Pfingsten v. Westenhaver

• Citation: 244 P.2d 395,39 Cal.2d 12
• Parties: PFINGSTEN v. WESTENHAVER et al. L. A. 22263.
• Decision Date: 13 May 1952
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

Page 395

244 P.2d 395

39 Cal.2d 12

PFINGSTEN v. WESTENHAVER et al.

L. A. 22263.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

May 13, 1952.

Early, Maslach, Foran & Tyler, George Maslach, Donald J. Pierr and John B. Connolly, all of Los Angeles, for appellant.

Daniel E. Farr, W. T. Stockman and Richard R. Roe, all of Los Angeles, for respondent.

EDMONDS, Justice.

The appeal of the administrator is from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action for damages to property occasioned by the collision of an automobile and a tractor pulling a trailer. The principal questions presented for decision concern the asserted negligence of the driver of the automobile, its ownership, and the amount of damages recoverable by Pfingsten if the liability of the estate of Mrs. Adams is established.

The only evidence as to the manner in which the collision occurred was presented by the deposition of John De Groote, who testified as a witness for Pfingsten. On the evening of the accident, De Groote said, he was driving south at 38 miles per hour on a highway in Iowa. The road was covered with ice. The automobile in which Mrs. Adams and her son were riding passed his approximately three-fourths of a mile north of a bridge. It was then traveling about 40 to 50 miles per hour. After the Adams car passed, De Groote slowed down somewhat because the road was icy.

Pfingsten's tractor-trailer combination, traveling north on the same highway, was then approaching the southern and of the bridge. Pfingsten dimmed his headlights for the on-coming automobiles. Shortly before the collision, De Groote observed the Adams automobile on its right side of the highway 'until they used their brake lights.' From the position of its headlights, the Pfingsten tractor-trailer also appeared to be on its right side of the road.

At the moment of impact, De Groote was about 400 to 500 feet north of the point of collision. He saw the brake lights of the Adams car go on. Immediately thereafter, its headlight beam 'went up towards the southeast' and 'shone or hit the east side of the bridge.' This was 'just a few seconds before' the accident occurred. After that, all he saw was 'just a dark cloud.' He did not see the vehicles come together. 'There was no light at all there for a second.' The headlights of the tractor-trailer were not visible to him 'because the car was in front of it.'

The collision occurred at the north end of the bridge. After the 'cloud of dust', De Groote saw 'a truck and car coming towards me.' His automobile passed between the still moving vehicles, through the debris and stopped on the bridge. He did not apply his brakes 'because there was just a little bit of a ridge on the ice there' and he 'would have hit the bridge.' This ridge of ice 'threw a lot' of automobiles as they attempted to stop for the accident. After De Groote stopped, the Adams automobile was on the shoulder on the east side of the highway and the tractor-trailer was in the ditch to the west of the road. The wreckage had come to rest about 70 or 75 feet north of the bridge.

According to De Groote, the automobile was struck on its right side, just behind the motor. Pfingsten said it had been hit 'almost directly in the middle' of the right side, and was demolished. The impact upon the tractor was from the front, with slightly more damage to the right side than to the left. Pfingsten testified that after the collision his tractor had no value.

As to the ownership of the automobile, De Groote testified, 'I learned with the inquest we had that it was Mrs. Adams'.' Pfingsten told the jury that he examined the automobile after the accident and removed from the steering column a registration certificate bearing the name 'Mrs. Maidie Blanche Adams'. He did not remember whether the certificate was of white or pink color, nor did he recall whether there were one or two documents on the steering column. Westenhaver's counsel showed him a purported automobile registration certificate which bore the name of someone other than Mrs. Adams. Pfingsten said it could have been the certificate he saw in the automobile. This slip was admitted into evidence for the purposes of impeachment, but not 'for the truth of the matters contained on it.' There was no other evidence concerning ownership of the automobile.

Al Livak, from whom Pfingsten bought the tractor, testified by deposition. Besides selling trucks and automobiles, Livak conducted a mechanical and body repair service garage. He had seen Pfingsten's tractor 'within two weeks' prior to the date of the collision. In his opinion, at the time of the accident the tractor was worth 'about $3,700'; thereafter it had only salvage value.

