Phillips v. Chase
| Citation | 201 Mass. 444,87 N.E. 755 |
| Parties | PHILLIPS et al. v. CHASE. |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1909 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Moorfield Storey and E. R. Thayer, for plaintiffs.
Robert M. Morse and J. H. Soliday, for respondent.
This is a petition for a revocation of a decree of the probate court for the adoption of De Forest Woodruff Chase by Jeannie P. Chase, then the wife of Dr Horace Chase. The adopted parent was nine years older than her adopted son, whose mother was the first wife of Dr Chase. It is the contention of the petitioners that the decree of adoption was obtained by fraud upon the probate court, through coercion and undue influence exercised upon Jeannie P. Chase by her husband, whereby she was induced to sign and prosecute the petition for adoption. The theory of the present petitioners, upon which the trial proceeded, is that Jeannie P. Phillips, afterwards Mrs. Chase, was possessed of a large amount of property, most of which was held for her benefit by two boards of trustees, under separate trusts; that Dr. Chase desired to get possession of her money and to use it for his own purposes, in speculation in stocks and otherwise; that almost from the beginning of their acquaintance he was planning to accomplish this result, and that he 'undertook to accomplish it by inducing her to marry him and to adopt his son, the adoption being a necessary step in carrying out the plan, because her property was held in trust upon such terms that he could not take it under her will or inherit it as her husband; that he was able to bring about the adoption only by undue influence, and by playing upon his wife's dread of another matrimonial scandal which she dared not face; that, through his position as physician and later as husband, he was able to exert and did exert a dominating and controlling influence over his wife, exercised when necessary with severity and cruelty, and that he continued to exert this influence until the end of their married life, and thereby prevented her from taking steps to avoid the adoption.' By the terms of each of the trusts the funds held by the trustees, except the income, were not subject to disposition by her, but on her decease were to pass to her heirs at law.
These issues were submitted to the jury:
To the first question they answered 'No,' and to the second they answered 'Yes.' Their verdict, which was in accordance with the finding of the probate court, was well warranted by the testimony, and there was ample evidence to sustain the theory, stated above, on which the petitioners' case was presented.
On the other hand, Dr. Chase, who had become the respondent as administrator of the estate of his son, De Forest W. Chase, who deceased after the petition was brought, testified at great length, and while a great deal was elicited from his testimony in cross-examination which tended strongly to support the theory of the petitioners, he said, in substance, that, apart from certain times when his wife was irresponsible and almost frenzied from a peculiar physical condition, they were happy together; that his conduct toward her through all the years of their married life was that of a devoted husband; that he married her only because he loved her; that his determination to marry her was not in the least affected by the fact that she had property; that never during his married life did he give his wife cause to say to him an unkind word; that, apart from occasions when she was more or less in a frenzied condition from her physical sufferings, their relations were always pleasant.
Early in the trial, upon a conference between the court and counsel, it became manifest that the respondent was likely to argue to the jury that the failure of Mrs. Chase to commence proceedings to obtain a revocation of the decree of adoption was strong evidence in contradiction of the claim of the petitioners. The relations of the husband and wife and their conduct toward each other through their whole acquaintance became important, as bearing upon the truth of the conflicting theories of the respective parties. Upon the petitioner's theory, marriage was only a part of Dr. Chase's general plan to get the benefit of Mrs. Chase's property. The plan and purpose continued as long as his wife lived, and an important part of it was to prevent her from taking proceedings to set aside the decree of adoption, and from furnishing evidence which might at some time be used by herself or others to thwart him in his purpose. Under these circumstances the conduct of Dr. Chase towards Mrs. Chase, from the time of his first acquaintance with her, which was four or five years before the adoption, and his conduct afterwards, through their whole married life, was competent for the consideration of the jury. The oral declarations of his wife and her writings touching the matters in dispute were competent under Rev. Laws, c. 175, §§ 66, 67. She having deceased, a wide latitude in the cross-examination of Dr. Chase was properly open in the discretion of the court.
The respondent excepted to the general course of the trial in these particulars, and the only exceptions in the case relate to the admission of evidence. We think it will serve no useful purpose to deal with the particulars of the very voluminous testimony, or with the special matters to which the respondent excepted as irrelevant. We have already intimated that the general course of the trial in these particulars was correct. When circumstantial evidence is largely relied upon to establish an issue, it is inevitable that many matters should be introduced which by themselves alone would be immaterial, although in connection with other evidence they may be helpful in discovering the truth. After a careful reading of all the evidence, we are of opinion that the respondent has shown no error in the admission of testimony.
An interesting question is raised by the respondent on the admission of the testimony of Mr. Chick, at one time an attorney of Mrs. Chase, in regard to an affidavit and will made by him for her, and certain communications, relative to the adoption, to be made by him to her brothers on her behalf, after her death. He testified, among other things that she told him to 'tell her brothers that the adoption was not her free act and deed, that it was brought about by ill treatment, coercion and duress on the part of her husband, and that she did not want it to stand. He prepared an affidavit for her which she signed and swore to before a notary, and a will in which she said, 'I now declare that said adoption was not made by me of my free will and choice, but was forced upon me by my husband by threats of abandonment, and I believe it was so forced upon me in order that said De Forest W. Chase might...
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