Philpott v. Jones
| Decision Date | 14 April 1914 |
| Citation | 164 Iowa 730,146 N.W. 859 |
| Parties | PHILPOTT ET AL. v. JONES ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Des Moines County; W. S. Withrow, Judge.
Contest over the probating of a will. Affirmed.
Power & Power, of Burlington, for appellants.
Seerley & Clark, of Burlington, for appellees.
On February 20, 1912, there was filed in the district court of Des Moines county, Iowa, an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of W. E. Jones. Due notice of probate was given by the clerk of the court by publication, as required by section 3284 of the Code of 1897. No other or further notice was given. On the 15th day of April, 1912, Elsie Phillpot and Leila Brownfield, granddaughters of the testator, appeared and filed objections, alleging as a ground therefor that the said W. E. Jones, at the time of the execution of said instrument, was not competent to execute a valid will; that he lacked testamentary capacity. Upon the issue thus tendered, the cause was tried to the court and a jury. W. M. Jones, W. H. Myers, Mary E. Myers, Sarah Fie, and Ann Featherby appeared in said proceedings, as proponents, but filed no pleadings. The cause having been fully submitted to the jury, the jury returned a verdict for contestants, finding that the instrument offered as the last will and testament of W. E. Jones should not be admitted to probate. The jury further found, in answer to a special interrogatory propounded by the court, that the contestants had proven, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that, at the date of the execution of said instrument, W. E. Jones was not of sound mind. Thereafter, on the 30th day of November, 1912, proponents filed a motion for a new trial, which was, by the court, overruled. Thereupon the court entered an order refusing the probate of the instrument offered as the last will and testament of W. E. Jones, and proponents appeal.
The main contention of appellants in this case is that the evidence offered and submitted by contestants failed to overcome the presumption created by the due execution of the instrument offered for probate, and failed to establish want of testamentary capacity on the part of the said Jones. Second, that even if contestants' evidence did tend to show want of testamentary capacity, the rebuttal evidence offered by proponents preponderated, and that a preponderance of all the evidence clearly established testamentary capacity, on the part of the testator, at the time the instrument was executed.
[1] It is true that the burden of proof rests upon contestants to show want of testamentary capacity, for the law presumes that a party making a will has, at the time of the making of it, sufficient mental capacity to do so, and one who alleges to the contrary assumes the burden of proving his contention. When an instrument of this character is filed with the clerk for probate, and the formal execution of it is shown, where it is shown to have been duly executed and attested, as required by law, the burden shifts to the contestants. See Stephenson v. Stephenson, 62 Iowa, 166, 17 N. W. 456;Hull v. Hull, 117 Iowa, 744, 89 N. W. 979;Ross v. Ross, 140 Iowa, 51, 117 N. W. 1105;Beebe v. McFaul, 125 Iowa, 514, 101 N. W. 267.
[2][3] As to whether or not contestants have carried the burden to a successful issue is not a question which we are called upon to determine. This case is not triable de novo here. We are bound by the finding of the jury, who are triers of fact, if there is evidence supporting and sustaining their finding upon the ultimate question of testamentary capacity. Where reasonable minds, searching for the truth, might reasonably differ upon the record made as to what the ultimate fact is about which there is controversy,it is, and always must be, a question for the jury. Where the record presents a state of facts from which an ultimate conclusion must be drawn, and reasonable minds might differ as to what conclusion should be drawn from the ultimate facts proven, it then becomes a jury question.
[4] The ultimate fact here to be determined is, Did the testator in this instrument possess a mind that retained full knowledge of the property he possessed, an intelligent perception and understanding of the disposition he desired to make of it and the persons that he desired to be the recipients of his bounty, with capacity to recollect and comprehend the nature of the claims of those that are excluded from participating in his bounty, a mind capable of exercising judgment, reason, and deliberation, and capable of weighing the consequences of his will to a reasonable degree and the effect of it upon his estate and family, at the time of the execution of the will? It is not necessary that he be competent to make contracts or transact business generally, nor that the mind retain all the vigor and force incident to youth, or that which attends upon robust physical health, in order that he may have this capacity. The mere fact, standing alone, that a person is old, in feeble health, or that his memory does not possess the vigor of youth, or of earlier years, or the fact that he has excluded from his bounty some or all of his legal heirs, or that his mind has reached that uncertain stage that would render him incapable of making a contract, or engaging in complex or intricate business matters, will not, in and of themselves, defeat a will executed by him if, notwithstanding this, he retains sufficient mind to comprehend the natural objects of his bounty, the nature and extent of his estate, and the disposition he wishes to make of it, with the full appreciation of those whom he desires to be the recipients of his bounty. See Perkins v. Perkins, 116 Iowa, 253, 90 N. W. 55;In re Evans' Estate, 114 Iowa, 240, 86 N. W. 283;In re Allison's Estate, 105 Iowa, 130, 73 N. W. 489;Webber v. Sullivan, 58 Iowa, 260, 12 N. W. 319;Meeker v. Meeker, 74 Iowa, 352, 37 N. W. 773, 7 Am. St. Rep. 489.
In Re Estate of Allison, supra, this court said, in a case involving testamentary capacity:
[5] The condition of the human mind at any stage of human existence is difficult of proof; perhaps the most difficult of any with which courts and juries are compelled to deal. Mental unsoundness, whether resulting from old age or physical sickness, is so various in its character and so different in its manifestations that it is often difficult for the most experienced experts, after most careful and thorough investigation, to trace it to any sufficient cause, or define its extent or its effect upon the conduct of the individual. Even the most experienced alienists, with all the facts before them, touching the conduct of the individual concerning whose mental condition the investigation is instituted, are often found widely differing in their conclusions as to the then condition of the mind under consideration. It has been said that the fact that the testator transacted his own business, and to all outward appearances seemed to be of sane and sound mind to those with whom he came in contact in business or in a social way, while competent to be considered on the question of sanity, does not, of itself, conclusively establish sanity. Mental unsoundness may exist which would render a man incompetent to make a will, notwithstanding to all outward appearances he seems to be sane to those with whom he comes in casual contact, who are not experts upon the question.
We have examined this record with care for the purpose only of ascertaining whether or not in the record there is sufficient evidence upon which a jury might reasonably predicate a conclusion that this testator, at the time of the execution of the will, did not have that testamentary capacity which, under the rules generally adopted, was sufficient to enable him to make a binding will. It is difficult to lay down any rule sufficiently broad in its application and sufficiently comprehensive in its scope that it may serve as a certain guide in determining whether or not, in a particular instance, the testator had, or had not testamentary capacity, but, from the facts, as we gather them from a careful reading of this record, studied in the light of the rules laid down for guidance in matters of this kind, we can only reach the conclusion that the record presents a state of facts from which reasonable minds might reach different conclusions. We do, however, find that there is sufficient evidence to justify the jury in its finding as to the ultimate fact.
Proponents, however, contend that the court erred in the submission of the cause to the jury, to proponents' prejudice; that prejudicial errors were committed by the court in the trial and submission of the cause that entitled proponents to a retrial. We may not dispose of the errors complained of in the order of their assignment, but will endeavor to dispose of each in what appears to us to be the logical order of sequence.
[6] It appears that the court allowed the contestants to show their pecuniary condition at the time of the execution of the will. It appears that this testimony was admitted, subject to a showing that at the date of the execution of the will the decedent had knowledge of such condition, and it is complained that...
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