PG Publ'g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh

Decision Date30 November 2021
Docket NumberNo. 20-3475,20-3475
Citation19 F.4th 308
Parties PG PUBLISHING, INC., d/b/a Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Appellant v. The NEWSPAPER GUILD OF PITTSBURGH, Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO Local 38061
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Brian M. Hentosz, Terrence H. Murphy [ARGUED], Littler Mendelson, 625 Liberty Avenue, EQT Plaza, 26th Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Counsel for Appellant

Patrick K. Lemon, Joseph J. Pass [ARGUED], Joseph S. Pass, Jubelirer Pass & Intrieri, 219 Fort Pitt Boulevard, 1st Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Counsel for Appellee

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges

OPINION

SMITH, Chief Judge.

This appeal implicates procedural complexities at the intersection of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). In many labor disputes, both statutes provide means for seeking vacatur or confirmation of arbitration awards. But they differ in several ways. They employ distinct procedural vehicles, require litigants to meet different legal standards, and—as particularly important here—prescribe separate limitations periods.

In this case, PG Publishing, Inc. ("PG") seeks to vacate the labor arbitration award at issue in this dispute, invoking both the LMRA and the FAA. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (LMRA Section 301); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (FAA Section 10 ). PG contends that even if it filed its complaint outside of the applicable limitations period for an LMRA action, it filed within the FAA's 90-day limitations period for motions to vacate an arbitration award.

Although we agree that a party may bring both an LMRA action and a FAA motion challenging or confirming certain labor arbitration awards, we conclude here that PG did not proceed by motion as required by the FAA, and so did not properly invoke that statute. We further conclude that its LMRA Section 301 action was untimely.

The District Court properly dismissed PG's complaint as untimely, so we will affirm. In reaching our decision, we clarify the procedures for seeking to vacate or confirm an arbitration award under the LMRA and under the FAA.

I

We begin by comparing two procedural vehicles for seeking to vacate or confirm a labor arbitration award: civil actions, whether under LMRA Section 301 or otherwise,1 and motions under the FAA. We do so because many labor arbitrations fall within the ambits of both the LMRA2 and the FAA, including the arbitration at issue presented in this appeal.3 It follows that both civil actions under the LMRA and motions under the FAA are available for seeking vacatur or confirmation of certain labor arbitration awards. E.g., Teamsters Local 117 v. United Parcel Serv. , 966 F.3d 245, 248–50 (3d Cir. 2020) (involving a union's motion pursuant to FAA Section 9, 9 U.S.C. § 9, to confirm a labor arbitration award); see generally Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 111 v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. , 773 F.3d 1100, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding that Section 301 and the FAA are not "mutually exclusive" (citing Smart v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers , 315 F.3d 721, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2002) )).

Although parties can use both procedural vehicles to pursue review of arbitration awards in certain labor disputes, LMRA Section 301 actions and FAA motions produce distinct types of proceedings, prescribe different legal standards, and provide separate limitations periods.

A. Motions practice and summary proceedings under the FAA

Whereas LMRA complaints proceed as typical civil actions,4 applications to courts under the FAA take the form of motions unless otherwise "expressly provided" in the FAA itself. 9 U.S.C. § 6. Neither FAA Section 9, which provides for confirmation of arbitration awards, nor FAA Section 10, which provides for vacatur of arbitration awards, prescribe other procedures. We have held that applications to confirm an arbitration award under FAA Section 9 are to be made as motions. IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int'l Partners, LLC , 438 F.3d 298, 308 (3d Cir. 2006). Likewise, we hold here that applications to vacate an arbitration award under FAA Section 10 are also to be made as motions. See Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc. , 552 U.S. 576, 582, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008) (FAA applications for vacatur are motions); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes , 975 F.2d 1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); O.R. Secs. v. Pro. Planning Ass'n , 857 F.2d 742, 748 (11th Cir. 1988) (same).

Unlike civil actions under the LMRA, which are formal civil proceedings to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are fully applicable, FED. R. CIV. P. 1, FAA Section 9 motions to confirm an arbitration award are addressed through summary proceedings, which are shorn of certain formalities such as pleadings. Teamsters , 966 F.3d at 254.5 That is because FAA Section 9 "expressly provides for an ‘application’ for confirmation, does not instruct parties to file a complaint, and does not instruct the district court to carry on a formal judicial proceeding." Id. at 255 ("the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only to the extent procedures are not provided for under the FAA" (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(6)(B) )).

Although we have not previously considered whether motions to vacate result in summary proceedings, we are satisfied that our reasoning in Teamsters applies equally to FAA Section 10 motions to vacate an arbitration award.

