Volk v. Baldazo
Decision Date | 27 August 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 13533,13533 |
Citation | 103 Idaho 570,651 P.2d 11 |
Parties | Teresa Marie VOLK and Leslie K. Volk, husband and wife, and Frank Volk and Rebecca Volk, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Fidel BALDAZO, Kathy Dean Shultz and Dean W. Shultz, Defendants-Respondents. Fidel BALDAZO, Cross-Claimant, v. Kathy Dean SHULTZ and Dean W. Shultz, Cross-Defendants. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
William J. Brauner, Caldwell, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael G. Brady, Boise, for defendant-respondent, Baldazo.
William J. Russell, Robert M. Tyler, Jr., Jeffrey L. Supinger, of Elam, Burke, Evans, Boyd & Koontz, Boise, and Ronald P. Rainey, of Alexanderson, Davis, Rainey & Whitney, and Gary E. Radke, Caldwell, for defendants-respondents, Shultz.
Jeffrey Robert White, Washington, D. C., and Jon J. Shindurling, of May, May, Sudweeks, Shindurling & Stubbs, Twin Falls, for amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
This appeal is from a partial summary judgment granted defendants on the ground that plaintiffs-appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court order granting partial summary judgment was certified for appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). The sole issue presented is whether an action for the wrongful death of a viable yet unborn fetus states a claim upon which relief can be granted under our wrongful death statute. We reverse and hold that a claim is stated.
At this procedural juncture the allegations of the complaint are considered as true. Walenta v. Mark Means Co., 87 Idaho 543, 394 P.2d 329 (1964). The complaint alleged that on September 13, 1977, plaintiff-appellant, Teresa Marie Volk, was approximately nine months pregnant and would give birth within two weeks. She had experienced no complications during the pregnancy. On September 13, 1977, she was driving an automobile owned by Frank and Rebecca Volk when she was injured in an accident involving a truck driven by defendant-respondent Fidel Baldazo and an automobile driven by defendant-respondent Kathy Dean Shultz, and owned by Dean W. Shultz. It is alleged that the Volk unborn fetus died within minutes of the accident and approximately eleven hours thereafter, was stillborn.
This action was filed for personal injuries suffered by Mrs. Volk, for damage to the automobile she was driving and for the wrongful death of the viable, unborn fetus. The Volks' claim for the wrongful death of the fetus was the subject of the partial summary judgment on the basis of the trial court's holding that a viable, unborn fetus is neither a "person" within the meaning of I.C. § 5-311 nor a "child" within the meaning of I.C. § 5-310.
I.C. § 5-310 provides:
I.C. § 5-311 provides:
The trial court reasoned that the legislature utilized the term "person" as controlling in both I.C. §§ 5-310 and 5-311 and that I.C. § 32-102 provided particular direction as to whether the legislature intended that a fetus be included within the meaning of the term "person". I.C. § 32-102 provides:
Therefore, the court concluded that "a viable fetus, i.e., a fetus capable of sustaining life independent of the mother, is considered a 'person' only if it is born alive" and that under the circumstances alleged in the complaint the Volks' failed to state a cause of action for wrongful death upon which relief could be granted.
We note that the instant circumstances present a number of questions which are of first impression in Idaho, and hence a unique opportunity to clarify the law of Idaho as it pertains to the narrow area presented by these unusual circumstances.
As a predicate to a wrongful death action for the death of a child, this Court has consistently required that the child would have been able to maintain an action for injury if death had not ensued. The recognition of such a cause of action, although it serves as a predicate for wrongful death recovery, is to be decided under the common law of torts and is not controlled by legislative intent. See e.g., White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Evans v. Olsen, 550 P.2d 924 (Okl.1976); Seattle First National Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash.2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962). The great majority of jurisdictions have permitted the cause of action on behalf of a child who sustained prenatal injuries and was subsequently born alive. See Annotation, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971). The United States Supreme Court noted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62, 93 S.Ct. 705, 730-31, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973):
(Footnotes and citations omitted.)
The Restatement of Torts (Second) § 869 (1979) states the rule:
" § 869. Harm to Unborn Children
(1) One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the child for the harm if the child is born alive.
(2) If the child is not born alive, there is no liability unless the applicable wrongful death statute so provides."
The comment to subsection (1), states that liability:
Based on what we deem to be the modern trend and the clear weight of authority, we hold that in Idaho a cause of action will lie on behalf of a viable child who sustains prenatal injuries, but is subsequently born alive. Our holding is limited to the instant circumstances where it is alleged that the fetus was viable at the time of injury. We intimate no view, and reserve for another time any view, on whether such a cause of action will lie on behalf of a child for such negligence committed prior to its conception. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Meade-Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) ( ). Likewise we state no opinion today as to the existence of a cause of action for injuries to a fetus subsequent to conception but prior to viability. See e.g., Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 [103 Idaho 573] A.2d 108, 110 (1958) (fetus is a separate organism from the time of conception).
Hence we hold that if the Volk child had survived the injuries, it would have been able to pursue a cause of action on its own behalf for any injury sustained subsequent to viability.
We now turn to a consideration of the defendants-respondents assertions that although a cause of action may have existed in the Volk child if born alive, and hence in its parents, nevertheless, our wrongful death statutes do not contemplate such a cause of action in the parents of a viable fetus sustaining injuries from which it dies and hence is not born alive. Our statutes pertaining to wrongful death actions are in derogation of the common law rule forbidding such action, Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980); Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944), and must be construed "liberally ... to effect their objects and to promote justice." I.C. § 73-102(1); Gavica v. Hanson, supra. We are required under principles of statutory construction to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d 318 (1971), and such legislative intent may be implied from a statute's language or inferred on grounds of policy or reasonableness, Gavica v. Hanson, supra; Summers v. Dooley, supra.
We deem it well settled that statutes authorizing actions for wrongful death are remedial in nature, designed to alleviate the harsh rule of common law that if an injured person died, his cause of action ceased to exist. Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital, 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (1980). The actions authorized by I.C. §§ 5-310 and 5-311 are not actions arising from the "surviving" rights of a decedent, Russell v. Cox, supra, but rather are compensatory in...
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