Pfeiffer, In re

• Decision Date: 29 July 1968
• Docket Number: Cr. 6970
• Citation: 264 Cal.App.2d 470,70 Cal.Rptr. 831
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re Steven D. PFEIFFER, on Habeas Corpus.

Page 831

70 Cal.Rptr. 831

264 Cal.App.2d 470

In re Steven D. PFEIFFER, on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 6970.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

July 29, 1968.

Walter J. Robinson, III, San Francisco, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., of California, Derald E. Granberg, Don Jacobson, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

Steven Pfeiffer, a state prison inmate, has petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus.

Pfeiffer reached his 17th birthday July 11, 1958. Three weeks later he, with Howard Reagan, also 17 years old, and Edward Murphy, 18 years of age, committed an armed robbery of a motel in Merced County. They were thereafter arrested for that crime. At the time of the robbery and arrest Pfeiffer and Reagan were parolees from the California Youth Authority, to which each had been committed as an 'incorrigible.' They were referred to the juvenile court where they did not waive, and were not represented by, counsel. The juvenile court found Pfeiffer and Reagan to be unfit for consideration under the procedure of that court and waived jurisdiction over them. They were accordingly remanded for prosecution under the general criminal law. In the superior court each of the three defendants pleaded guilty to first degree robbery and was sentenced to the state prison for an indeterminate period of from five years to life. (See Pen.Code, §§ 211, 211a, 213.)

On December 29, 1963, Pfeiffer, without force or violence, escaped from a facility of the Department of Corrections in San Bernardino County. Six days later he perpetrated an armed robbery of a service station in Los Angeles, taking around $100. He then went to New York City, where he was steadily employed until January 1965. He next traveled to Peru, where he became a teacher for the North American-Peruvian Cultural Institute. In Peru he married a girl who has borne him a child.

In December of 1965, Pfeiffer, having been traced to Peru, was arrested and returned to the United States. In Los Angeles he was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, the robbery which followed his escape. Because of his earlier 1958 robbery conviction Pfeiffer appeared ineligible for consideration for probation. On his arraignment for judgment the court stated the following:

'Mr. Pfeiffer, it is unfortunate that I am not in a position to grant probation, because the probation report reflects that during the period of time during which you have been an escapee, you have become rehabilitated. Since your escape occurred in another county, this county has no control over the matter; and even if there were there would be serious questions of public policy whether it could be overlooked. But I am not going to make a finding on the priors because I want the Adult Authority to have a free hand in fixing the total of your sentence. * * * It will be the judgment of the Court that the defendant shall be sentenced to the State Prison for the term prescribed by law. Defendant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Los Angeles County for delivery to the Director of Corrections at the Reception Center at Chino, California. This sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence to which the defendant is subject by reason of his prior conviction for robbery for which he was sentenced on April 30, 1962 (sic). That's about all I can do for you, sir. Good luck to you.'

Pfeiffer was then taken to San Bernardino County where he was charged with escape from a state prison. (Pen.Code, § 4530, subd. (b).) He pleaded guilty to that charge. Again he appeared to be ineligible for probation because of the 1958 robbery. In a report of the probation officer we find the following comment: 'Mr. Pfeiffer was seemingly able to rehabilitate himself to a certain degree after his escape. This is indicated by his establishing of a stable life in Peru and discarding his negative behavior patterns. It would appear that he has adequately demonstrated his ability to be a productive, responsible citizen. ( ) In view of the defendant's demonstrated ability to become rehabilitated, this officer believes a certain amount of consideration by the court is warranted. Mr. Pfeiffer is returning to State Prison as an escapee with a subsequent offense. It would seem that the Adult Authority will take this into consideration as well as Mr. Pfeiffer's apparent rehabilitation when he applies for parole. A concurrent sentence would give the Parole Board maximum leeway in establishing a parole date. This officer strongly feels that such a sentence in this case is warranted and justified.' Pfeiffer was then sentenced to state prison for the escape.

