Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Purcell

• Decision Date: 22 February 1996
• Docket Number: CA-CV,No. 1,1
• Parties: PHOENIX NEWSPAPERS, INC., an Arizona corporation, d/b/a The Arizona Republic, and Judy Nichols, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Helen PURCELL, Maricopa County Recorder, a public officer, and Maricopa County, a public body; State of Arizona, a public body, Defendants-Appellees. 94-0223.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 340

927 P.2d 340

187 Ariz. 74

PHOENIX NEWSPAPERS, INC., an Arizona corporation, d/b/a The Arizona Republic, and Judy Nichols, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Helen PURCELL, Maricopa County Recorder, a public officer, and Maricopa County, a public body; State of Arizona, a public body, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 94-0223.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1, Department E.

Feb. 22, 1996.

Reconsideration Denied March 22, 1996.

Review Granted on Issue No. 3 and

Denied on Other Issues Nov. 19, 1996.

[187 Ariz. 76] Morrison & Hecker by James F. Henderson, Patricia A. Sallen, Phoenix, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Grant Woods, Arizona Attorney General by Anthony B. Ching, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for Defendant-Appellee State of Arizona.

OPINION

PATTERSON, Judge.

This appeal requires us to decide the constitutionality of Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") section 16-168(E). This section authorizes the Maricopa County Recorder's Office to provide voter registration lists for purposes provided under the statute and requires a fee for such use. We hold that section 16-168(E) does not violate equal protection or public policy, nor does it constitute special legislation. We therefore affirm the trial court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July, 1992, Judy Nichols, a reporter for Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. ("PNI"), requested a magnetic tape copy of the Maricopa County voter registration list ("list") from the County Recorder, Helen Purcell. The request noted that it would be used for non-commercial, PNI business.

Purcell responded that she could provide the list if PNI satisfied the requirements of section 16-168(E), which provides:

Precinct registers and other lists and information derived from registration forms may be used only for purposes relating to a political or political party activity, a political campaign or an election, for revising election district boundaries, or for any other purpose specifically authorized by law. The county recorder shall, upon a request for such use and within thirty days from receipt of such request, prepare additional copies of any precinct register and furnish them to any person requesting them upon payment of a fee equal to five cents for each name appearing on the register for a printed list and ten cents for each name for an electronic data medium, plus the cost of the blank computer tape or disc if furnished by the recorder, for each copy so furnished.

Purcell further wrote that since there were more than 1,140,000 registered voters in Maricopa County, the list would cost approximately $114,000 for a magnetic computer tape or $57,000 for a printed list.

An attorney for PNI responded to Purcell's letter stating that he believed section 16-168(E) to be unconstitutional. He also offered to pay $20 per hour for the computer time needed to copy the magnetic tape plus any costs for personnel time. A deputy county attorney responded to the letter declining the offer because the county recorder was bound by section 16-168(E).

PNI and Nichols (collectively "PNI") filed a complaint for special action against Purcell and Maricopa County seeking an order directing the County Recorder to provide copies of the lists at a reasonable cost. The trial court determined that although the voter registration lists were public records, access was not contravened by section 16-168(E).

PNI then amended the complaint to add the State of Arizona as a defendant. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Purcell and Maricopa County with prejudice. ¹ Thereafter, PNI filed for summary judgment arguing that section 16-168(E) contravened the policy of access and openness explicit in Arizona's public records laws, violated equal protection, and constituted special legislation.

The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing the constitutionality of section 16-168(E). The trial court granted the State's motion and denied PNI's motion for summary judgment. PNI filed a timely appeal from the trial court's judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Equal Protection

PNI first argues that section 16-168(E) violates Article 2, Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution. This section has been held to have the same effect as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Big D Const. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 163 Ariz. 560, 565-66, 789 P.2d 1061, 1066-67 (1990). We determine that its effect here is the same.

