Pfeifer v. Lever Bros. Co., Civ. No. H-86-377.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-86-377.
• Citation: 693 F. Supp. 358
• Parties: Robert Richey PFEIFER, Plaintiff, v. LEVER BROTHERS COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

693 F. Supp. 358

Robert Richey PFEIFER, Plaintiff, v. LEVER BROTHERS COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. No. H-86-377.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

July 7, 1987.

Charles Lee Nutt, Clements & Nutt, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Russell H. Gardner, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALEXANDER HARVEY, II, Chief Judge.

Presently before the Court in this civil action is defendant's motion for summary judgment. Various other motions are also pending, but as a result of the Court's ruling herein, it is not necessary to address any of these other matters.¹

In this case, Robert Richey Pfeifer (hereinafter "Pfeifer"), plaintiff, has brought suit against defendant Lever Brothers Company (hereinafter "Lever Bros."), alleging that Lever Bros. terminated his employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. At the time of his termination, Pfeifer was 50 years of age, and he held the position of plant engineering manager at defendant's Baltimore plant. While plaintiff has withdrawn his claim for reinstatement, he seeks an award of back pay, front pay, attorneys' fees, and other relief under the ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Both parties have submitted voluminous memoranda with attached exhibits in support of and in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. In addition, the parties have taken two lengthy depositions, the transcripts of which have been filed herein and reviewed by the Court. Both sides have clearly availed themselves of the opportunity to conduct ample discovery.²

After a review of the ample record here, this Court has concluded that no hearing is necessary for a decision on this motion. See Local Rule 6. For the reasons to be stated herein, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I Facts

The facts relevant to the motion before the Court are as follows. Plaintiff was hired by Lever Bros. in 1977 for the position of plant engineering manager at its Baltimore plant, which is devoted to the manufacture of soap and detergent. At or about the time of plaintiff's termination, the Baltimore plant was organized in eight separate departments, the manager of each of which (including plaintiff) reported directly to the overall plant manager. The function of the plant engineering department was to procure and maintain the machinery and equipment used in the plant's production processes in the most efficient and economical manner. The engineering department was also responsible for the plant's utilities and sanitation, and for the lion's share of facilities maintenance.

As manager of the engineering department, Pfeifer oversaw its operations and was responsible for efforts undertaken to ensure compliance with applicable environmental regulations. Indicative of the scope of Pfeifer's duties is the fact that at the time of his termination the engineering department was staffed by approximately 160 individuals, including 30 salaried or managerial employees, of whom 11 were engineers. The budget for Pfeifer's department in 1983 exceeded $12.3 million. Plaintiff in addition oversaw a supplemental $7 million budget for major capital projects initiated by Lever Bros.' corporate headquarters. At the time of his termination, Pfeifer received an annual salary of $51,700, which was larger than the salary of any other department manager at the Baltimore plant.

For several years prior to plaintiff's discharge, Lever Bros. had been dissatisfied with the operating results of its Baltimore plant. For example, in 1983 the plant operated at a deficit of $2.8 million. As a result of these severe losses, Lever Bros. in mid-November of 1983 asked for and received the resignation of the overall plant manager, Robert Farmer (hereinafter "Farmer"). Farmer had worked for Lever Bros. since 1977, had hired Pfeifer and had been plaintiff's immediate supervisor for the entire time of Pfeifer's employment at Lever Bros. Plaintiff was very loyal to Farmer and had been comfortable with Farmer's relaxed management style, which mirrored his own.

Upon Farmer's forced resignation, James Vaka (hereinafter "Vaka"), assumed the duties of plant manager. Vaka was 46 years old at this time, and he had been employed at Lever Bros. for over 25 years. As became immediately apparent, Vaka's approach to management differed drastically from Farmer's. Unlike Farmer, Vaka was not interested in the minutia of his subordinates' jobs. Instead, Vaka's focus was on the bottom line, to the near exclusion of almost everything else. At his deposition, Pfeifer candidly admitted that Vaka's assumption of the position of plant manager required "some major adjustments on the part of a lot of people," and that he personally found it difficult to keep up with Vaka's expectations.

