Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-4739,98-4739
• Citation: 177 F.3d 1272
• Parties: Doris Cristina PIAMBA CORTES, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Maria Constanza Piamba Cortes, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1272

177 F.3d 1272

Doris Cristina PIAMBA CORTES, Individually and as Personal

Representative of the Estate of Maria Constanza

Piamba Cortes, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., a Delaware Corporation,

Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

No. 98-4739.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 15, 1999.

Lyndall M. Lambert, Barwick, Dillian, Lambert & Ice, P.A., Miami, FL, Charles M. Shaffer, Jr., Griffin Bell, William Faulkner Lummus, Jr., R. Byron Attridge, Chilton Davis Varner, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

Joel S. Perwin, Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A., Miami, FL, Robert L. Parks, Haggard Parks & Stone, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, Bruce S. Rogow, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Marc Moller, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York City, for Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and MORAN ^*, Senior District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we hold as a matter of first impression that Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, as clarified by Montreal Protocol No. 4, requires a passenger to prove that an air carrier subjectively knew its conduct likely would result in harm to its passengers in order to escape the Convention's limitations on liability. On summary judgment, the district court held that Article 25 measures an air carrier's conduct objectively and concluded as a matter of law that, under either an objective or subjective standard, the passengers' claims for damages were not limited by Article 25's liability cap. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court incorrectly entered summary judgment against the air carrier on this issue and remand for a determination by the finder of fact whether the air carrier's conduct precludes the application of the Convention's liability cap to this case.

In addition, we hold that the district court: (1) properly applied Florida compensatory damages law to this case; (2) properly refused to apply Florida's apportionment of liability statute; and (3) did not abuse its discretion during the damages trial by excluding evidence relating to the facts of the underlying plane crash and prohibiting reference to the legal finding of willful misconduct. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to these issues.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 ("Flight 965") crashed as the plane attempted to navigate its arrival to the Alfonso Bonilla Aragon airport in Cali, Colombia. The crash killed 151 passengers, including Maria Constanza Piamba Cortes, a domiciliary of Colombia who was returning home after studying in the United States. Appellee-Cross Appellant Doris Cristina Piamba Cortes ("Piamba Cortes"), acting both individually and as the personal representative of her sister Maria Constanza Piamba Cortes, filed a tort action against Appellant-Cross Appellee American Airlines, Inc. ("American").

The facts leading up to the crash are largely undisputed and have been detailed comprehensively by the district court. See In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on December 20, 1995, 985 F.Supp. 1106, 1109-22 (S.D.Fla.1997). We need not duplicate the district court's detailed factual recitation; for purposes of our discussion, we set forth an abbreviated statement of facts that are relevant in resolving this appeal.

Flight 965 left Miami International Airport on the afternoon of December 20, 1995, bound for Cali. Captain Nicholas Tafuri and First Officer Donnie Ray Williams piloted the Boeing 757, which the parties agree was airworthy and in good mechanical and structural condition. At all material times during the flight, Williams flew the aircraft while Tafuri primarily handled radio communications. The Cali airport is located in a valley approximately forty-three miles long and twelve miles wide. The arrival and approach paths for aircraft landing at the airport are designed to keep planes in an "airway" in the center of the valley and away from the mountainous terrain that surrounds the valley.

American provides special training to its pilots who fly into Central and South America in order to acquaint them with the unusual features of these regions. Among other things, pilots are instructed, in no uncertain terms, not to rely on local air traffic controllers ("ATCs") for information about their location or position in the sky. According to American's training materials, Latin American ATCs will assume when providing clearance that the pilot is on course, the plane is located where the pilot says it is, the pilot knows where the mountains are, and the pilot will refuse a clearance that will take the plane into a mountain. Because these assumptions may be incorrect, the ATCs will clear pilots to descend below minimum safe altitudes in mountainous areas.