1. Standard of Review

We begin our analysis by noting that whenever the validity of a statute is questioned there is a strong presumption of constitutionality. Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 148, 800 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1990). Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged under the equal protection clause, "the legality of a particular classification depends on its character, the individuals affected, and the asserted government purpose." Big D Const., 163 Ariz. at 566, 789 P.2d at 1067.

The test to determine the nature of a classification involves a two-tiered analysis. Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Foundation, 130 Ariz. 550, 555, 637 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1981). If the statute is aimed at limiting a fundamental right, "we apply a test of strict scrutiny and we will uphold the statute only if it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. "Similarly, if the statute discriminates among individuals based on a 'suspect class,' it is also subjected to strict scrutiny." Id.

"If, however, the challenged statute does not impact upon a fundamental right or a suspect class, the statute will be upheld if it has any conceivable rational basis to further a legitimate governmental interest." Id. PNI does not argue that the right to obtain a copy of voter registration records is a fundamental right, nor does it argue that it affects a suspect class. We further note that PNI applies a rational basis standard in its analysis of the statute.

2. Rational Basis Test

For our review a rational basis test will be applied. This test "upholds legislative regulation which imposes burdens on one class but not another so long as (1) the court can find some legitimate state interest to be served by the legislation and (2) the facts permit the court to conclude that the legislative classification rationally furthers the state's legitimate interest." Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 78, 688 P.2d 961, 970-71 (1984); see also Big D, 163 Ariz. at 566, 789 P.2d at 1067. The party challenging the statute has the burden of establishing "that the legislature's classifications are purely arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose." Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F.Supp. 1270, 1279 (D.Ariz.1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931, 104 S.Ct. 1719, 80 L.Ed.2d 190 (1984).

a. Limitation on Uses of Voter Information

PNI first questions the requirement that information derived from the voter registration records shall be used only for purposes relating to political activity, campaigns or elections. PNI submits that no evidence has been offered to support the trial court's finding that a legitimate state interest is furthered by this statutory provision.

A court, under the rational basis test, may consider "either the actual basis on which the legislature acted or any hypothetical basis on which it might have acted." Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 173 Ariz. 342, 350, 842 P.2d 1355, 1363 (App.1992), (quoting Carr v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1330, 1334 (D.Ariz.1991)).

The State has not set forth any rational basis nor does the legislative history ² indicate any rationale behind limiting the use of voter registration information to political, campaign, and election purposes. We, however, perceive a basis upon which the legislature validly could have believed it was necessary to limit copies of voter registration information.

Section 16-168(E) protects registered voters from unwanted intrusions into their privacy caused by the wholesale distribution of registration information. Copies of the lists used for non-commercial purposes, unrelated to campaigns and elections, could lead to annoying situations for registered voters. ³ For example, a group might use the information contained in the list for recruitment drives.

Such uses might discourage some citizens from registering to vote while public policy strongly advocates greater voter registration and participation. This result would run counter to the perceived legislative purpose of enacting section 16-168(E) to encourage and facilitate public elections. We therefore find that the first sentence of A.R.S. section 16-168(E) serves a legitimate state interest.

b. Classification Under Section 16-168(E)

PNI next argues that the classification under A.R.S. section 16-168(C) which gives major political parties free copies of voter registration lists--while A.R.S. section 16-168(E) requires all others to pay--does not serve legitimate state interests.

We agree with the State that the classifications used in sections 16-168(C) and 16-168(E) further legitimate state interests. First, the classification of major political parties as recipients of free lists aids the recorder's office and the election process. With the lists, the parties can provide information to party candidates and contact registered voters concerning elections. The ability of political parties to provide this information prevents the recorder's office from receiving numerous overly burdensome and possibly capricious requests for copies of the lists. In other words, it helps make the recorder's workload manageable.

Furthermore, a state does not violate equal protection when it provides certain benefits in the election process to political parties that have substantial public support. See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Accordingly, the legitimate governmental interests of administrative efficiency in the recorder's office and...