Phinney v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 29 July 1949
• Docket Number: 30965.
• Citation: 208 P.2d 879,34 Wn.2d 330
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: PHINNEY et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

208 P.2d 879

34 Wn.2d 330

PHINNEY et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

No. 30965.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 29, 1949

Department 2

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1949.

Action by Harvey Brown Phinney and Gladys Rose Phinney, husband and wife, against City of Seattle and others to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage as result of automobile collision at street intersection. Judgments for plaintiffs against City and City appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; James T. Lawler, judge.

A. C Van Soelen, Arthur Schramm, Seattle, for appellant.

Padden & Moriarty, Ivan Merrick, Jr., Seattle, for respondents.

GRADY Justice.

This action was brought by Harvey Brown Phinney and Gladys Rose Phinney, husband and wife, against The City of Seattle and Robert W. Bagshaw and Charlotte E. Bagshaw, husband and wife to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage as a result of an automobile collision at a street intersection in the city of Seattle. The case was tried Before the court and a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs against the city of Seattle. A judgment was entered upon the verdict and the city has taken this appeal.

At the time of the accident Delridge Way was an arterial highway within the limits of the city of Seattle and had been designated as such by city ordinance. This arterial highway ran approximately in a northerly and southerly direction and was intersected by West Orchard Street, which ran in an easterly and westerly direction. After the designation of Delridge Way as an arterial highway the appellant erected and maintained near the southwest corner of the intersection a sign requiring traffic on West Orchard Street to stop Before entering Delridge Way. For a period of thirteen days prior to the day of the accident, the stop sign was down and lying by the highway but hidden by tall grass and weeds. The respondents were driving their automobile east on West Orchard Street, and the defendants were driving their automobile south on Delridge Way. The two automobiles collided at the intersection of the two highways. The jury found by its verdict that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the appellant in the maintenance of the stop sign. The appeal is Before the court on an agreed statement of facts and the only questions presented are: (a) whether placing and maintaining a stop sign at a street intersection by and within a city is a governmental fuction, and (b) whether such city is liable in damages to the user of one of the streets who is injured because of the negligent failure to maintain such stop sign. Our answer to each question is in the affirmative.

Rem.Rev.Stat Vol. 7A, Sec. 6360-106, provides that cities shall have the power to determine and designate intersections of streets within their limits at which vehicles shall be required to stop Before entering such intersection. The act further provides:

'* * * and upon the determination and designation of such points at which vehicles will be required to come to a stop Before entering such intersection, the proper authorities so determining and designating shall cause to be posted and maintained proper signs of the standard design adopted by the director of highways indicating that such intersection has been so determined and designated and that vehicles entering the same are required to stop.'

By this statute the state has issued a direct command to its cities not only to post the stop signs but also to maintain them. As applied to the situation in this case the legislative purpose was to require the appellant to afford the users of Delridge Way protection by requiring the users of West Orchard Street to stop Before entering thereon, and thus have an opportunity to observe the traffic on Delridge Way, and also to warn users of West Orchard Street of the presence of a favored highway. In the absence of a statute a city would not be obligated to post or maintain any stop signs at street intersections, but if it does so of its own accord it performs a governmental function under its police power, and, according to the rule adopted by this court would not be liable in damages to users of the streets for its negligence in failing to maintain stop signs. Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152, 110 A.L.R. 1110, and cases cited; Crowley v. Raymond, 198 Wash. 432, 88 P.2d 858.

Rem.Rev.Stat Sec. 6362-41a gave the same authority to counties as Section 6360-106 gives to cities and that statute and Section 6308-3 made substantially the same command with reference to stop signs at highway intersections within such counties. In Lyle v. Fiorito and King County, 187 Wash. 537, 60 P.2d 709, this court considered the effect and application of Sections 6362-41a and 6308-3, which had been violated in substantially the same manner as Section 6360-106 was in this case. The statute did not in express terms give a right of action to any one injured because of the...