Like FAA Section 9, FAA Section 10 provides that courts may vacate an arbitration award upon "application" of any party to the arbitration; does not instruct parties to file a complaint; and does not instruct the district court to carry on a formal judicial proceeding. 9 U.S.C § 10(a). And confirmation and vacatur of an arbitration award are simply opposite sides of the same FAA coin: "A court must confirm an arbitration award unless it is vacated, modified, or corrected." Hall St. , 552 U.S. at 582, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (cleaned up). Thus, we conclude that motions to vacate under FAA Section 10 also result in summary proceedings. Id. (noting that an application for confirmation, vacatur, modification, or correction of an arbitration award "will get streamlined treatment as a motion" (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 6, 9 – 11 )); see generally Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 27, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (proceedings under the FAA are meant to follow "summary and speedy procedures").6

B. Legal standards under FAA summary proceedings

Because FAA motions result in summary proceedings, and summary proceedings lack certain formalities such as pleadings, the pleading standards set forth in Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to FAA motions. IFC Interconsult , 438 F.3d at 308–09.7 This makes intuitive sense: The pleadings stage of a civil action serves as a gateway to discovery and to the discovery tools available under the Civil Rules. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). By contrast, the summary proceedings that result from an FAA motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award are "not intended to involve complex factual determinations, other than a determination of the limited statutory conditions for confirmation or grounds for refusal to confirm." Teamsters , 966 F.3d at 252 (quoting Zeiler v. Deitsch , 500 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) ); see also O.R. Secs. , 857 F.2d at 745 (rejecting contention that an FAA proceeding to vacate an arbitration award should "develop into full scale litigation, with the attendant discovery, motions, and perhaps trial"). A court can, within its discretion, decide an FAA motion without conducting a full hearing or taking additional evidence. Legion Ins. Co. v. Ins. Gen. Agency, Inc. , 822 F.2d 541, 542–43 (5th Cir. 1987) ("This case posed no factual issues that required the court, pursuant to the Arbitration Act, to delve beyond the documentary record of the arbitration and the award rendered.");8 accord Faberge , 23 F.3d at 46.

Whereas at the pleading stage of an LMRA Section 301 action, a plaintiff's factual allegations in its complaint to vacate an arbitration award are entitled to a liberal reading,9 a party moving to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to FAA Section 10 immediately bears the burden of proof. Gottdiener , 462 F.3d at 110 ; Egan Jones Ratings Co. v. Pruette , No. 16-mc-105, 2017 WL 345633, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2017) ; cf. O.R. Secs. , 857 F.2d at 745 (disagreeing that "the burden of dismissing" an FAA motion to vacate is "on the party defending the arbitration award"). There is thus a formal difference between the standards applicable to an LMRA Section 301 complaint and an FAA Section 10 motion, even if both are brought simultaneously by a single party to seek vacatur of the same arbitration award based on all of the same arguments. But in practice, that formal distinction may often be of little significance. It may well be the case that many LMRA Section 301 actions to vacate can be decided as a matter of law on the pleadings. E.g., Prospect CCMC, LLC v. CCNA/Pa. Ass'n of Staff Nurses and Allied Pros. , Misc. No. 18-174, Civ. Action No. 18-4039, 2019 WL 342713, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2019). ("As this matter seeks review of a labor arbitration award, there are no material issues of fact presented, but rather questions as to which party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.").

C. Statutes of limitations for FAA motions

LMRA Section 301 actions and FAA motions also draw different statutes of limitations. FAA motions are governed by the statutes of limitations set forth in the FAA itself. As relevant here, FAA Section 12 provides a 90-day limitations period for motions to vacate, modify, or correct an award.10 9 U.S.C. § 12.

By contrast, as a matter of federal law, "actions to vacate or confirm an arbitration award under Section 301 [are] governed by the relevant state statute of limitations." Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Office Ctr....

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Palmore v. Clarion Univ. of Pa.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • December 8, 2022
    ... ... litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc". , 704 ... F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) ...  \xC2" ... 2014)). See also PG Publ'g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild ... of Pittsburgh , 19 F.4th 308, 318 n.13 (3d ... ...
  • Palmore v. Clarion Univ. of Pa.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • December 8, 2022
    ... ... litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc". , 704 ... F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) ...  \xC2" ... 2014)). See also PG Publ'g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild ... of Pittsburgh , 19 F.4th 308, 318 n.13 (3d ... ...
  • Mathis v. Carney
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • January 6, 2023
    ... ... Crown Bay Marina, Inc". , 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir ... 2013) ...  \xC2" ... 2014)). See also PG Publ'g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild ... of Pittsburgh , 19 F.4th 308, 318 n.13 (3d ... ...
  • France v. Bernstein
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • August 9, 2022
    ...Cir. 2017).10 As the party moving to vacate, Bernstein "bears the burden of proof" on those points. PG Publ'g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh , 19 F.4th 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2021).A. There Was Fraud Perhaps the easiest conclusion in this case, even under a clear-and-convincing-evidence ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT