Phillips v. Phillips, E2015-00407-COA-R3-CV

• Decision Date: 08 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. E2015-00407-COA-R3-CV,E2015-00407-COA-R3-CV
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals
• Parties: MELISSA A. PHILLIPS v. BURNS PHILLIPS, ET. AL.

MELISSA A. PHILLIPS v. BURNS PHILLIPS, ET. AL.

No. E2015-00407-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

August 27, 2015 Session

OCTOBER 8, 2015

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Cumberland County

No. 2014CH816

Hon. Ronald Thurman, Chancellor

This is an unemployment compensation case. The employee filed a claim for benefits following her termination from her employer. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development granted the claim. The Appeals Tribunal reversed the decision, finding that the employee was ineligible for benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A).¹ The Board of Review upheld the reversal. The employee filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court reversed the decision. The employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development appeal. We affirm the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andree S. Blumstein, Solicitor General, and Jason I. Coleman, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Burns Phillips, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development.

Scott Newton Brown, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Plateau Pediatrics, PLC.

Rachel M. Moses and Janet Mynatt, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Melissa A. Phillips.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Melissa A. Phillips ("Employee") worked for Plateau Pediatrics, PLC ("Employer") as a "back-up check-in and check-out receptionist" from February 10, 2010, through February 21, 2014, when she was discharged while on medical leave. Her medical leave began on October 16, 2013, when she underwent surgery on her shoulder. Her leave was extended after she underwent another surgery. On January 16, 2014, she notified Employer that her leave was projected to extend through April. On February 21, 2014, while Employee was still on medical leave, Employer advised her that it could no longer hold her position but that she would be considered for any opening that met her qualifications when she was released to resume work without restrictions.

On March 31, 2014, Employee was released by her doctor to resume work without restrictions. She did not advise Employer that she had been cleared for work. Instead, she applied for unemployment compensation that day with the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Agency"). The Agency initially determined that she was eligible for benefits and issued a decision, providing, in pertinent part,

[Employee] was forced to leave most recent work because of a health condition that was not work related. The record shows [Employee] contacted [Employer] to reapply for work when released without restrictions. [Employer] discharged [Employee] while under a doctor's care. Medical documentation verifies it was necessary to be absent until 3/31/14. [Employee] properly notified [Employer] of the need to leave work.

[Employee] has provided this agency medical evidence of the need to leave work and medical release to resume former duties. [Employee] contacted[Employer] to request reemployment as soon as again able to perform former duties. However former work was not available.

Since [Employee has met all of the medical provisions under [Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303] and work is not available with [Employer], the claim is approved as of [March 31, 2014].

Employer appealed the decision, arguing that Employee was ineligible for benefits because she failed to return and offer to work pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A). The Appeals Tribunal held a hearing by telephone, at which Employee and Employer's representatives, Villa Edwards and Susan Lankford, testified.

Employee testified that she maintained contact with Employer throughout her medical leave. She attended a meeting with Ms. Edwards in February 2014, after which she was told that "they would no longer be able to hold [her] position." Employer denied her request to postpone her separation until the following week when she was expected to receive an updated prognosis from her physician. She claimed that she was escorted to her office to retrieve her belongings and then "escorted out of the door."

Ms. Edwards testified that Employee was released because Employer experienced hardship due to her prolonged absence. She advised her that Employer would consider her for any opening that met her qualifications when Employee was able to resume work without restrictions. Neither Employee nor her physician advised Employer that Employee was released to resume work without restrictions. She claimed that the separation was amenable and that Employee was not instructed to retrieve her belongings. She explained that Employee chose to retrieve her belongings and that she and another receptionist assisted Employee, who was still recovering from surgery.

Ms. Lankford confirmed that Employee's work history was never in question. She explained that Employee was good at her job and that the patients loved her. She noted that Employee had missed work for extended periods in 2011 but that Employee's attendance had improved prior to her medical leave.

The Appeals Tribunal held that Employee was ineligible for benefits and liable for the overpayment of benefits, finding, in pertinent part, as follows:

The evidence establishes that [Employee] stopped working due to a non-work-related medical condition. She notified [Employer] as soon as she learned that she needed surgery; however, [Employee] failed to return to [Employer] and ask for her former job. [Employee] learned in February that [Employer] was no longer holding her job. Nevertheless, [TennesseeCode Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A)] requires that a claimant return to the employer and offer to work as soon as the claimant is able to work and to [perform his or her] former duties.

Employee appealed the decision to the Board of Review. The Board of Review adopted the Appeals Tribunal's findings of fact and conclusions of law but stated,

In appealing to the Commissioner's Designee, [Employee] argues that on February 19, 2014, she was escorted out of the building after she was discharged while she was on medical leave. It was not disputed that she was terminated, but she was terminated only after she initiated the separation. Under the circumstances, [Employee] is considered to have voluntarily quit for reasons not attributed to [Employer]; hence, she is disqualified under this section. At the same time she may qualify for benefits under the medical exception.

The Board of Review further found that she was ineligible for benefits pursuant to the medical exception, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A). In so finding, the Board of Review stated that [Employee] failed to establish that she was forced to leave work due to an illness or injury and that she was later denied employment after offering to resume work once released to perform her former job without restrictions. The Board of Review noted that Employee was not relieved of the obligation to offer to return to work even though she was involuntarily terminated.

Employee filed a petition to rehear. Following the denial of her petition, she filed a petition for judicial review with the chancery court, naming the Board of Review and Employer (collectively "Respondents") as respondents. The court reversed the denial of benefits, holding that "the administrative record [did] not contain substantial and material evidence, and a reasonable basis in law, to support the legal conclusion of the Commissioner's designee." The court stated, in pertinent part,

The voluntary quit disqualification provision of [Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A)] does not apply in a situation where the employee has been involuntarily terminated from employment. The medical exception described in that section only applies to separations under that (voluntary quit) disqualification section. It is prefaced by the statement that "[n]o disqualification shall be made under this section," if the claimant shows entitlement to the medical exception. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (emphasis added). This medical exception provides an alternative means for the unemployment compensation claimant to prevent voluntary quit disqualification, and allows her to become eligible whenemployment is lost after a period of absence due to medical incapacity. It operates only to prevent voluntary quit disqualification. It has no impact on eligibility under the discharge provision of [section 50-7-303(a)(2)]. It does not disqualify an eligible claimant where her discharge without misconduct happened to occur during her approved medical leave.

The court held that Employee's claim should have been evaluated under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(2)(A), which disqualifies claimants who have been discharged for misconduct. Finding no evidence to support a conclusion that Employee was discharged for misconduct, the court further found that the "decision denying unemployment compensation because [Employee] had allegedly voluntarily quit without good cause [wa]s erroneous as a matter of law." This timely appeal followed.

II. ISSUE

We restate the issue raised on appeal as follows:

Whether there is substantial and material evidence in the administrative record, and a reasonable basis in law, to support the Board of Review's decision that Claimant was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303(a)(1)(A).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Both the trial court and this court are obligated to apply the same standard in an appeal from an agency determination concerning unemployment compensation. Ford v. Traughber, 813 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991...