Philogene v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 25 May 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 08–1399 (RC).
• Citation: 864 F.Supp.2d 127
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Hubert PHILOGENE, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.

864 F.Supp.2d 127

Hubert PHILOGENE, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 08–1399 (RC).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

May 25, 2012.

George A. Rose, The Rose Law Firm, LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Sarah L. Knapp, Attorney General's Office of the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, District Judge.

Granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiff brings suit against the District of Columbia and Sergeant Kenneth W. Mack, alleging that they improperly cited, arrested, and prosecuted him for operating a nightclub without a license. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants' conduct violated the common law and the U.S. Constitution. Because the plaintiff's factual allegations do not support a claim of municipal liability, the court will dismiss the plaintiff's constitutional claims against the District of Columbia. In addition, the court will dismiss the plaintiff's constitutional claims against Sergeant Mack because they are time-barred. Absent any viable federal claims, the court chooses not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's common-law claims. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From 2004 to 2007, the plaintiff operated a restaurant and nightclub in the District of Columbia called The Lime. Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 21] at 2. Sergeant Kenneth W. Mack, an officer with the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department, visited The Lime in early 2007 and asked to see the plaintiff's license or permits. Id. Over the next few months, Sergeant Mack issued the plaintiff several citations for operating The Lime as a public hall without a proper permit. Id. In July 2007, the plaintiff was arrested for the same offense. Id. at 3. He was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to five days in prison. Id.

In May 2008, the plaintiff filed suit against the District of Columbia in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and the defendant removed the plaintiff's action to this court. In May 2011, the plaintiff amended his complaint to name Sergeant Mack as an additional defendant.2d Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 16]. Now before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.¹See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mot.”) [Dkt. # 19].

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Court Grants the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

All that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require of a complaint is that it contain a “short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C.2000). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F.Supp.2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C.2010), nor must the plaintiff plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory, Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C.Cir.2000).

Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, id., nor must the court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

2. The Plaintiff Fails to State a § 1983 Claim Against the District of Columbia

The plaintiff alleges that the District of Columbia violated his constitutional rights, and he therefore seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipality, such as the District, is only liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees if a plaintiff can show that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; and (2) such deprivation was the result of a government policy or custom. Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C.Cir.2004); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Under § 1983, a plaintiff may not hold the District liable under a simple theory of respondeat superior. Burnett v. Sharma, 511 F.Supp.2d 136, 141 (D.D.C.2007).

Here, the plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Mack violated a number of his constitutional rights by citing and arresting him. See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20–33. Even if his allegations were sufficient to establish a predicate constitutional violation,² the plaintiff's claim founders on the second step of the inquiry. The plaintiff's second amended complaint does not articulate any specific allegations describing a government policy or custom behind Sergeant Mack's actions. Instead, the plaintiff summarily reiterates the elements of a claim for municipal liability under Monell.Id. ¶ 21 (“Consequently, while acting under color of District of Columbia law, the Defendant commenced to implement a policy, custom, usage or practice wherein the rights, privileges or immunities of the Plaintiff was violated.”). These formulaic and threadbare recitals of a cause of action are legally insufficient to shield the plaintiff's claim from a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Because the plaintiff has alleged no factual basis to support his claim of municipal liability, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim to relief against the District of Columbia. Id.; see also Creecy v. District of Columbia, 2011 WL 1195780, at *9 (D.D.C.2011) (holding that Iqbal requires dismissal of conclusory claims that individual officers' unconstitutional conduct gave rise to municipalliability); Trimble v. District of Columbia, 779 F.Supp.2d 54, 58–59 (D.D.C.2011) (same). Accordingly, the court will dismiss the plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia.

3. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against the District Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986

The plaintiff also brings claims against the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and § 1986, but these charges must be dismissed for the same reasons discussed above. Municipal liability under § 1985(3) must be predicated on an “official custom or policy,” which the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged. See Zherka v. City of New York, 459 Fed.Appx. 10, 11–12 (2d Cir.2012); Parrott v. District of Columbia, 1991 WL 126020, at *5 (D.D.C.1991) (concluding that “[e]ven if [the plaintiff's allegations] were true, there is no allegation that this discriminatory conspiracy was part of an official policy, and thus plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the district”). In the alternative, the court concludes that the plaintiff's factual allegations do not support plausible a claim to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that the defendants committed any acts in furtherance of a racially motivated conspiracy. Instead, he simply parrots the elements of a § 1985(3) claim. This naked assertion, wholly devoid of any factual enhancement, is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937;Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 688 (D.C.Cir.2009) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim under Iqbal because the plaintiff did not allege any facts other than the requisite elements of the legal claim).

Because a colorable claim under § 1985 is a prerequisite to a claim under § 1986, the plaintiff's § 1986 claim must also be dismissed. Burnett v. Sharma, 511 F.Supp.2d 136, 145 (D.D.C.2007) (“The language of [§ 1986] establishes unambiguously that a colorable claim under § 1985 is a prerequisite to stating an adequate claim ... under § 1986.”).

4. The Plaintiff's Claims Against Sergeant Mack Are Time–Barred

The plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Mack violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20–34. The defendants argue that these claims are time-barred. Defs.' Mot. at 4. To be precise, the defendants point out that Sergeant Mack was never served with the original complaint. Id. The defendants maintain that Sergeant Mack thus did not receive any notice of this lawsuit until May 2011, when he was served with the second amended complaint. Id. The defendants conclude that the plaintiff's claims are barred by D.C.'s three-year statute of limitations for constitutional torts. Id. The plaintiff counters that his amended pleadings are not barred by the statute of limitations because they relate back to the date of the original pleading. Pl.'s Opp'n at 8.

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 must be brought no more than one year after the cause of action accrues. Id. (“[N]o action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of...