Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Com., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1985
• Citation: 499 A.2d 294,508 Pa. 576
• Parties: PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. Appeal of HOUSING POLICE ASSOCIATION. 126 E.D. 1984 133 E.D. 1984
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 294

499 A.2d 294

508 Pa. 576

PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD, Appellant.

PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

Appeal of HOUSING POLICE ASSOCIATION.

126 E.D. 1984

133 E.D. 1984

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 15, 1985.

Decided Oct. 2, 1985.

James L. Crawford, Philadelphia, Miriam L. Gafni, Neal Goldstein, Michael Kleeman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Kenneth M. Jarin, Patrick Kelly, Miriam L. Gafni, Neal Goldstein, Michael Kleeman, James L. Crawford, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

At issue in the instant case is whether the Philadelphia Housing Authority (hereinafter "PHA") is a public employer under the terms of the Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. § 217.1 et seq. ("Act 111"). This question arises as a result of the contention of the Housing Police Association (hereinafter "HPA") that its members, the security officers employed by PHA, are covered by the provisions of Act 111.

Procedurally, this case arose as follows. On August 31, 1981, HPA filed a petition seeking to represent the officers employed by PHA pursuant to Act 111. HPA requested an expedited election in accordance with Section 7(c) of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, as amended, 43 P.S. § 211.1 et seq. (hereinafter "PLRA"), which requires the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "PLRB") to conduct, upon request, an election before determination of the appropriate unit. ¹ The election was held on October 2, 1981 and the ballots were impounded.

On December 22, 1981, a full hearing was held before the PLRB and on March 9, 1982, the hearing examiner issued an order determining appropriateness of the unit and directing canvassing and counting of impounded and challenged ballots. A nisi order of certification was issued on April 1, 1982, certifying HPA as the exclusive representative of the PHA security officers under Act 111.

Thereafter, PHA filed timely exceptions challenging the PLRB's legal conclusions that the officers are "policemen" under Act 111 and arguing that it is not an "employer" within the meaning of Act 111. These exceptions were dismissed in a final order of the PLRB. PHA then appealed to the Commonwealth Court. In an opinion by President Judge Crumlish, Jr., for the Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, that court reversed the PLRB on the ground that the PHA was neither the "Commonwealth" nor a "political subdivision of the Commonwealth" and therefore not an employer within the meaning of Act 111. 472 A.2d 1188. The PLRB and HPA were granted appeals by this Court pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 1112.

Appellants contend that the PHA is an agency of the Commonwealth and thereby a public employer within the meaning of Act 111, and the security officers it employs are "policemen" for the purposes of coverage under Act 111. Appellee responds by maintaining that these employees are governed by the Public Employee Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1101.301 et seq. (hereinafter "PERA"). At the heart of this issue is the interpretation of section 1 of Act 111 which provides:

Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of the Commonwealth or by the Commonwealth shall, through labor organizations or other representatives designated by fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.

43 P.S. § 217.1 (emphasis added).

The Commonwealth Court found that the security officers fell within the parameters of PERA because the definition of a "public employer" under PERA expressly includes the terms "agency" and "authority" ² whereas the Act 111 language in section 217.1, supra, is limited to "political subdivision of the Commonwealth" and "the Commonwealth." Appellants' contentions in challenging this result ignore the clear language of Act 111, and disregard the legislative intent.

In reviewing the result reached by the Commonwealth Court, our attention must initially focus upon the terms and plain meaning of the Act. Where the language of a statute is explicit and clear, it has been a long standing principle of this Court not to disturb the plain meaning of that language by resorting to the rules of statutory construction. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Hartlieb, 465 Pa. 249, 348 A.2d 746 (1975); Davis v. Sulcowe, 416 Pa. 138, 205 A.2d 89 (1964); In re Kritz' Estate, 387 Pa. 223, 127 A.2d 720 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 40 A.2d 30 (1945). A principle of statutory construction is only an aid in determining legislative intent and will not be permitted to change the clear meaning of a legislative mandate. Rich v. Meadville Part Theatre Corp., 360 Pa. 338, 62 A.2d 1 (1948). We therefore begin our analysis of Act 111 by first determining whether section 1 is clear and free of ambiguity as to the public employers included therein so as to alleviate the necessity to employ the principles of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent.

In Philadelphia Fire Officers Association v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, (hereinafter "Philadelphia Fire Officers Association ") 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977), this Court was presented with its first Act 111 interpretation problem. ³ In that case we examined the legislative background of Act 111 along with that of the PLRA and PERA. Act 111 and PERA address collective bargaining within the public sector of the Commonwealth. To focus upon the issues involved, it is necessary to review the legislative background that provided the setting for the enactment of Act 111. In Philadelphia Fire Officers Association, supra, we set forth that history which merits repetition here.

The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act ("PLRA"), June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, No. 294, 43 P.S. §§ 211.1-211.13, which created the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board and charged it with the specialized tasks of determining bargaining representatives and conducting hearings on unfair labor practice complaints, excluded from its definition of employers covered by the Act "the United States or the Commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal authority...." 43 P.S. § 211.3(c). While by virtue of the PLRA and its federal counterpart, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1973) collective bargaining became the order of the day in the private labor sector, such bargaining in the public sector was in 1937 and for almost thirty years thereafter considered against public policy. The Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, formerly 43 P.S. §§ 215.1-215.5 (now repealed), made strikes by public employees unlawful, provided that any public employee who struck terminated his employment, and established a grievance procedure. The statute, however, did not provide for bargaining on terms, working conditions or hours of employment, nor did it provide for the selection of a bargaining representative to represent a unit of public employees. The Act of 1947, in short, was not a collective bargaining statute.

In the late 1960's, legislative policy with respect to collective bargaining in the public sector began to change. In 1968, as is well known, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, faced with a recent history of strikes by police and fire personnel which the Act of 1947 was ineffective to prevent, enacted what is today commonly known as "Act No. 111." That Act provides generally for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public employers and, in the event of a bargaining impasse, for compulsory and binding arbitration with no right to strike....

Section 11 of Act No. 111 provides that "[a]ll acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed."

Two years later, the Legislature enacted a comprehensive statute governing collective bargaining in the public sector, the Public Employe Relations Act of 1970 ("PERA"), sometimes referred to as "Act 195." This Act, however, excluded from the definition of employees covered by the Act "those employes covered under the act of June 24, 1968 [Act No. 111], entitled 'An act specifically authorizing collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public employers ....' " 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2). A separate provision specifically preserved Act No. 111 from repeal. 43 P.S. § 1101.2002 (Supp. 1976-77).

Id. at 552-54, 369 A.2d at 260-61.

See also Township of Moon v. Police Officers of Township of Moon, --- Pa. ----, 498 A.2d 1305 (1985). It should be noted that both Act 111 and PERA evolved from the same Report and Recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Public Employe Law of Pennsylvania (hereinafter "Hickman Commission Report "), 1968 Govt.Empl.Rel.Rep. (BNA) No. 251, whose task it was to conduct a thorough examination of the entire spectrum of public employees and employers for the purpose of effectuating changes in the Pennsylvania Public Employee Anti-Strike Act of 1947, Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, 43 P.S. § 215.1 et seq. (repealed). The thrust of the Hickman Commission Report was that the discord in the field of public employment could be ameliorated by permitting collective bargaining. Hickman Commission Report, supra at E-2.

[Collective bargaining] opens the door to communication; without it an impasse commonly develops before either party has heard an explanation of the other's position. If a new statute did...