From the very start of Vaka's tenure, Pfeifer's deficiencies as a manager were recognized and documented. On a Saturday preceding the official assumption of his duties in November of 1983, Vaka toured the plant with plaintiff and other department heads. Vaka expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the damaged and dilapidated condition of certain facilities and equipment which were subject to plaintiff's control. Numerous safety hazards, including exposed asbestos and hundreds of open electrical conduits, were pointed out. Vaka in addition noted large quantities of unused scrapped equipment discarded in an open-air junkyard, on the roofs of buildings, and in various other locations throughout the plant. These piles of junked equipment indicated to Vaka that Pfeifer was both inattentive to simple maintenance and unwise in his selection of equipment.

Following assumption by Vaka of his official duties as plant manager, further deficiencies in plaintiff's job performance came to Vaka's attention. In late 1983, Vaka asked Pfeifer to prepare a status report of engineering projects budgeted at $50,000 or more. Pfeifer's report indicated ten or more major engineering projects that were overspent, incomplete or behind schedule. It also come to Vaka's attention that the engineering department had failed on numerous occasions to obtain proper authorization for its purchases. Vaka further noted that plaintiff's department had exercised inadequate supervision over outside contractors. On several occasions, Vaka verbally warned Pfeifer concerning these deficiencies, and in a written memorandum dated December 22, 1983, Vaka explicitly advised Pfeifer that he was responsible for the performance of his department and that plaintiff's continued unsatisfactory performance would not be tolerated in 1984.

The new year, however, did not bring about any substantial improvement in Pfeifer's performance. In a memorandum dated November 19, 1983, Vaka had directed Pfeifer to prepare a snow removal plan for the Baltimore plant. Pfeifer's "plan" did not work when the first snowfall occurred, and failed even more drastically during a second and more severe snowfall in early 1984. On January 23, 1984, Pfeifer submitted his year end summary of his 1983 department goals. This report glossed over or ignored the deficiencies which Vaka had noted in the engineering department's performance. In a conference held on January 24, 1984, Vaka criticized plaintiff both for his inadequate and factually incorrect report and for his continued substandard managerial performance.

Also on January 24, Vaka issued a written memorandum confirming and documenting his criticisms of Pfeifer's report and performance. In this memorandum, Vaka specifically noted one poorly engineered project which was incomplete and which almost certainly would exceed its budget, remarking:

This is another example of poor management by you and your staff and it is obvious that no one checks the numbers, both dollars and engineering calculations. I must hold you accountable as manager of this fiasco. As I have stated to you on several occasions, this type of performance is not acceptable and will not be tolerated.

Vaka also observed that "there is obviously a lack of control by you and your staff in the maintenance area, as well as the general engineering area," and Vaka specifically advised Pfeifer's that his performance had not improved appreciably despite the multiple warnings he had already received.

Vaka's estimation of plaintiff's managerial abilities reached its nadir on February 1, 1984 when Pfeifer submitted six change orders for work done by outside contractors which had been completed weeks before without prior authorization and budget approval. Under company policy, change orders were required to be submitted well before the contractor's work commenced. This incident, along with several others,³ led to Vaka's decision to terminate Pfeifer's employment on February 7, 1984.

Vaka selected Thomas Dougherty (hereinafter "Dougherty") as the new manger of the engineering department. Dougherty was 33 years of age at the time and had five years of increasingly responsible experience in engineering management with Lever Bros. Vaka was favorably impressed with Dougherty's skills as a result of their having worked together previously at the Lever Bros. plant in Hammond, Indiana. Dougherty was holding a managerial position at Lever Bros.' corporate offices in New York when Vaka requested his transfer to the Baltimore plant. Dougherty's starting salary as plant engineering manager of the Baltimore plant was higher than Pfiefer's final and highest salary in that same position.

II Summary Judgment Principles

In its motion for summary judgment, defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot prevail on this record on the claim he has here asserted under the ADEA. It is well settled that a defendant moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), F.R.Civ.P.; Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1...