Phillips v. Iowa

• Decision Date: 24 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. C00-0123-MWB.,C00-0123-MWB.
• Citation: 185 F.Supp.2d 992
• Parties: Michelle Sandra PHILLIPS, Petitioner, v. State of IOWA, Ken Burger, Superintendent, Mt. Pleasant Correctional Facility, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

185 F.Supp.2d 992

Michelle Sandra PHILLIPS, Petitioner, v. State of IOWA, Ken Burger, Superintendent, Mt. Pleasant Correctional Facility, Respondent.

No. C00-0123-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

January 24, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jon M. Kinnamon, Cedar Rapids, IA, for petitioner.

Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BENNETT, Chief Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................  995
                 II. DISCUSSION ..................................................................  995
                     A. Procedural And Factual Background ........................................  995
                     B. Standard Of Review .......................................................  996
                     C. Court's Role In Reviewing Habeas Petitions: The Requirements of
                § 2254(d)(1) .......................................................  997
                     D. Phillips's Claims ........................................................  998
                        1. Facial challenges on constitutionality of Iowa Code section 902.12 ....  998
                           a. Bill of attainder argument .........................................  998
                           b. Equal protection argument .......................................... 1005
                               i. Burden on fundamental rights argument .......................... 1006
                              ii. Arbitrary and capricious classification argument ............... 1006
                        2. As applied Eighth Amendment challenge: Cruel and unusual
                punishment .......................................................... 1014
                     E. Certificate Of Appealability ............................................. 1020
                III. CONCLUSION .................................................................. 1021
                

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, the petitioner, Michelle Sandra Phillips ("Phillips"), seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that her sentences for three counts of second-degree robbery are unconstitutional. After Phillips entered guilty pleas and was adjudged guilty on February 27, 2001 of three counts of second-degree robbery in Iowa state court, she was sentenced to serve three terms of imprisonment of up to ten years each, to run concurrently. Although Phillips was sentenced to indeterminate terms, Iowa's sentencing scheme requires her to serve 100 percent of her sentences, subject to a possible fifteen percent reduction for "good time." See Iowa Code §§ 902.12, 903A.2 (collectively known as "the eighty-five percent rule"). Thus, Phillips must serve a minimum of eight and one-half years imprisonment before she will be eligible for release.

In her petition, Phillips challenges the constitutionality of her imprisonment on three discrete grounds. First, she argues that Iowa Code section 902.12, which requires that certain offenders, including those convicted of second-degree robbery, serve one hundred percent of the mandatory maximum sentence, constitutes a bill of attainder because it alters the sentence imposed by the trial court without a hearing and removes the Iowa Parole Board's discretion in determining the actual length of an indeterminate sentence. Second, Phillips contends that the applicability of Iowa Code section 902.12 results in cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. She argues that this is so because the statute results in a punishment that is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime committed. And third, Phillips maintains that section 902.12, which enumerates those felonies subject to a one hundred percent mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, violates the Equal Protection Clause, because "[t]he list of forcible felonies contained in the statute are underinclusive and the statute excludes without a rational or legitimate basis other class `C' forcible felonies as well as some class `B' forcible felonies that have a higher classification than Petitioner's class `C' robbery offense." Pet.'s Br., at 12.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural And Factual Background

As Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss noted in the Report and Recommendation regarding Phillips's petition for habeas corpus, Phillips's petition presents pure questions of law; therefore, an exhaustive dissertation of the underlying facts of her conviction are unnecessary. Briefly put, Phillips pled guilty to three counts of second-degree robbery, in violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.3.¹ Upon accepting her guilty plea, the state court sentenced Phillips to three indeterminate terms of imprisonment, not to exceed ten years each, which were to run concurrently.

Phillips timely exhausted her state remedies, and this petition for habeas corpus was filed timely as well, on August 2, 2000. On June 21, 2001, Magistrate Judge Zoss filed a Report and Recommendation on Phillips's petition, in which he recommends judgment be entered in favor of the State and against Phillips. Phillips, however, filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on July 2, 2001, in which she sets forth eleven objections.

In her objections, Phillips, of course, disagrees with Judge Zoss's recommendation but primarily disagrees with his characterization of her arguments. Judge Zoss's characterization, however, obviously affected his analysis of Phillips's claims. Therefore, her objections go to the substance of Judge Zoss's recommendation, and the court will address each of Phillips's objections in turn. Nevertheless, it suffices to say for the present time that Phillips chiefly objects to Judge Zoss's description of her claims for habeas relief on the ground that she does not contend that her three indeterminate sentences not to exceed ten years are unconstitutional. Instead, she claims that the application of Iowa Code section 902.12 to her sentences effectively resulted in a new and separate sentence, without a judicial hearing, of a determinate ten year sentence. She contends that the Iowa Code allows only for indeterminate sentences, and by requiring that certain convicted felons serve 100 percent of the maximum allowable sentence, section 902.12 usurps the judiciary's role in sentencing defendants.

B. Standard Of Review

The standard of review to be applied by the district court to a Report and Recommendation of a magistrate judge is established by statute:

A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that it is reversible error for the district court to fail to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report when such review is required. See, e.g., Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 306 (8th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860, 117 S.Ct. 164, 136 L.Ed.2d 107 (1996); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir.1994)); Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995) (also citing Belk, 15 F.3d at 815). However, the plain language of the statute mandates de novo review only for "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Therefore, those portions of the proposed findings or recommendations contained in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which no objections are filed are reviewed only for "plain error." See Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir.1994) (reviewing factual findings for "plain error" when no objections to the magistrate judge's report were filed). Phillips has filed eleven objections to the Report and Recommendation, and the court, therefore, will undertake the necessary review of Judge Zoss's recommended disposition of Phillips's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

C. Court's Role In Reviewing Habeas Petitions: The Requirements of § 2254(d)(1)

Section 2254(d)(1) of Title 28, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, provides as follows:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), "for [a petitioner] to obtain federal habeas relief, he [or she] must first demonstrate that his case [or her case] satisfies the condition set by § 2254(d)(1)."

In Williams, the Supreme Court addressed the question of precisely what the "condition set by § 2254(d)(1)" requires. See id. at 374-90, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Part II of the minority decision); id. at 402-12, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Part II of the majority decision).² In the portion of the majority decision on this point, the majority summarized its conclusions as follows:

[Section] 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the...