Walker v. Chasteen

• Decision Date: 17 June 2021
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 126086,126087,126088
• Citation: 2021 IL 126086,183 N.E.3d 153,451 Ill.Dec. 107
• Parties: Reuben D. WALKER et al., Appellees, v. Andrea Lynn CHASTEEN (The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, et al., Appellants).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2021 IL 126086
183 N.E.3d 153
451 Ill.Dec. 107

Reuben D. WALKER et al., Appellees,
v.
Andrea Lynn CHASTEEN (The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, et al., Appellants).

Docket Nos. 126086
126087
126088

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed June 17, 2021.

183 N.E.3d 156

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Carson R. Griffis, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Cathy McNeil Stein and Paul Fangman, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for other appellant.

Daniel K. Cray and Melissa H. Dakich, of Cray Huber Horstman Heil & VanAusdal LLC, of Chicago, and Laird M. Ozmon, of Law Offices of Laird M. Osmon, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellees.

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

183 N.E.3d 157

451 Ill.Dec. 111

¶ 1 In this direct appeal, we address the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012) ), as well as sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Illinois Housing Development Act (Act) ( 20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31 (West 2012)). Section 15-1504.1 of the Code created a $50 filing fee for residential mortgage foreclosure cases. 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012). Sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Act created programs funded by the fee created in section 15-1504.1. 20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31 (West 2012). The circuit court of Will County determined that these statutes violate the free access, due process, equal protection, and uniformity clauses of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 12, art. IX, § 2. For the following reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 This case involves two underlying residential mortgage foreclosure lawsuits. In April 2012, plaintiff Reuben D. Walker filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint in Will County. In August 2015, plaintiff M. Steven Diamond filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint in Cook County. In filing those cases, each plaintiff paid a $50 "add on" filing fee under section 15-1504.1 of the Code.

¶ 4 In October 2012, Walker filed a putative class action complaint against the clerk of the circuit court of Will County, challenging, inter alia , the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1. The trial court certified a class of plaintiffs, consisting of all individuals and entities who had paid the $50 filing fee up to the time Walker had filed his mortgage foreclosure action, and a class of defendants consisting of all circuit court clerks in Illinois. The State, through the Attorney General, was allowed to intervene in the matter. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 19 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006); 735 ILCS 5/2-408(c) (West 2012).

¶ 5 In November 2013, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Walker, finding that circuit court clerks fall within the judicial fee officer prohibition in article VI, section 14, of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 14 ) and that the provision in section 15-1504.1 authorizing 2% of the filing fee to be retained by the clerk for administrative expenses creates an impermissible fee office ( 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012) ). The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional on its face.

¶ 6 On September 24, 2015, this court reversed and remanded the case, holding that circuit court clerks did not fall within the state constitutional provision prohibiting fee officers in the judicial system. Walker v. McGuire , 2015 IL 117138, 396 Ill.Dec. 156, 39 N.E.3d 982. This court did not address the other constitutional claims raised by Walker.

¶ 7 On June 9, 2016, following remand, plaintiffs’ counsel amended their complaints to add Diamond as an additional named party. On December 4, 2018, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint asserted a putative class action against the Illinois circuit court clerks. Plaintiffs sought, inter alia , a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statutes at issue and return of monies collected.

¶ 8 Relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleged, inter alia , that section 15-1504.1 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012) ) and sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Act ( 20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31 (West 2012)) violate the equal protection, due process, and uniformity

451 Ill.Dec. 112

183 N.E.3d 158

clauses of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 ( Ill. Const. 1970, art I, § 2, art. IX, § 2 ). Plaintiffs also alleged that the statutes violate the constitutional right to obtain justice freely (the "free access" clause) ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12 ). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a return of all filing fees paid pursuant to section 15-1504.1. Defendants maintained that the statutes are constitutional. The Cook County circuit clerk also argued that the voluntary payment doctrine precluded plaintiffs’ claims because they did not pay the filing fee "under protest."

¶ 9 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The court determined that the plaintiffs paid the fee under duress and that, therefore, the voluntary payment doctrine did not apply. The court further found that the statutes at issue are facially unconstitutional because the challenged provisions violate the free access, equal protection, due process, and uniformity clauses of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

¶ 10 The trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining the Illinois circuit courts from enforcing and following the statutes at issue as they are currently enacted. The court stayed enforcement of the injunction to provide this court an opportunity to review the case.

¶ 11 The Illinois Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Illinois, the Cook County circuit clerk, and the Will County circuit clerk filed separate direct appeals. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). This court consolidated those appeals. The Attorney General and the Cook County circuit clerk filed separate briefs in this appeal. This court granted the Will County circuit clerk leave to join and adopt the Attorney General's brief.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 This matter comes for our review on the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018); Coleman v. East Joliet Fire Protection District , 2016 IL 117952, ¶ 20, 399 Ill.Dec. 422, 46 N.E.3d 741. A circuit court's order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Cohen v. Chicago Park District , 2017 IL 121800, ¶ 17, 422 Ill.Dec. 869, 104 N.E.3d 436.

¶ 14 In these proceedings, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012) ) and sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Act ( 20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31 (West 2012)).¹ These statutes were enacted as part of the "Save Our Neighborhoods Act," in response to the mortgage foreclosure crisis of 2010. The legislative goal was to "create[ ] additional programs for people in foreclosure problems" and to "help people who needed help with their mortgage situations and in our foreclosure-plagued society." See General Assembly, House Civil Judiciary Comm. Transcripts (May 7, 2010) at 10:11-16, 4:16 to 6:1; 6:19-21.

¶ 15 Section 15-1504.1 of the Code requires mortgage foreclosure plaintiffs to pay the clerk of the circuit court an additional fee for the Foreclosure Program Prevention Fund. 735 ILCS 15/15-1504.1 (West 2012). Section 15-1504.1(a-5) further

183 N.E.3d 159

451 Ill.Dec. 113

requires a portion of the fees to be deposited into the Abandoned Residential Property Municipality Relief Fund (Abandoned Residential Property Fund). Id. § 15-1504.1(a-5). The clerk of the court retains 2% of the fee collected and remits the remainder to the state Treasurer for the Foreclosure Prevention Program Fund and the Abandoned Residential Property Fund. Id. § 15-1504.1(a-5)(2).

¶ 16 In turn, section 7.30 of the Act requires the Illinois Housing Development Authority (Housing Authority) to grant 25% of the Foreclosure Prevention Program Fund to approved housing counseling agencies outside Chicago, based in part on the number of foreclosures, and 25% to approved counseling agencies in Chicago for housing counseling or foreclosure prevention services. 20 ILCS 3805/7.30(b)(1), (2) (West 2012). Section 7.30 also requires the Housing Authority to grant 25% to approved community-based organizations outside Chicago for approved foreclosure prevention outreach and 25% for such programs in Chicago. Id. § 7.30(b)(3), (4). " ‘Approved community-based organization’ " is defined as a "not-for-profit entity that provides...