Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, Bucks Cnty., PA, 16-4175

• Citation: 917 F.3d 161
• Decision Date: 27 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. 16-4175,16-4175
• Parties: Jason PIASECKI, Appellant v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, BUCKS COUNTY, PA; District Attorney Bucks County; Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

917 F.3d 161

Jason PIASECKI, Appellant

v.COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, BUCKS COUNTY, PA; District Attorney Bucks County; Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

No. 16-4175

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued March 6, 2018

Opinion Filed: February 27, 2019

Peter Goldberger, Esq., 50 Rittenhouse Place, Ardmore, PA 19003, Matthew Stiegler, Esq. [Argued], 7145 Germantown Avenue, Suite 2, Philadelphia, PA 19119, Attorneys for Appellant

Karen A. Diaz, Esq., Stephen B. Harris, Esq. [Argued], Bucks County Office of District Attorney, Bucks County Justice Center, 100 North Main Street, Doylestown, PA 18901, Attorneys for Appellee

Aaron J. Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, 1441 Sansom Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, Attorneys for Amicus Defender Association of Philadelphia

Mark B. Sheppard, Esq., Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, 1735 Market Street, 21^st Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Attorneys for Amicus Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys

Before: McKEE, AMBRO and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

We are asked to decide whether a habeas corpus petitioner who was subject only to registration requirements under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA") when he filed his petition was "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court," as required for jurisdiction. We hold that the registration requirements were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody and that they were imposed pursuant to the state court judgment of sentence. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Following a bench trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Jason Piasecki was convicted of fifteen counts of possession of child pornography. On April 26, 2010, the court sentenced him to a term of three years’ probation. At sentencing, the court informed Piasecki:

So as to counts 16 through 30, as to each count the defendant is sentenced to 36 months’ county probation. The conditions of his sentence are that he undergo sex offender supervision, that he be subject to ten-year registration, that he have no unsupervised contact with minor children under the age of 18, excluding your son and your girlfriend’s son, without written permission of Bucks County Adult Probation and Parole.

You’re to have no computer Internet use. You’re to continue in treatment with Dean Dixon and Dr. Nover. You’re not to drink, and you’re to take medications as directed. You’re ordered to pay court costs.

I’m going to have you sign the mandatory sex offender conditions.¹

At the time of sentencing, Pennsylvania sex offenders were subject to registration requirements under a statutory scheme referred to as Megan’s Law III.² But in December of 2012, as Piasecki pursued appellate and collateral relief in state court, the Pennsylvania legislature permitted its Megan’s Law statute to expire and replaced it with SORNA. It was enacted to "bring the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006."³ Any state that did not implement restrictions similar to those set forth in the Adam Walsh Act stood to lose ten percent "of the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year [under] ... the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968."⁴ When Piasecki filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, SORNA applied retroactively to any Megan’s Law registrant who lived in the Commonwealth.⁵ An offender who had been required to comply with Megan’s Law III was therefore automatically subject to SORNA’s increased registration and reporting requirements.

Piasecki was a Tier III offender under the provisions of SORNA. Accordingly, he was required to register in-person with the State Police every three months for the rest of his life.⁶ The statute also required him to appear, in-person, at a registration site if he were to:

• Change his name;

• Change his residence or become transient;

• Begin a new job or lose previous employment;

• Matriculate or end enrollment as a student;

• Add or change a phone number;

• Add, change, or terminate ownership or operatorship of a car or other motor vehicle, and, as part of that visit, provide his license plate number, VIN number, and location where the vehicle will be stored;

• Commence or change "temporary lodging;"⁷

• Add, change, or terminate any email address or other online designation; or

• Add, change, or terminate any information related to an occupational or professional license.⁸

If Piasecki were to become homeless, he was required to "appear in person monthly and to be photographed."⁹ Prior to any international travel, Piasecki had to "appear in person at an approved registration site no less than 21 days" before his anticipated departure.¹⁰ Failure to abide by any of these reporting requirements exposed Piasecki to criminal prosecution.¹¹

The parties do not dispute that Piasecki was subject to these restrictions—and only these restrictions—when he filed his § 2254 petition on December 4, 2014.¹² His probation and its attendant conditions of supervision had expired on April 26, 2013. Piasecki’s habeas petition attacked his underlying conviction on four grounds, none of which are relevant to the issues before us.¹³

The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute made "sex offenders’ registration obligations considerably more burdensome," but ultimately concluded that Piasecki was "free to live, work, travel, or engage in any legal activity without the approval of a government official."¹⁴ The Magistrate Judge also concluded that Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration requirements were "collateral consequences and not direct consequences of the petitioner’s conviction."¹⁵ Accordingly, the court reasoned that they were not part of the judgment of the state court and could not support habeas corpus jurisdiction.

In overruling objections that Piasecki filed to the Report and Recommendation, the District Court emphasized that Piasecki’s sentence had expired, and that the registration requirements were "merely collateral consequences of a conviction."¹⁶ It also noted that Piasecki’s reporting requirements were not explicitly included in the state court’s judgment and that the requirements were "remedial rather than punitive."¹⁷ Consequently, the court held that they could not support habeas jurisdiction because they did not constitute custody.

We granted a certificate of appealability, and this timely appeal followed.

II.¹⁸

A federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 only if the petitioner was "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" when the petition was filed.¹⁹ "Thus, custody is the passport to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction."²⁰ The jurisdictional requirement has two components—"custody" that arises "pursuant to the judgment of a state court" that is under attack.²¹ Put differently, the habeas jurisdictional provision requires that the petitioner be subject to a "non-negligible restraint on physical liberty" that is a "direct consequence of [the] conviction" being challenged.²² Therefore, we must examine these elements separately to determine if Pennsylvania’s SORNA requirements were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody. If they were, we must determine if they were directly imposed pursuant to the judgment of a state court.

A. "In Custody"

Over the past half-century, courts have addressed the issue of habeas custody in an effort to determine when various state-imposed restrictions were sufficiently onerous to constitute "custody" for purposes of habeas jurisdiction. It is now beyond dispute that custody is not limited to "actual physical custody."²³ Rather, for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction, a petitioner is "in custody" if he or she files while subject to significant restraints on liberty that are not otherwise experienced by the general public.²⁴

In Jones v. Cunningham , the Supreme Court considered whether a parolee was "in custody" for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.²⁵ The conditions of Jones’s parole required him to live with his family in Georgia; obtain permission to leave the community, change residence, and own or operate a car; and make monthly visits to his parole officer.²⁶ Additionally, he was required to permit parole officers to come into his home or place of employment, "follow the officer’s instructions and advice," and be subject to "revocation and modification at any time."²⁷

Jones held that these parole restrictions were sufficiently restrictive to render the petitioner "in custody." It rooted its analysis in the historical development of the custody requirement. The Court acknowledged that "the chief use of habeas corpus statutes has been to seek release of persons held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail."²⁸ However, the Court also noted that courts had "long recognized the writ as a proper remedy even [when] the restraint [was] something less than close physical confinement."²⁹ For example, English courts permitted the use of habeas corpus where "a woman alleged to be the applicant’s wife was being constrained by her guardians to stay away from her husband against her will."³⁰ The test employed in England was "simply whether she was ‘at her liberty to go where she pleased.’ "³¹ Jones noted that United States courts have historically found that "the use of habeas corpus has not been restricted to situations in which the applicant is in actual, physical custody."³² Rather, "[h]istory, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on [a person’s] liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to...