In July 1965, Howard Reagan, Pfeiffer's accomplice in the 1958 Merced County robbery, petitioned the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that he was not afforded the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution in the Merced County proceedings. A hearing was held in which the State of California was represented by its Attorney General.

The evidence at Reagan's hearing, among other things, disclosed the following. At the juvenile court proceedings, including the point at which that court waived its jurisdiction and remanded defendants for prosecution under the general criminal law, defendants were not represented by counsel. ¹ There had been no waiver of counsel. Upon their remand to the superior court for criminal prosecution an attorney was appointed to represent them. It was indicated that counsel held no interview with any defendant, at least prior to the day set for the preliminary examination. On that day preliminary examination was waived and the defendants were held for trial before the superior court. Still represented by the same attorney, they were arraigned before the superior court on September 15, 1958. The reading of the information was waived and each of the defendants pleaded guilty to the charge of robbery. The court announced, 'Let the matter be referred to the Probation Officer for report and recommendation, returnable October 3, 1958.' ² Counsel then indicated his inability to be present on that day because of a Bar Association meeting. The court stated, 'I want the probation officer's report.' Counsel, asked if he knew 'any of the background of this case' in which the probation officer would be interested, answered 'No, I do not.' The defendants then expressed a desire to 'waive this and get our sentence now.' Counsel thereupon pointed out to the court 'the offense alleged is armed robbery with a deadly weapon.' Asked by the court, 'There is no chance for probation?' he replied, 'No, there is not.' A moment later the court stated to the prisoners, 'Under the offense (with) which you have been charged here, there is no chance for probation.' Counsel made no response, apparently believing, as did the court, that the defendants were ineligible for probation as a matter of law. In fact, each of the defendants was eligible for probation. ³ Moreover, each of the defendants was eligible for commitment to the California Youth Authority. The court then accepted the waiver by each defendant of a probation officer's report and of the statutory delay for imposition of sentence. (Pen.Code, § 1191.) The court thereupon indicated an intent to sentence each defendant to state prison. Counsel made no effort to secure lesser penalties, be pronounced?' replied, 'None of which cause appearing why sentence should not be pronounced?' replied, 'None of which I have any knowledge.' Each of the defendants was thereupon sentenced to state prison.

Following the sentencing of the defendants, defense counsel stated that he had just examined his records and that he believed it should be called to the court's attention that 'Two of them are 17 years of age at the present time.' The following then occurred: 'THE COURT: All right. I think sending them to the California Medical Facility, ⁴ which is an adjunct of the State Penal System, it has the authority and the right to transfer them to any place of incarceration (sic). Is that correct, Mr. (Probation Officer)? (PROBATION OFFICER): That is correct. THE COURT: It works both ways, the Youth Authority can send them to San Quentin, and San Quentin can send them to Youth Authority. That will be the order of the court. That is all.' Counsel remained silent, although regardless of such custodial transfers, the defendants' prison sentences would be for a maximum term of life (Pen.Code, § 213) while on commitment to the Youth Authority they would ordinarily be discharged not later than at age 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1771, 1780.) The entire proceedings from arraignment through sentence took but a few minutes.

The district court concluded that the representation afforded Reagan Throughout the 1958 proceedings was 'constitutionally inadequate.' ⁵ It adjudged Reagan's imprisonment to be unlawful and ordered him discharged from custody. On appeal from that decision the United States Court of Appeals affirmed, stating: 'Since appellee did not have adequate representation in the state court proceeding, it is quite clear this his conviction and sentence did not meet the requirements of the federal constitution. (Citation.) ( ) The District Court ordered that appellee be discharged from custody. In the usual case of the granting of such petitions, the order has been conditional, directing discharge unless, within a specified or a reasonable time, appropriate state authorities afford to the state prisoner an opportunity to replead with constitutional irregularities corrected. In this case, however, the appellee, at age 17, enjoyed California legal rights which were incident to his youth. These rights have gone with the passage of time and are irretrievable. Under these circumstances, the District Court made the proper disposition, and its order is Affirmed.' (Wilson v. Reagan, 9 Cir., 354...