Phillips v. Town of Marblehead

• Decision Date: 04 January 1889
• Citation: 148 Mass. 326,19 N.E. 547
• Parties: PHILLIPS et al. v. TOWN OF MARBLEHEAD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

148 Mass. 326

19 N.E. 547

PHILLIPS et al. v. TOWN OF MARBLEHEAD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

January 4, 1889

January 4, 1889

HEADNOTES

COUNSEL

F.L Evans, for petitioners.

W.D Northend, for respondents.

OPINION

FIELD J.

Whether a person who is offered as a witness is shown to be qualified to give an opinion upon the value of land must be left largely to the discretion of the presiding judge. We cannot say, upon the evidence recited in the exceptions, that Mason was not rightly excluded as a witness to value. The case shows that there was no difficulty in obtaining witnesses whose qualifications were unquestioned, and this fact was properly considered by the presiding judge in deciding to exclude him. Tucker v. Railroad Co., 118 Mass. 548. It was also, we think, within the discretion of the presiding judge to admit the question which was put to Wyman by the respondents, on cross-examination, to which the petitioners objected. As Wyman's land was adjoining to and of the same general character as that of the petitioners, sales of it would be competent to prove the value of the petitioners' land, but the opinion of witnesses upon the value of Wyman's land would not be competent to prove the value of the petitioners' land. Wyman v. Railroad Co., 13 Metc. 316, 327; Shattuck v. Railroad Co., 6 Allen, 115. When therefore, the respondents asked the witness Wyman his opinion of the value of his own land, the question might have been excluded. The inquiry was immaterial and irrelevant, except, perhaps, for the purpose of testing the weight of the opinion of the witness as to value. The question, however, having been answered without objection, the respondents could not have been permitted to contradict the answer by the testimony of other witnesses, or by other evidence than the testimony of the witness himself. Immaterial or irrelevant issues cannot be raised and tried in this manner. Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293; Fletcher v. Railroad Co., 1 Allen, 9. But the extent to which the cross-examination of a witness as to credit may be carried must be left largely to the judge presiding at the trial, and if matters which are merely immaterial, or which tend to show the reasons of the witness for his opinions or his fairness of mind, are admitted in cross-examination, there is, as a general rule, no exception. Considerable latitude should be allowed in cross-examining witnesses to value, in order that the grounds of their opinion may appear. Prescott v. Ward, 10 Allen, 203; Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108.

The record of the board of selectmen, of whom Martin was one, was offered for the purpose of contradicting the testimony of Martin. The fact that the record or certificate was signed by Martin, as well as by...