Pflaster v. Town Of Berryville

• Decision Date: 12 November 1931
• Citation: 161 S.E. 58
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: PFLASTER . v. TOWN OF BERRYVILLE.

161 S.E. 58

PFLASTER .

v.TOWN OF BERRYVILLE.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 12, 1931.

Error from Circuit Court, Clarke County.

George E. Pilaster was convicted of operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicants or narcotic drugs, in violation of an ordinance of the town of Berry-ville, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Argued before PRENTIS, C. J., and CAMPBELL, HUDGINS, GREGORY and BROWNING, JJ.

Charles C. Collins, of Washington, D. C, and J. Lynn Lucas, of Luray, for plaintiff in error.

Frank m. Wray, of Berryville, for defendant in error.

GREGORY, J.

The plaintiff in error was arrested on a warrant, wherein he was charged with operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicants or narcotic drugs. He was tried before the mayor of the town of Berryville and found guilty, and his punishment fixed at a fine of $110 and confinement in jail for sixty days, which jail sentence was suspended upon payment of the fine and costs.

He appealed from the judgment of the mayor to the circuit court, and there he was again found guilty, and his punishment fixed by a jury at a fine of $100 and confinement in jail for thirty days. He moved to set aside the verdict, but judgment was entered thereon by the court. He is here asking a review and reversal of that judgment.

Pflaster, the accused, was driving his automobile on Main street in the town of Berryville, and it collided with an automobile driven by Miss Luke. Immediately after the accident, he called the town sergeant, and, when the sergeant arrived, he noticed from the conduct and speech of the accused and the odor from his breath that he was under the influence of "liquor." Whereupon the sergeant arrested him and placed him in jail.

There are five assignments of error: First, that the verdict is contrary to the evidence; second, that the lower court erred in permitting the reputation of the accused to be shown; third, that the lower court erred in permitting the mayor to testify as to a certain admission made by the accused some fifteen or twenty minutes after the mayor's trial had been completed; fourth, that the prohibition ordinance of the town of Berryville is void; fifth, that the lower court should have discharged the jury after the attorney for the town in his opening statement had told the jury that the accused had been convicted in the mayor's court.

A discussion of the evidence in detail is unnecessary. It abundantly supports the verdict of the jury, and clearly convinces the impartial mind that the accused was operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicants as charged in the warrant. The sergeant's testimony, to the effect that the accused was under the influence of intoxicants, is corroborated by the testimony of a number of other witnesses. The trial court, in refusing to set aside the verdict on the ground that it was contrary to the evidence, committed no error.

In the discussion of the remaining assignments of error, we must bear in mind that the evidence in the case is sufficient to convince a reasonable man that the accused was guilty, and, unless he has pointed out some substantial and prejudicial error that has injuriously affected his rights, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. Errors which may have developed in the trial of the case of an unsubstantial nature, and which have not injured the accused, will be treated as harmless.

The second assignment of error is that the reputation of the accused as a violator of the prohibition laws was improperly admitted in the evidence. The record is so meager and imperfect that it is not possible to know whether any proper exception was taken to the ruling of the court on this point, or whether the town had adopted that section of the prohibition law which permits the reputation of an accused to be shown. But in any event, the guilt of the accused having been established by competent evidence, and the jury having properly so found and fixed his punishment at the minimum penalty prescribed for the offense, it necessarily follows that he was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence of his reputation as a violator of the prohibition laws.

Where the guilt of an accused has been established by competent and proper evidence, the law will not permit him to go unpunished simply because objectionable evidence was erroneously admitted by the trial court, and especially is this true where it further appears that the jury were not misled or improperly influenced thereby, and they have rendered the only verdict which they could have properly rendered under the evidence. Again the admission of improper evidence will not constitute reversible error when it appears that if such evidence had been excluded the result could not thereby have been changed. Hall v. Com., 143 Va. 554, 130 S. E. 416; Jarrell v. Com., 132 Va. 551, 110 S. E. 430.

It is assigned as error that the court permitted the mayor who tried the case to testify as to certain admissions made by the accused in the presence of the mayor about ten or fifteen minutes after the mayor's trial had been completed. The mayor's statement of this is as follows:

"I heard part of evidence night of 14th and finished night of 15th. Trial took place in my office. After trial all over and decision rendered and he had complied with judgment he volunteered the statement to me after asking all others to...