American also instructs its pilots that they must continually verify their exact location by every means available; if they are unable to locate and cross-check their position or are otherwise unsure of where they are, they must suspend any descent of the airplane until their position is verified and the safe minimum altitude is determined. Furthermore, American teaches its pilots to insist on the complete published or assigned flight plan for the plane's approach to the airport unless the pilot is sure of the plane's location and the terrain below. If the plane is operating on an unpublished route, American's training materials and FAA regulations provide that "the pilot, when an approach clearance is received, shall maintain the last altitude assigned until the aircraft is established on a segment of the published route." Id. at 1129-30.

The flight plan assigned to Flight 965 called for the plane to follow a specified route during its arrival and approach to Cali. The arrival phase typically is conducted in accordance with a specified route that consists of a series of waypoints that define the path to the landing strip. In this case, the waypoints were marked by radio beacons known as "navaids," which emit radio waves that can be tuned in from the cockpit and allow the pilot to determine the compass direction to, and in some instances the distance to, the waypoint. The waypoints also may help a pilot establish the plane's position in the sky, as well as its distance to a certain point.

Based on data recovered from Flight 965's digital flight data recorder and the statements of Tafuri and Williams on the plane's cockpit voice recorder, ¹ the parties have reconstructed the following events that led to the crash.

Flight 965 approached Cali at night. Originally, Flight 965 was assigned a published arrival path to Cali that called for the plane to fly over the "Tulua" waypoint, located approximately thirty-four miles northeast of the airport, proceed to the "D21 CLO" waypoint, and then fly over the "Rozo" waypoint, which is located approximately three miles north of the airport. From there, the arrival path called for the plane to continue south to the "Cali" waypoint, located nine miles south of the airport, and, after executing a 180-degree turn, return north to the airport and land.

When Flight 965 was approximately fifty-four miles north of the airport, the ATC stationed in Cali cleared the plane to the Cali waypoint and instructed the pilots to descend and maintain 15,000 feet and to "report uh, Tulua." Id. at 1117. Moments later, however, the Cali ATC offered the pilots the option of landing straight onto the runway without having to turn the plane around at the Cali waypoint. The pilots accepted the offer, and thus accepted a published flight route that began at the Tulua waypoint, proceeded to the Rozo waypoint, and ended at the runway.

After accepting the offer, the cockpit voice recorder suggests that Williams erroneously believed the flight route began at the Rozo waypoint instead of the Tulua waypoint. Tafuri told Williams that the flight route began at the Tulua waypoint, but then asked the ATC for permission to go "direct to Rozo and then do the Rozo arrival," a request that set in motion a chain of events that culminated in the crash. Id. at 1118. The ATC responded by saying, "Affirmative," but added instructions to "take the Rozo One" approach and to "report Tulua at twenty-one miles and five thousand feet." Id. at 1119. ²

After this exchange, one of the pilots sought to program the flight management computer ("FMC") to fly automatically to the Rozo waypoint by typing the letter "R" into the FMC's keypad. A total of twelve waypoints appeared on the FMC screen, the first of which was for the "Romeo" waypoint, located approximately 132 miles to the northeast of the plane. Although the pilots were required to verify that the chosen waypoint was actually Rozo, the pilot did not verify the Rozo waypoint and instead selected the Romeo waypoint. The FMC immediately began to fly the plane in the direction of the Romeo waypoint, sending the plane on a prolonged, and pronounced, turn to the left, toward the east and toward the mountains.

At the time the plane began turning, it was descending past an altitude of 16,880 feet and was flying adjacent to, or slightly to the southwest of, the Tulua waypoint. During the turn east, Tafuri told Williams that he wished the plane to fly to the Tulua waypoint, but instead of dialing the proper frequency for the Tulua waypoint (117.7) into his electronic horizon situation indicator ("EHSI"), Tafuri unwittingly dialed 116.7, the frequency for a different waypoint located 160 miles to the east of the valley. Consequently, the course deviation indicator ("D-bar") function of his EHSI indicated that the Tulua waypoint was located to the left of the plane. Tafuri, however, instructed Williams to turn back toward the right, which sent the plane in a westerly...