Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie

• Decision Date: 21 April 1902
• Docket Number: 326
• Parties: Philadelphia Ball Club, Limited, Appellant, v. Lajoie
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

51 A. 973

202 Pa. 210

Philadelphia Ball Club, Limited, Appellant, v. Lajoie

No. 326

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

April 21, 1902

Argued January 16, 1902

Appeal, No. 326, Jan. T., 1902, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. No. 5, Phila. Co., dismissing bill in equity in case of Philadelphia Ball Club, Limited, v. Napoleon Lajoie et al. Reversed.

Bill in equity for an injunction. Before RALSTON, J.

From the record it appeared that the defendant was employed by the plaintiff as a baseball player under a contract dated April 18, 1900, the material portions of which were as follows:

5. It is mutually agreed between the parties thereto, that if the said party of the second part shall, at any time during the said term of his employment as aforesaid, without the written consent of said party of the first part, or its assigns leave the service, or perform service or agree to perform, in the future, services for any other club or organization whatever, or if he shall be guilty of offering, agreeing conspiring or attempting to lose any game of ball, or if he shall be interested in any pool or wager thereon, he may be expelled by said party of the first part, or its assigns, from its club. Or, if said party of the first part, or its assigns, shall so elect, it may institute and prosecute proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction, either in law or equity, to obtain damages for any breach of this contract, or to enforce the specific performance thereof by the said party of the second part or to enjoin said party of the second part from performing services for any other person or organization, during the period of service herein contracted for, and nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent such remedy in the courts, in case of any breach of this agreement by said party of the second part, as said party of the first part, or its assigns, may elect to invoke.

17. It is further understood and agreed, that the party of the first part, or its assigns, may at any time after the beginning and prior to the completion of the period of this contract, give the party of the second part ten days' written notice of its option and intention to end and determine all its liabilities and obligations under this contract, in which event, upon the expiration of said ten days, all liabilities and obligations undertaken by said party of the first part, or its assigns, in this contract, shall at once cease and determine; the said party of the second part shall thereupon be also freed and discharged from his obligations hereunder, and shall have no claim for salary or other compensation for any period after said ten days. If such notice be given to the party of the second part while "abroad" with the club, he shall be entitled, at or before the expiration of said ten days, to his necessary traveling expenses to the city of Philadelphia. But if this contract shall be so ended and determined by said party of the first part, or its assigns, after the beginning and before the end of the term of employment under this contract, without any fault or neglect of duty on the part of the party of the second part, then the said party of the second part shall be entitled to salary or compensation at the contract rate for said ten days in addition to the sum earned and due, and unpaid to him at the time of the giving of notice of termination as aforesaid, whether during said ten days the party of the second part shall be required to perform services, or not, but he may be required to perform services under this contract, during said ten days, at the option of said party of the first part, or its assigns, without affecting the validity or force of such notice.

18. In consideration of the faithful performance of the conditions, covenants, undertakings and promises herein by the said party of the second part, inclusive of the concession of the options of release and renewals prescribed in the seventeenth and nineteenth paragraphs, the said party of the first part, for itself and its assigns, hereby agrees to pay to him for his services for said term, the sum of $2,400, payable as follows: in half monthly installments on the 1st and 15th of each month thereafter, during the period specified in paragraph two; unless the "nine" or team of the club should be "abroad," for the purpose of playing games, in which event the installments then falling due shall be paid on the first week day after the return "home" of the "nine" or team.

19. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed for the consideration above mentioned, that the party of the first part, or its assigns shall have the option or right to renew this contract with all its terms, provisions and conditions for another period of six months, beginning April 15, 1901, and for a similar period in two successive years thereafter, and the said party of the second part hereby agrees to perform similar services and be subject to all the obligations, duties and liabilities prescribed in this contract for the period or periods of such renewal or renewals, provided only that written notice of the exercise of such option of renewal be served upon the said party of the second part prior to the 15th day of October of the current year of this contract and of the current year of and renewal thereof.

