Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson
Decision Date | 23 May 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-165.,99-165. |
Parties | Stuart J. PICKENS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Lynnette SHELTON-THOMPSON and State of Montana, Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Division, Respondents and Respondents. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Paul Neal Cooley; Skelton & Cooley, Missoula, Montana, for Appellant.
Charles W. Schuyler; Marsillo & Schuyler, Missoula, Montana, for Lynnette Shelton-Thompson.
Gail Hammer, Department of Public Health & Human Services, Child Support
Enforcement Division, Missoula, Montana, for Child Support Enforcement Division.
¶ 1 Stuart Jonathan Pickens (Pickens) appeals from the judgments entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, on orders dismissing his two petitions for judicial review of a decision and order from the State of Montana, Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED), determining the amount of his current and past due child support obligation. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 Pickens raises a number of issues on appeal. The dispositive issue, however, is whether the District Court's dismissal of Pickens' first petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on his failure to comply with the requirements of § 40-5-253, MCA, violated Pickens' right to due process of law.
¶ 3 In 1995, Lynette Shelton-Thompson (Shelton-Thompson) applied to CSED for assistance in obtaining child support from Pickens for their daughter. CSED initiated an administrative action to determine the amount of Pickens' child support obligation and, in August of 1998, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a contested case hearing on that issue. On August 28, 1998, the ALJ entered a decision and order determining the amount of Pickens' current and past due child support obligation. The ALJ's order included a paragraph notifying the parties of their statutory right to petition for judicial review of the decision under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), Title 2, Chapter 4, Part 7 of the Montana Code Annotated. The notice did not refer to § 40-5-253, MCA, which contains more specific procedural requirements for appealing from an administrative decision in a child support enforcement case than those found in the MAPA.
¶ 4 Pickens timely filed a petition for judicial review of the ALJ's order and mailed copies of the petition to Shelton-Thompson and CSED. CSED subsequently moved the District Court to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because Pickens had failed to properly serve the parties as required by § 40-5-253, MCA. The District Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because Pickens failed to comply with the requirements of § 40-5-253, MCA, granted CSED's motion and dismissed Pickens' petition. Pickens moved the court to amend or reconsider its order dismissing his petition. He argued, inter alia, that application of § 40-5-253, MCA, in this case violated his constitutional right to due process of law. His motion subsequently was deemed denied by operation of Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P.
¶ 5 While Pickens' motion to amend or reconsider was pending in the District Court, he requested the ALJ to amend the underlying decision, asserting that the failure to refer to § 40-5-253, MCA, in the order's notice provision was a clerical error which should be corrected. On February 2, 1999, the ALJ entered its Order Correcting Clerical Error, which added a reference to § 40-5-253, MCA, to the notice provision of the earlier order.
¶ 6 On February 25, 1999, Pickens appealed from the ALJ's amended order by filing a complaint under a new cause number. CSED moved to dismiss, asserting that the complaint was actually a petition for judicial review of the ALJ's original decision and the court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was not timely filed. The District Court deemed the complaint a petition for judicial review, granted CSED's motion to dismiss and entered judgment on the dismissal. Pickens appeals from the orders dismissing each of his actions.
¶ 7 We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss to determine whether the court abused its discretion. In re McGurran, 1999 MT 192, ¶ 7, 295 Mont. 357, ¶ 7, 983 P.2d 968, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). However, a court's determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. In re McGurran, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). Moreover, constitutional issues raise questions of law and our review of such questions is plenary. See State v. Schnittgen (1996), 277 Mont. 291, 295, 922 P.2d 500, 503
.
¶ 8 Did the District Court's dismissal of Pickens' first petition for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on his failure to comply with the requirements of § 40-5-253, MCA, violate Pickens' right to due process of law?
