal of the defendant to the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County, it was heard by the Honorable William H. Grimball Presiding Judge, who, by his order, dated May 28, 1940 reversed the action of the Civil and Criminal Court, and ordered the case back for a new trial. From that order appeal comes to this court upon two exceptions, as follows:
It appears from the record that Arnold Rose, the employee of defendant company, on the day in question, had driven the automobile which collided with Mr. Pfaehler's machine, to a point outside of the city limits, to a place of entertainment known as The Cat and the Fiddle, to carry passengers for hire, whom he left at that place of entertainment. One of them engaged Rose to come back for him at a certain time, and paid him in advance for that purpose.
The plaintiffs introduced the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Pfaehler, in relation to the incidents of the collision and the personal injuries of the two plaintiffs, and also the testimony of witnesses relating to the injury done to the automobile, and also to the personal injuries to the plaintiffs, and rested their cases there.
The defendant introduced the testimony of Joe Sottile, an officer of the Ten Cent Taxi Company, who swore that the company did not employ anyone by the name of John Varn, or authorize anyone of that name to drive the car in question. Thereupon the defendant offered the testimony of Arnold Rose, who testified that he was the driver of the automobile of the defendant company. He testified that on the 21st of June, 1936, he was in the employ of the Ten Cent Taxi Company, and on that day had in charge the car which was in the collision with Mr. Pfaehler; that he was not driving the car at the time of the collision; that it was being driven by "a fellow I had picked up named John Varn." He testified that he did not give anyone permission to drive the car. He stated that he had carried some passengers from the city to a place of entertainment outside the city limits, known as The Cat and the Fiddle, and had left them there. One of them, John Varn, engaged him to come back for him, and paid him in advance. He testified further:
On cross examination this witness testified:
At the conclusion of the testimony, the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict, which motion was refused. The presiding judge charged the jury generally as to the law of negligence, and other matters pertinent to the issues. The only part of the charge necessary to be set out is the following, which the court charged the jury without request by either party, and no exceptions or objections were made by either party: "As this collision happened in the City of Charleston the ordinances of the City of Charleston would apply to the drivers of both vehicles; and if either of these drivers violated any of the City Ordinances then he would be guilty of negligence per se or guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and if such negligence were the cause of the collision then that driver would be responsible for it."
The appeal of the plaintiffs from the order of Judge Grimball is predicated upon two grounds, which we have heretofore quoted herein. The first exception is based on the contention that a new trial should be granted because the trial judge charged the ordinances of the City of Charleston.
In the argument of this case before us, appellants' attorneys asked for, and were granted, the right to criticize the opinion of the court in the case of Steinberg v. South Carolina Power Company, 165 S.C. 367, 163 S.E. 881 which case turned upon the question of the applicability...
To continue reading
Request your trial