Kidd v. Bruce, Case No. 03-3354-JWL (D. Kan. 2/13/2004), Case No. 03-3354-JWL.
| Decision Date | 13 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 03-3354-JWL. |
| Parties | A.J. KIDD, Plaintiff, v. L.E. BRUCE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
A.J. Kidd brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), alleging that he did not knowingly and intelligently enter into his plea agreement because his counsel miscalculated the potential length of his sentence. He also contends that this miscalculation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment.
After thoroughly reviewing the parties' motions, briefs and the underlying record, the court finds that the evidence clearly establishes that Mr. Kidd is entitled to no relief. In particular, the state court adjudicated Mr. Kidd's claim on the merits and found that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into the guilty plea, despite his mistaken belief regarding the length of the possible sentence. Mr. Kidd has failed to demonstrate that this decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling Federal Law. As such, the court denies his petition in its entirety.
On October 28, 1999, the State filed a complaint charging Mr. Kidd with attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery and aggravated intimidation of a witness. On January 3, 2000, Mr. Kidd pled guilty to the aggravated battery and criminal threat charges. During the plea colloquy, the state trial judge explained and Mr. Kidd acknowledged that the sentencing range on the aggravated battery charge was 38 to 172 months of incarceration. Similarly, the state trial judge explained and Mr. Kidd acknowledged that the sentencing range on the criminal threat charge was 5 to 17 months. When the judge asked Mr. Kidd if there were any other terms or conditions affecting the plea agreement that were not set forth in writing, Mr. Kidd indicated that there were none.
Mr. Kidd also submitted a document entitled "Tender of Plea of Guilty or No Contest." Therein, he stated that he fully understood that the court was not bound by any agreements made between the County Attorney and defense counsel concerning the sentence to be imposed in this case. He further stated that he understood that it was "the Court's responsibility, and the Court's alone, to determine the appropriate sentence in the matter." Mr. Kidd's counsel, Joseph A. Alien, signed and attached a certificate of counsel to the plea tender. In that document, Mr. Alien noted that he "made no promises to the defendant concerning any sentence which the Court may impose." In a written order accepting the plea agreement, the state court judge indicated that he had informed Mr. Kidd of the maximum penalty that could be imposed.
The judge ordered the probation office to prepare a pre-sentence investigation report. After receiving the report, Mr. Kidd filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on March 3, 2000. In his motion, he alleged that his counsel improperly advised him of the potential sentencing range under the plea agreement.
On April 4, 2000, the court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw. At that hearing, Mr. Alien explained that in advising Mr. Kidd as to his potential sentence, he relied on a pre-sentence report from a prior conviction in 1997. Unfortunately, that report either omitted or did not allow for conversion of several misdemeanor convictions that were included in the 2000 report. As a result, Mr. Alien advised Mr. Kidd that his criminal history would place him in category "C" under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, when in reality, petitioner's criminal history placed him in category "B." Mr. Alien further indicated that Mr. Kidd made it clear that he would enter the plea if he had a criminal history score of "C," but that he would not enter the agreement if his score was higher. As such, Mr. Alien concluded that Mr. Kidd had "grounds to believe that he was improperly advised." The court denied Mr. Kidd's motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to a controlling term of 144 months imprisonment.
Mr. Kidd appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. State v. Kidd, 43 P.3d 902, No. 86,492 (Kan. Ct. App. April 5, 2002). The state appellate court noted that Kansas common law has consistently held that where a trial court advises the defendant of his maximum sentence, his plea is knowing and voluntary, even if he holds a mistaken belief about his criminal history score or the length of his guideline sentence. Id. at 3. The appellate court found that, in this case, the trial court properly "informed Mr. Kidd of his potential maximum sentence, and, in fact, sentenced him within that range." Id. at 4. The appellate court also found that petitioner could not seriously blame his attorney for his own lapse of memory as to his prior convictions. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court denied review on June 13, 2002.
On August 2, 2002, Mr. Kidd filed a state habeas corpus petition pursuant to K.S.A. § 60-1507. On October 30, 2002, the state district court denied the pro se motion because Mr. Kidd raised the same claim that the Kansas Court of Appeals addressed on direct appeal. Mr. Kidd did not appeal the denial of his § 60-1507 motion to the Kansas Court of Appeals. Mr. Kidd filed his petition for federal habeas corpus relief on August 25, 2003.
Because Mr. Kidd "filed his habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") govern this appeal." Martinez v. Zavaras, 330 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The AEDPA "circumscribes a federal habeas court's review of a state-court decision." Anderson v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).
Specifically, where, as here, the Kansas Court of Appeals reviewed the merits of petitioner's claims, "habeas relief is not warranted unless the state adjudication `(1) . . . was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Martinez, 330 F.3d at 1262 (quoting § 2254(d)) (emphasis added). "Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the `unreasonable application' clause, the Court in Williams stressed that the relevant inquiry is not whether the state court's application of federal law was incorrect, but whether it was `objectively unreasonable.'" Anderson, 327 F.3d at 1153 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).
The court presumes "that factual determinations made by the state court are correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption with clear and convincing evidence." Martinez, 330 F.3d at 1262 (citing § 2254(e)(1); Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002)). "This presumption does not extend to legal determinations or to mixed questions of law and fact." Id. (citing Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2000)). "That is, the `deferential standard of review does not apply if the state court employed the wrong legal standard in deciding the merits of the federal issue.'" Id. (quoting Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003)). "Ultimately, our review of the state court's proceedings is quite limited, as section 2254(d) sets forth a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings." Anderson, 327 F.3d at 1152.
Mr. Kidd alleges that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea agreement because plea counsel (Mr. Alien) miscalculated his criminal history score and, as a result, inaccurately projected the length of his sentence. Mr. Kidd further alleges that this advice constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment.1
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). "The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is `whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).
The Supreme Court has not conclusively determined whether an attorney's miscalculation of a defendant's sentence violates substantive due process so as to invalidate a guilty plea. However, it has set forth a legal framework to guide the court's analysis of this issue. In Hill, 474 U.S. 52, petitioner claimed that his plea was involuntary as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney supplied him with information about parole eligibility that was erroneous. Id. at 56. The Court explained that where a "defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice `was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). As such, "a defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel `may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann'" Id. at 56-57 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). In the end, the...
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