Phillips v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1931
• Docket Number: 13126.
• Citation: 158 S.E. 274,160 S.C. 323
• Parties: PHILLIPS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

158 S.E. 274

160 S.C. 323

PHILLIPS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. et al.

No. 13126.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 20, 1931

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Marion County; E. C Dennis, Judge.

Action by Ida Phillips against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Henry E. Davis, of Florence, and Lide & McCandlish, of Marion, for appellants.

H. E Yarboro, Jr., and J. C. Hooks, both of Mullins, and A. F Woods, of Marion, for respondent.

STABLER J.

This is an action in tort. The complaint alleges that at Chadbourn, N. C., on October 2, 1929, the plaintiff, with her three children of the ages of seven years, five years, and twenty months, respectively, boarded a regular passenger train of the defendant railway company, which was in charge of the defendant Gregg, as conductor, for the purpose of returning to her home in Mullins, S. C.; that she did not have sufficient time at Chadbourn to purchase tickets, but boarded the train expecting to pay the fare in cash; that shortly after the train left Chadbourn the conductor asked her for her tickets, but she informed him that she had not had time to purchase tickets and therefore desired to pay cash for the transportation; that thereupon the conductor asked her "in a violent, rude and angry manner if she did not know it was the law to buy tickets," and informed her that the fare would be $1.14 for her and $.65 for each of two of the children, to which she replied that the second child was only five years old, and that she had never previously been required to pay fare for a child of that age; that in reply the conductor "in a rude, angry and violent manner" told her that she would have to pay for the child in question; that she then stated to him that she was willing to pay if such was the law, but that she had always understood differently, and did not care to pay for the child until assured by the railway agent at Mullins that she ought to pay, in which event she would gladly pay the fare demanded; that she then offered him two $1 bills for the payment of fare, which he declined to receive, stating "in a loud, violent, rude, angry, disrespectful and insulting manner," in the presence of other persons occupying the coach, that she was not a lady or she would raise no question about the fare, and then went on his way through the train without taking the money tendered him; that she continued to hold the money, and a few minutes later the conductor approached her from the rear, reached over her shoulder, and rudely snatched the money from her hand, giving her one cent in change, and rudely stating that he had gotten the proper fare any way. The complaint further alleges that:

"Plaintiff was much unnerved, frightened, mortified and humiliated by the violent, disrespectful, insulting, willful, wanton and malicious conduct of the conductor of the defendant, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, as above described, and as a result thereof she then suffered and has continued to suffer great humiliation, mortification, nervous shock, mental distress, sickness and physical injury, to her damage in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, all of which was caused by the joint and concurrent acts of the defendants hereinbefore described."

The defendants filed separate answers, denying the material allegations of the complaint, and setting up as a defense that on the occasion referred to in the complaint the plaintiff was an interstate passenger under an interstate contract of carriage; that such contract is controlled exclusively by the tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and by the applicable principles of law as declared by the federal courts, and that under such tariffs and principles of law it was necessary and proper to require payment of fare on the part of plaintiff and her two children, one of whom was five and the other seven years of age. The defendant railway company set up as a further defense that on the occasion referred to in the complaint the plaintiff was an interstate passenger under an interstate contract of carriage; that such contract is controlled exclusively by the applicable principles of law as declared by the federal courts; and that hence the company was not liable for the alleged misconduct of its codefendant in manner or language.

At the close of plaintiff's testimony, the defendant company made a motion for a nonsuit on the ground that it appeared from the evidence offered by plaintiff that her suit grew out of a contract for transporting her by the railway company as a passenger in interstate commerce, and there was no proof sustaining her right to recover either actual or punitive damages from that defendant. The motion was refused, and, at the close of all the testimony, the company made a motion for a directed verdict on similar grounds. This motion also was refused, and the jury found for the plaintiff $200 actual damages and $300 punitive damages. Thereupon the defendants moved for a new trial on the ground that there was no proof of either actual or punitive damages. This motion also was denied.

The exceptions impute error to the trial Judge in refusing the motions for a nonsuit, for a directed verdict, and for a new trial, and in refusing to charge defendants' fourth request, as follows: "If you find from the evidence in this case that the plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, your verdict can include only actual damages, that is to say, such damages as will compensate her for the injury suffered by her, if any. She is not entitled under the law to what is called punitive or exemplary damages." The appeal centers around the question as to whether the rules of the federal courts or those of the state courts are applicable in the case. It seems to be conceded that the Congress of the United States has been given the paramount authority over commerce among the several states, but that, until Congress has exercised such authority, the states may legislate, notwithstanding such legislation may apply to an interstate carrier and have an incidental effect upon interstate commerce.

In Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319, 13 L.Ed. 996, the United States Supreme Court said: "The mere grant of such a power to Congress, did not imply a prohibition on the states to exercise the same power; that it is not the mere existence of such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the States, and that the States may legislate in the absence of congressional regulations."

And again in Penn. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 24 S.Ct. 132, 135, 48 L.Ed. 268: "It is well settled that the state may make valid enactments in the exercise of its legislative power to promote the welfare and convenience of its citizens, although in their operation they may have an effect upon interstate traffic."

And, commenting on a quotation from an earlier case (Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 18 S.Ct. 289, 42 L.Ed. 688):

" It is true that this language was used of a statute of Iowa enacting a rule of obligation for common carriers in that state. But the principle recognized is that, in the absence of Congressional legislation upon the subject, a state may require a common carrier, although in the execution of a contract for interstate carriage, to use great care and diligence in the carrying of passengers and transportation of goods, and to be liable for the whole loss resulting from negligence in the discharge of its duties.

"We can see no difference in the application of the principle based upon the manner in which the state requires this degree of care and responsibility, whether enacted into a statute or resulting from the rules of law enforced in the state courts."

In M. P. Railway Company v. Larabee Flour Mills Company, 211 U.S. 612, 29 S.Ct. 214, 217, 53 L.Ed. 352, the court refers to the "oft-repeated rule that the state, in the absence of express action by Congress may regulate many matters which indirectly affect interstate commerce, but which are for the comfort and convenience of its citizens," and adds: "Of the existence of such a rule there can be no question."

And, referring to the contention that the Congress, by creating the Interstate Commerce Commission and giving to it a large measure of control over interstate commerce, withdrew from the state all power in respect to regulations of a local character, said: "This proposition cannot be sustained. Until specific action by Congress or the Commission, the control of the state over these incidental matters remains undisturbed."

In Adams Express Company v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 149, 57 L.Ed. 314, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257, the court said:

"That the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign nations comprehends power to regulate contracts between the shipper and the carrier of an interstate shipment by defining the liability of the carrier for loss, delay, injury, or damage to such property, needs neither argument nor citation of authority.

"But it is equally well settled that until Congress has legislated upon the subject, the liability of such a carrier, exercising its calling within a particular state, although engaged in the business of interstate commerce, for loss or damage to such property, may be regulated by the law of the state. Such regulations would fall within that large class of regulations which it is competent for a state to make in the absence of legislation by Gongress, growing out of the territorial jurisdiction of the state over such carriers, and its duty and power to safeguard the general public against acts of misfeasance

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