Phillips v. Kijakazi

• Docket Number: C/A 0:22-3596-RMG-PJG
• Decision Date: 06 December 2023
• Parties: Jennifer L. Phillips,[1] Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

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Jennifer L. Phillips,^[1] Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

C/A No. 0:22-3596-RMG-PJG

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

December 6, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S DENIAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS

PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

[X] Affirm [ ] Reverse and Remand

This social security matter is before the court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.). The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying the plaintiff's claims for social security benefits.

Part I—Plaintiff seeks:

[ ] Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Plaintiff's age at filing:

[X] Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”): Date last insured: December 31, 2024

[ ] Other:

Application Dated: August 28, 2020

Plaintiff's Year of Birth: 1983

Plaintiff's alleged onset Dated: March 15, 2020

Part II—Social Security Disability Generally

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(5), and/or 42 U.S.C § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) and/or § 416.905(a); see also Blalock v Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973). The regulations generally require the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to consider five issues in sequence, as outlined below. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4) and/or § 416.920(a)(4). If the ALJ can make a determination that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process review does not proceed to the next step. Id.

A claimant has the initial burden of showing that he/she is unable to return to past relevant work because of his/her impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) and/or § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1983).

Part III—Administrative Proceedings

Date of ALJ Decision: March 29, 2022

In applying the requisite five-step sequential process, the ALJ found:

Step 1: Plaintiff was engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period:

[ ] Yes [X] No

Step 2: [X] Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:

[F]ibromyalgia; obesity; PTSD; depression; anxiety; ADHD; and neurocognitive disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

[ ] Plaintiff does not have a severe impairment.

Step 3: [X] Plaintiff's impairment(s) does/do not meet or medically equal a Listing. 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4: Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity is as follows:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can frequently reach, handle, and finger. She is limited to simple, routine tasks performed two hours at a time with only simple, work-related decisions and occasional changes in the work setting, but no fast-paced production rate work. Time off task is accommodated by normal breaks.

[ ] Plaintiff could return to his/her past relevant work.

Step 5: [ ] Plaintiff could not return to his/her past relevant work, but using the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines (“Grids”) as a framework supports a finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 2.

[X] Plaintiff could not return to his/her past relevant work, but there are jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, as follows:

Job Title

DOT Number

Exertion and Skill Level

Number of Jobs in the National Economy

Laundry Sorter

361.687-014

Light, SVP 2

130,000

Electrical Assembler

729.687-010

Light, SVP 2

30,000

Bench Assembler

706.684-042

Light, SVP 2

150,000

Date of Appeals Council decision: September 27, 2022

Part IV—Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings “are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court may review only whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence' to support the agency's factual determinations.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775.

Part V—Issues for Judicial Review

1. Did the Administrative Law Judge fail to assign proper weight to the opinions of Dr. Edward Booker and Dr. Robin Moody? [ ]

2. Did the Administrative Law Judge commit reversible error by (a) selectively extracting isolated evidence from the record which was unfavorable to Ms. Phillips rather than consider the entire record in context; (b) failing to liberally construe the Social Security Act in her favor; and (c) improperly interjecting his own medical opinion concerning the severity of Ms. [Phillip]'s impairments? []

(Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 16.)

Oral Argument:

[ ] Held on.

[X] Not necessary for recommendation.

Summary of Reasons

Although Plaintiff raises two issues for this judicial review, they both hinge on the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence, and therefore, the court addresses these issues together.

A claimant's residual functional capacity is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations” and is determined by assessing all of the relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing residual functional capacity, an ALJ should scrutinize “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Social Security Ruling 96-8p further requires an ALJ to reference the evidence supporting her conclusions with respect to a claimant's residual functional capacity. Further, “remand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)) (alterations in original); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016).

Here, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's evaluation of the opinion evidence from her treating physician, Dr. Edward Booker, and from a consultative examiner, Dr. Robin Moody. As to this evidence, the federal regulations were amended effective March 27, 2017 with regard to applications filed on or after March 27, 2017 to rescind the provision that a treating physician's opinion must be accorded controlling weight in certain circumstances. However, although the new regulations provide that the ALJ will no longer “give any specific evidentiary weight . . . to any medical opinion(s) . . . including those from [the claimant's] medical sources,” the ALJ is still directed to weigh them pursuant to the same factors previously provided for weighing opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. The ALJs are instructed to consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of the opinion evidence considering supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion. Id. Supportability and consistency are the most important factors to consider, and an ALJ must explain how these factors are considered.^[2] The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how the other factors are considered. Id.

Nonetheless the ALJ's reasons for finding the opinion of a medical...