Phillips v. District Court In and For Second Judicial Dist.
| Decision Date | 16 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 27808,27808 |
| Parties | Eckley PHILLIPS and Melva Phillips, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT of the State of Colorado, and the Honorable Zita L. Weinshienk, One of the Judges Thereof, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Grant, McHendrie, Haines & Crouse, P. C., John G. Salmon, David A. Bottger, Denver, for petitioners.
Zita L. Weinshienk, pro se.
Walberg & Pryor, Thomas L. Roberts, Johnson & Mahoney, P. C., Dale S. Carpenter III, Denver, for respondents.
This is an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, in which the petitioners seek a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent district court from allowing discovery of certain expert medical reports written by the following physicians: Dr. John Sanidas, Dr. Lazarus Orkin, and Dr. Wagner Schorr. We issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. We now make the rule absolute as to the report of Dr. Sanidas and discharge the rule as to the reports of the remaining two physicians.
Petitioners in this proceeding are plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action in which they allege that plaintiff Eckley Phillips lost a kidney due to negligent treatment by defendants Drs. Green and Waggener.
On August 26, 1977, a hearing was held on the combined motion of the defendants seeking an order to produce medical reports prepared by Drs. Sanidas, Orkin, and Schorr. Previous to this point in time, plaintiffs and defendants had freely exchanged the reports of numerous medical experts the parties had employed to aid in preparation of their respective cases. In addition, as to Drs. Orkin and Schorr, whom the plaintiffs intended to call at trial, defendants were provided, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i), with a written notice of the nature and substance of the testimony each was expected to give. Dr. Sanidas was previously listed as an expert witness but his name was withdrawn from the list prior to the issuance of a final pretrial order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court judge ruled that plaintiffs must deliver to defendants all written reports prepared by plaintiffs' expert medical witnesses and consultants.
Initially, we note that matters relating to pretrial discovery are ordinarily within the trial court's discretion and are reviewable only by appeal rather than in an original proceeding. Chicago Cutlery Company v. District Court, Colo., 568 P.2d 464 (1977). However, where a gross abuse of discretion is shown and damage to the petitioners could not be cured by appeal, an original writ in the nature of prohibition may issue. See, Curtis, Inc. v. District Court, 186 Colo. 226, 526 P.2d 1335 (1974). We believe these conditions to be present here, at least with respect to that portion of the district court's ruling concerning the report of Dr. Sanidas.
The range of discovery in Colorado is quite broad and we have pointed out that discovery rules are to be liberally interpreted in order "to effectuate the full extent of their truth-seeking purpose." Cameron v. District Court, Colo., 565 P.2d 925, 928 (1977). In this context, it is axiomatic that a trial court enjoys a broad discretion with regard to resolution of motions pursuant to state and local rules of discovery. It is with these principles in mind that we must review the order of the district court in the instant case.
Plaintiffs have indicated that they intend to call Drs. Orkin and Schorr to testify as experts in their malpractice action against the defendants. This being the case, the disclosure of the reports which these doctors have prepared, is governed by the provisions of C.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A):
Plaintiffs have complied with part (i) of this subsection. However, while the rule permits the court to order further discovery by other means, plaintiffs argue that the district court in ordering them to surrender the reports of Drs. Orkin and Schorr went beyond the scope of the rule and abused its discretion. In support, plaintiffs urge that the "substantial need" requirement for discovery under Rule 26(b)(3) also applies to reports prepared by experts under 26(b)(4). Interpreting this rule in a manner consistent with the need for liberal discovery, we are unable to conclude that the trial court's discretion under 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) is limited by the "substantial need" requirement.
The provisions for discovery of trial preparation materials under Rule 26(b) (3) are made specifically subject to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4). Thus, the "substantial need" requirement for discovery of trial preparation materials in general is subject to differing standards which have been adopted for materials prepared by experts specifically. With respect to experts who will not testify, one must show "exceptional circumstances." C.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) (B). As to experts who will testify, the policy of the rule favors discovery, but the decision is ultimately left to the sound discretion of the trial court. C.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A). This in itself suggests a standard separate and distinct from that imposed in 26(b)(3). Of course, the trial court's discretion is not completely unfettered; the standards which normally guide appellate courts in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion are equally applicable in this situation. There is, however, no reason, in the context of 26(b)(4), to impose the additional requirement of "substantial need." Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's ordering the reports of Drs. Orkin and Schorr to be discoverable under C.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A).
We also find plaintiffs' contention that these reports are "privileged" under Rule 26(b)(3) to be without merit.
Dr. Sanidas was initially listed by the plaintiffs as a witness but was later...
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