Pfau v. V. COMAIR HOLDINGS, INC.

Decision Date29 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 26491.,26491.
Citation135 Idaho 152,15 P.3d 1160
PartiesBradley PFAU and Renae Bonander, Co Personal Representatives of the Estates of Roy E. Raymond and Verna Marie Raymond, deceased, for and on behalf of the Estates of Roy E. Raymond and Verna Marie Raymond, and the Heirs of said Estates, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMAIR HOLDINGS, INC., a Kentucky corporation; Comair, Inc., an Ohio corporation; Empresa Brasiliera De Aeronautica, S.A., d/b/a Embraer, a foreign corporation, and EAC-Embraer Aircraft Corporation, a Florida corporation, and Delta Airlines, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Benoit, Alexander, Sinclair, Harwood & High, L.L.P., Twin Falls, for appellants. J. Walter Sinclair argued.

Moore, Baskin & Parker, Boise, Vandeveer Garzin P.C., Troy, Michigan, for respondents. Paige A. Parker argued. TROUT, Chief Justice.

This case presents a certified question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan regarding whether the scope of wrongful death damages under Idaho law goes beyond loss of support damages to include loss of inheritance, loss of net accumulation and/or loss of earnings.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Roy and Verna Marie Raymond were killed in a plane crash in Monroe County, Michigan en route to Detroit Metropolitan Airport on January 9, 1997. This is a wrongful death action brought on behalf of their heirs ("the heirs") against Comair, the airline with whom Roy and Verna Marie Raymond were traveling at the time of their deaths, Delta, a part owner and associated airlines with Comair, and Empresa Brasilerira de Aeronautica, S.A. d/b/a Embraer, the manufacturer of the EMB-120 that crashed. The suit was originally brought in the 11th Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida. The case was transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. This case comes before the Court on the Court's acceptance of a certified question. The question was certified by Hon. John Feikens of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, on March 6, 2000. This Court issued an Order on May 16, 2000, accepting Certification of one issue.

II.

CERTIFIED QUESTION

Under Idaho's Wrongful Death Act and all related case and statutory law, are economic damages limited to the loss of support received or reasonably anticipated during the life of the decedent, or do they also include damages for the loss of anticipated inheritance the claimants may have received after the natural death of the decedent, and/or the loss of the net accumulation of the decedent, and/or loss of earnings of the decedent?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

United States courts may submit to the Idaho Supreme Court a certified question of law as to which there is no controlling precedent among the decisions of the Court. I.A.R. 12.1. Here, the certified question turns upon interpretation of I.C. § 5-311. This is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. See Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216, (1999); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997).

IV.

DISCUSSION

The heirs of Roy and Verna Marie Raymond urge this Court to extend Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute to allow damages for loss of anticipated inheritance, and/or loss of net accumulation, and/or loss of earnings of the decedent. These three theories of damages are generally a measure of the present value of the future additions the decedent would have made to the estate had he or she not died prematurely. Whether damages for anticipated inheritance, net accumulation, or loss of earnings should be allowed under I.C. § 5-311 is a case of first impression in Idaho.

Idaho Code § 5-311 provides:

1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against such other person, or in the case of his or her death, his or her personal representative. In every action under this section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be just.

The precise issue we are presented with is whether the statutory language "such damages may be given as under all circumstances of the case as may be just" permits evidence of damages in the form of future additions to the estate. When construing a statute, the focus of this Court is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Adamson, 133 Idaho at 605, 990 P.2d at 1216. In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, this Court, in addition to examining the literal words of the statute, will also consider the public policy and legislative history of the statute. Id. A further aid to our construction is the application of a statute, "especially where the public relies on that application over a long period of time." State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho at 733, 947 P.2d at 406.

Idaho's Wrongful Death Act was adopted in 1881 and the statute "as originally enacted, has remained virtually intact for over one hundred years." Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 922, 821 P.2d 973, 977-78 (1991). As noted above, the language of I.C. § 5-311 "places but one restriction on the amount which may be recovered. That restriction is to be found in this language: `such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just.'" Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 245, 130 P.2d 859, 862 (1942)(emphasis in original). For the past century, Idaho courts have followed a loss of support theory of damages. This theory measures damages as the loss to the survivors of what the decedent would have contributed to them in the form of support if he or she had lived. Following this theory, our earliest cases define "just" damages to include recovery for loss of companionship, protection, bodily care, intellectual culture, and moral training "providing it sufficiently appears that pecuniary damages resulted from such loss." Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789, 796, 285 P. 676, 678 (1930). See also, Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942). Proof of damages under this section includes "[e]vidence relating to the nurture bestowed, and revealing the intellectual powers and moral character of the person ... must be introduced to show the extent of what would have been supplied by the deceased had he lived, and, by reason of his death, need now be bought and paid for." Hepp, 64 Idaho at 251, 130 P.2d at 865 (citing Sipes v. Michigan C.R. Co., 231 Mich. 404, 204 N.W. 84, 85 (1925)). Similarly, damages available under I.C. § 5-311 for the death of a child have been defined as "contributions which the parents might reasonably have expected to receive from the earnings of the deceased during minority and/or the comfort, society and companionship that the deceased would have afforded to the parents." See Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 573, 651 P.2d 11, 14 (1982) (citations omitted). Our most recent cases continue to follow the loss of support theory of damages. For example, in Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 821 P.2d 973 (1991), this Court upheld the lower court's decision not to allow proof of plaintiff's remarriage as a consideration of the damages that are just under "all the circumstances," stating that:

The true question is: What had these plaintiffs the right to expect to receive from the parent during his life? And for the loss of this they are to be compensated. What they got after his death does not enter into the case. The loss spoken of is the taking away of that which they were receiving, and would have received had he lived. It is the destruction of their expectations in this regard that the law deals with and for which it furnishes compensation.

Westfall, 120 Idaho at 923,821 P.2d at 978 (quoting Stahler v. Philadelphia Ry. Co., 199 Pa. 383, 49 A. 273 (1901)). The heirs focus on one small portion of this quoted language and argue allowing recovery for what would have been received "had he lived" would include net accumulations, earnings and inheritance. They argue it is the loss of the net earnings and accumulations to the estate had Roy and Verna Marie Raymond lived, which their heirs are entitled to recover. We disagree. The quoted language in Westfall once again delineates the longstanding interpretation of our statute that damages for wrongful death are measured by the support the survivors would have received, had the decedent lived. Although the hundred-year application of I.C. § 5-311 would not necessarily preclude us from expanding the definition of what damages are just, our longstanding interpretation aids in our construction of the statute where the legislature, the public, and the courts have relied on this application of the statute for over a century. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc.,130 Idaho at 733,947 P.2d at 406.1 Based on our interpretation of legislative intent, the policy underlying damages in a wrongful death action, and the highly speculative nature of these damages, we are not persuaded our interpretation of "just" damages under I.C. § 5-311 should be expanded to include loss of inheritance, net income and accumulation damages.

A. Legislative history reflects loss of support theory of damages.

In 1984 the Idaho legislature repealed I.C. § 5-311 and reenacted another § 5-311 for the purpose of correcting a legislative oversight created in enacting a new code of probate procedure. Westfall, 120 Idaho at...

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