Following the collision, Pfingsten was able to shut off the two rear compartments of his trailer, minimizing the loss of cargo through leakage. Of the 4,800 gallons of fuel oil in the tank at the time of the collision, he recovered 1,541 gallons by using another tractor-trailer unit at a cost of $50. He stated that he had to pay $335.60 for the oil which was lost.

The cost of towing the trailer to Omaha for repairs was $182. In addition, Pfingsten testified that the reasonable value of towing the tractor from the point of collision was $80.

As soon as he learned that his tractor was useless, Pfingsten placed three orders for a new tractor of the same make and attempted unsuccessfully to secure a tractor of another make. He was unable to obtain delivery of a new tractor until 89 days after the date of the collision. During this period he was not able to lease a tractor. He testified that the reasonable rental value of a tractor-trailer unit such as his was 20 to 25 cents per mile, which included approximately five cents per mile for fuel and depreciation. The rental was the same whether or not a driver was provided for the vehicle. Pfingsten averaged 300 miles per day, six days a week, with his equipment.

Upon this and other evidence, the jury returned a verdict for Pfingsten and assessed damages in the amount of $7,200. The appeal is from the judgment subsequently entered.

Westenhaver contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict, in that there is no substantial evidence of either negligence on the part of the driver of the automobile or of ownership of the automobile. Pfingsten's testimony as to the reasonable value of repairs to his trailer and other items of damage claimed by him was erroneously admitted, Westenhaver says, because Pfingsten did not qualify as an expert. Westenhaver also contends that evidence of damage to the trailer should not have been received because the condition of the trailer before the accident was not shown and there is nothing in the record upon which to base the jury's implied finding that the damages were caused by the accident. Evidence of loss of use of the tractor was improperly admitted, it is said, because under Iowa law a plaintiff may not recover for loss of use of property totally destroyed. He also takes the position that evidence of the rental value of a tractortrailer combination will not support an award for loss of use of the trailer alone. Other grounds relied upon are that certain instructions constituted reversible error.

Pfingsten, on the other hand, contends that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. He asserts that there was no error either in the admission of evidence or the instructions to the jury.

The law of the forum controls the rules of evidence, including the question of its sufficiency. Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 595; 15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, § 22, p. 955; cf. Estate of Winder, 98 Cal.App.2d 78, 84, 219 P.2d 18; see Sayles v. Peters, 11 Cal.App.2d 401, 407, 54 P.2d 94. Applying that principle, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict must be determined in accordance with the law of California.

If there is any evidence which sustains the implied finding of the jury, its determination is final. Skulte v. Ahern, 22 Cal.App.2d 460, 463, 71 P.2d 340; Kleem v. Chapot, 112 Cal.App. 553, 556, 297 P. 574. 'Where different conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the evidence by different minds the trial court's findings are not to be disturbed on appeal.' Connor v. Owen, 28 Cal.App.2d 591, 592-593, 82 P.2d 1114; Morris v. Fortier, 59 Cal.App.2d 132, 141, 138 P.2d 368.

The record in the present case includes undisputed evidence showing that the Adams automobile was traveling at a high rate of speed upon a treacherously icy highway. Brakes were applied under conditions conducive to skidding. The headlight beam of the automobile suddenly swung at an angle to the previous line of travel and the collision occurred. From such evidence, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the driver of the Adams automobile was negligent and that his negligence was the cause of the collision.

Upon the issue of liability, Westenhaver argues that the 'only uncontroverted evidence' of ownership was improperly admitted hearsay testimony by De Groote. But the record does not indicate that it was hearsay. De Groote testified from his own knowledge. Sec. 1845, Code Civ.Proc. How he acquired his knowledge does not appear. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly overruled Westenhaver's motion to strike the testimony. Even if it might be said to be hearsay, its admission was not prejudicial. Sanguinetti v. Pelligrini, 2 Cal.App. 294, 299, 83 P. 293.

Pfingsten's testimony concerning the registration slip which he saw in the automobile is said to have been impeached upon cross-examination. However, his credibility, and the weight to be given his testimony, was a question for the determination of the jury. Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal.2d 261, 267, 158 P.2d 3; Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 808, 814-815, 141 P.2d 732; Hershey v. Laswell, 63 Cal.App.2d 219, 222, 146 P.2d 509. His uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to establish the ownership of the automobile. Westenhaver presented no...