¶ 9 The notice provision in the ALJ's decision and order informed Pickens that he had a right to petition for judicial review of the decision under the MAPA, which provides procedures by which parties may obtain judicial review of administrative decisions in contested cases. Pursuant to the MAPA, a party may appeal an administrative decision by filing a petition for judicial review in the appropriate district court within 30 days of service of the decision and promptly serving copies of the petition on the agency involved and all parties of record. Section 2-4-702(2)(a), MCA.
922 P.2d at 474. Here, Pickens timely filed his petition for judicial review in the District Court on September 24, 1998, and mailed copies of the petition to CSED and Shelton-Thompson on or about the same date, thus fulfilling the service requirements established under the MAPA and Hilands.
¶ 12 CSED moved the District Court to dismiss Pickens' petition on the basis that § 40-5-253(4), MCA, required him to issue and serve a summons within 30 days of filing his petition and, because he failed to do so, the court did not have jurisdiction over the case. The District Court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. Pickens then moved the court to amend or reconsider its order of dismissal, asserting that application of § 40-5-253, MCA, in this case violated his right to due process of law. The District Court implicitly rejected his argument in this regard and Pickens asserts error.
¶ 13 Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." As Pickens observes, we have stated that "due process generally requires notice of a proposed action which could result in depriving a person of a property interest and the opportunity to be heard regarding that action." Dorwart v. Caraway, 1998 MT 191, ¶ 76, 290 Mont. 196, ¶ 76, 966 P.2d 1121, ¶ 76. Pickens argues that application of § 40-5-253, MCA, in this case violates his right to due process of law because he did not receive sufficient notice of the procedures by which to obtain judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
¶ 14 Pickens contends that due process requires not only that he be given notice of his right to judicial review, but also notice of the specific procedures by which to obtain such review. He further contends that notice which is inaccurate or misleading is insufficient to satisfy due process. According to Pickens, the notice provision in this case was misleading and did not give sufficient notice of the procedures by which to appeal the ALJ's decision because it mentioned only § 2-4-702, MCA, and that statute does not refer to the different procedural requirements applicable to CSED actions as set forth in § 40-5-253, MCA.
¶ 15 Notice sufficient to comport with due process is that which is reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to inform parties of proceedings which may directly affect their legally protected interests. Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Com'n (1983), 206 Mont. 359, 368, 671 P.2d 604, 609; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Driscoll v. Stapleton
...232, ¶ 11, 380 Mont. 290, 355 P.3d 729 ; Seven Up Pete Venture v. State , 2005 MT 146, ¶ 18, 327 Mont. 306, 114 P.3d 1009 ; Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson , 2000 MT 131, ¶ 7, 300 Mont. 16, 3 P.3d 603 ; Woirhaye v. Mont. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct. , 1998 MT 320, ¶ 7, 292 Mont. 185, 972 P.2d 800. As ......
-
Tai Tam, LLC v. Missoula Cnty.
...heard regarding that action.’ " Geil v. Missoula Irrigation Dist. , 2002 MT 269, ¶ 53, 312 Mont. 320, 59 P.3d 398 (quoting Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson , 2000 MT 131, ¶ 13, 300 Mont. 16, 3 P.3d 603 ). "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful......
-
Dorwart v. Caraway
...31, 306 Mont. 430, ¶ 31, 35 P.3d 291, ¶ 31; McDermott v. McDonald, 2001 MT 89, ¶ 10, 305 Mont. 166, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 200, ¶ 10; Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson, 2000 MT 131, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 16, ¶ 15, 3 P.3d 603, ¶ 15; Jellison v. Mahoney, 1999 MT 217, ¶ 8, 295 Mont. 540, ¶ 8, 986 P.2d 1089, ¶ 8; S......
-
In re Mental Health of KGF
...issues of due process and right to counsel involves questions of law and our review of such questions is plenary. See Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson, 2000 MT 131, ¶¶ 7-8, 300 Mont. 16, ¶¶ 7-8, 3 P.3d 603, ¶¶ 7-8; State v. Okland (1997), 283 Mont. 10, 14, 941 P.2d 431, 433. DISCUSSION ¶ 18 As a......