The plaintiff renewed the contract for the year 1901. In the mean time defendant had signed a contract with the Philadelphia American League Base Ball Club. The qualifications of the defendant as a player are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The court below in an opinion by RALSTON, J., dismissed the bill.

Error assigned was in dismissing the bill.

The specifications of error are sustained, and the decree of the court below is reversed, and the bill is reinstated. And it is ordered that the record be remitted to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

John I. Rogers and John G. Johnson, for appellant. -- In view of the exceptional skill of the defendant, the injunction should have issued: Philadelphia Ball Club v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C.C. Rep. 57; American Assn. Base Ball Club of Kansas City v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C.C. Rep. 232; Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N.C. 393; 9 N.Y.S. 779; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union Buttonhole, etc., Co., 1 Holmes, 253.

The contract did not lack mutuality: Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449; Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. 516; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union Buttonhole, etc., Co., 1 Holmes, 253; Franklin Telegraph Co. v. Harrison, 145 U.S. 459; 12 S.Ct. Repr. 900; Van Dorn v. Robinson, 16 N.J. Eq. 256; Yerkes v. Richards, 153 Pa. 646.

Richard C. Dale, with him William J. Turner, for appellee. -- The decree should be affirmed because the contract between the appellant and the appellee Napoleon Lajoie, which is the foundation of this suit, is so lacking in mutuality as not to be enforceable by injunction: Wilson v. Clarke, 1 W. & S. 554; Martinsburg Bank v. Central Pa. Telephone, etc., Co., 150 Pa. 26; Crane v. Crane, 105 Fed. Repr. 869; Bickford v. Davis, 11 Fed. Repr. 549; Harrisburg Base Ball Club v. Athletic Assn., 8 Pa. C.C. Rep. 337; Philadelphia Base Ball Club v. Hallman, 20 Phila. 276; Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779; Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449; Patton v. Develin, 2 Phila. 103; Dornan's Est., 2 W.N.C. 522; Philips v. Mining & Mfg. Company, 7 Phila. 619; Bodine v. Glading, 21 Pa. 50; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335; Harrisburg Base Ball Club v. Athletic Assn., 8 Pa. C.C. Rep. 337.

The decree should be affirmed because the services of a baseball player are not unique, extraordinary, or of such a personal or intellectual character that their loss could not be substantially supplied by the similar services of some other baseball player: Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG. M. & G. 603; McCaull v. Braham, 16 Fed. Repr. 37; Daly v. Smith, 49 Howard's Pr. 150; Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6.

The decree of the lower court should be affirmed because-even if the services of a baseball player might, under certain circumstances, be so unique, personal and extraordinary as to admit of the remedy by injunction, yet it does not appear that the place of the appellee Lajoie in this case cannot be, at least substantially, supplied by other baseball players, or that the appellant has suffered any irreparable injury: American Assn. Base Ball Club v. Pickett, 20 Phila. 298; Philadelphia Base Ball Club v. Hallman, 20 Phila. 276; Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779; Metropolitan Exhibition Company v. Ewing, 42 Fed. Repr. 198; Carter v. Ferguson, 12 N.Y.S. 580; Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356; 20 A. Repr. 467; Jaccard Jewelry Co. v. O'Brien, 70 Mo.App. 432; Burney v. Ryle & Co., 91 Ga. 701; 17 S.E. Repr. 986.

The appellant's bill as a whole discloses no cause for equitable interference, because the injunction prayed for, if granted, would simply work a hardship to the appellees, without any particular benefit to the appellant: Oil Creek R.R. Co. v. Atlantic, etc., R.R. Co., 57 Pa. 72.

The decree in this case should be affirmed because the subject-matter of the controversy between the parties is passed and ended, and could not be affected by a reversal of the decree of the court below: Harper v. Roberts, 22 Pa. 194; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U.S. 696; 12 S.Ct. Repr. 103.

The decree of the lower court should be affirmed because the fifth paragraph of the contract between appellant and appellee Lajoie does not preclude the said appellee from setting up or the court from considering the defense of nonmutuality, or any other of the above-stated defenses to this proceeding: Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224; 12 S.Ct. Repr. 632.

Before McCOLLUM, C.J., MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.

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