Pickle v. State
| Docket Number | 2022-CP-00929-COA |
| Decision Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Parties | C.D. PICKLE, JR. A/K/A CLANTON D. PICKLE, JR. A/K/A C.D. PICKLE APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.
¶1. C.D. Pickle Jr. appeals from the Leflore County Circuit Court's order denying his motion to vacate his criminal sentence. We affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶2. "Pickle, a sixteen year old, was arrested [in November 1974] for . . . capital murder . . . while committing the crime of rape." Pickle v. State (Pickle I), 791 So.2d 204, 205 (¶2) (Miss. 2001). "He was convicted and sentenced to death ...." Id. After he appealed his conviction, our supreme court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
¶3. In 1978, Pickle was convicted again of capital murder and was sentenced to "life in prison." Id. at (¶3). Pickle has since filed numerous motions attacking his conviction and sentence. Pickle v. State (Pickle II), 306 So.3d 771, 773-74 (¶¶2-4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (discussing the procedural history of Pickle's extensive court filings); see also Pickle v. State (Pickle III), 351 So.3d 464 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).
¶4. In July 2022, Pickle filed a motion in the circuit court to vacate his sentence. He claimed (1) he was illegally sentenced, and (2) he is entitled to a resentencing hearing under Miller v. Alabama.[1] The circuit court denied Pickle's motion, and this appeal followed.
¶5. When reviewing a circuit court's denial of a PCR motion, this Court "will only disturb the circuit court's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we review the circuit court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review." Pickle III, 351 So.3d at 467 (¶6) (quoting Nance v. State, 327 So.3d 1089, 1092 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)).
¶6. Pickle claims on appeal, as he did in his motion to vacate, that he was illegally sentenced. "Upon its enactment on April 17, 1984, the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) created a three-year period for movants to seek relief for convictions that occurred prior to the UPCCRA." Pickle II, 306 So.3d at 774 (¶6) (citing Truitt v. State, 878 So.2d 244, 245 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). Because Pickle's motion was filed over thirty years after the time period for seeking relief had expired, his motion is time-barred. Several "fundamental-rights exceptions have been expressly found to survive procedural bars," including "the right to be free from an illegal sentence ...." Creel v. State, 305 So.3d 417, 421 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). However, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently overruled precedent applying "the judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception" to "the substantive, constitutional bars codified by the Legislature in the [UPCCRA]." Howell v. State, 358 So.3d 613, 615-16 (¶¶8, 12) (Miss. 2023).
¶7. In his reply brief, Pickle seemingly argues that there is no evidence that his motion is time-barred. However, the record contains the "minutes of the court" from 1978, which provide, in relevant part:
Additionally, we take judicial notice of this Court's own published opinion finding that another PCR motion filed by Pickle was time-barred, "as reflected by [his] extensive history of . . . numerous court filings[.]" Pickle III, 351 So.3d at 467 (¶6).
¶8. Pickle also argues that the supreme court's recent holding in Howell cannot be applied "retroactive[ly]." In other words, Pickle seemingly argues that because his motion to vacate was filed and decided before the supreme court's decision in Howell, the ruling in Howell should not apply to him. Pickle does not cite authority in support of this argument; therefore, it is procedurally barred. Williams v. State, 334 So.3d 177, 184 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) .
¶9. Despite the statutory bar, Pickle's claim that his sentence is illegal is without merit. At the time, Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-21 (Supp. 1974) provided: Because Pickle was sentenced to imprisonment for life, his sentence is not illegal. See Williams v. State, 159 So.3d 1195, 1197 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) ().
¶10. Next, Pickle claims that he is entitled to a resentencing hearing under Miller v. Alabama because he was a juvenile when he committed capital murder in this case. Although Pickle was sentenced to "life" in prison, and not "life without parole," he argues that his sentence was tantamount to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility.
¶11. There is a statutory exception to the three-year PCR bar in cases "in which the petitioner can demonstrate . . . [t]hat there has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence or that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been introduced at trial it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence[.]" Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i) (Rev. 2020). In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentence for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. Therefore, Pickle's claim that he is entitled to a resentencing hearing under Miller v. Alabama is not barred, and we address the merits of his claim.
¶12. In support of his argument, Pickle cites Parker v. State, 119 So.3d 987 (Miss. 2013). In Parker, the defendant "was fifteen at the time of his conviction for murder" in 2011. Id. at 990, 996 (¶¶5, 21). His sentencing order provided, in relevant part, "[T]he defendant is sentenced to serve the rest of his natural life in prison in the custody of the [MDOC]." Id. at 996 (¶21). Our supreme court noted that "[a]t first blush, Parker's sentence might seem distinguishable from Miller because [the sentencing statute] neither mandate[d], nor ma[de] any provision allowing for, a sentence of 'life without the possibility of parole.'" Id.; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Rev. 2006) (). Parker, however, asserted that "a plain reading of the parole statute, Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3, render[ed] his life sentence 'tantamount to life without parole.'" Parker, 119 So.3d at 996 (¶22). At the time, the parole statute stated, in relevant part, that "[e]very prisoner who has been convicted of any offense . . . and is confined in the execution of a judgment for such conviction in the Mississippi Department of Corrections . . . for the term of his or her natural life . . . [and] has served not less than ten (10) years of such life sentence, may be released on parole ...." Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1) (Rev. 2011). Except subsection (h) read, Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(h) (Rev. 2011). The supreme court noted that "if Section 47-7-3(1)(h) is enforced, as it presently reads, Parker will not be eligible for parole." Parker, 119 So.3d at 997 (¶22). Further, "[t]he legislative mandates, when read together, are tantamount to life without parole and fail to consider Parker's youth." Id.
¶13. We previously discussed that Pickle was convicted of capital murder and sentenced under section 97-3-21 (Supp. 1974), which set forth a sentence of life imprisonment for murder and a sentence of death for capital murder. Pickle, however, was sentenced to remain in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections "for and during his natural life."
¶14. Unlike Parker who was convicted of murder, Pickle was convicted of capital murder. With respect to capital offenders, the parole statute provides, "No person sentenced for the following offenses shall be eligible for parole: . . . (ii) Any offense to which...
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