Pickens v. Maxwell Bros. & Quinn

• Decision Date: 06 June 1935
• Docket Number: 14084.
• Citation: 180 S.E. 348,176 S.C. 404
• Parties: PICKENS v. MAXWELL BROS, & QUINN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

180 S.E. 348

176 S.C. 404

PICKENS v. MAXWELL BROS, & QUINN.

No. 14084.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 6, 1935

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; M. M Mann, Judge.

Action by Lizzie Pickens against Maxwell Brothers & Quinn. A magistrate's judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Circuit Court, and plaintiff appeals.

Judgment of Circuit Court reversed, and that of magistrate affirmed.

James Hopkins and Chas. F. Cooper, both of Columbia, for appellant.

Herbert & Dial, of Columbia, for respondent.

E. C DENNIS, Acting Associate Justice.

This action was commenced in the magistrate court of Richland county for damages in the sum of $100. When the case was called for trial, the defendant took the position that the magistrate in Richland county did not have jurisdiction of an amount greater than $25. The magistrate overruled this contention and rendered judgment in the sum of $100.

This matter was then heard on an appeal by Judge Mann, and the magistrate was reversed. The circuit judge held that the contention of defendant was correct, and that the magistrate did not have jurisdiction in a case where the amount demanded exceeded $25. In so far as the jurisdiction of a magistrate in Richland county is concerned, the present case is of no importance except for the principle involved, for the reason that the Legislature passed an act which now makes clear the jurisdiction of magistrates in Richland county.

The principle, however, involved in this matter is one of importance, and therefore deserves the same consideration as if it were now applicable to Richland county, as it may affect other counties.

The order of Judge Mann is very convincing. A casual reading of this order is most persuasive. However, a further study brings out the error.

In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. As has frequently been stated in effect, the intention of the Legislature constitutes the law. All rules for the interpretation and construction of statutes of doubtful meaning have for their sole object the discovery of the legislative intent, and they are valuable only in so far as, in their application, they enable us the better to ascertain and give effect to that intent. Even penal laws, which it is said should be strictly construed, ought not to be so construed as to defeat the obvious intention of the Legislature. 25 R. C. L. p. 960.

The Constitution and the statute law of this state fix the jurisdiction of magistrates in all of the counties of the state.

The question in this case is whether or not the law set forth in volume 1 of the 1932 Code (Code Civ. Proc. tit. 2, c. 3), article 1, sections 75 to 101 thereof, providing for the establishment of county courts, is controlling in this case.

That act provides the method and procedure for the establishment of county courts generally. Section 94 abolishes the jurisdiction of magistrates in criminal cases in all counties wherein the county court shall be established, and section 95 reduces the jurisdiction of magistrates in civil cases to an amount not exceeding $25.

The county court of Richland county was established later by an independent act which is article 5 of the Code of 1932 (Code Civ. Proc. tit. 2, c. 3), sections 164 to 181 inclusive.

Under this act the county court of Richland...