Picquett v. Wellington-wild Coal Co.

Decision Date05 January 1909
Citation86 N.E. 899,200 Mass. 470
PartiesPICQUETT v. WELLINGTON-WILD COAL CO.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

Edward F. McClennen, Alfred L. Fish, and Brandeis, Dunbar & Nutter for plaintiff.

John Lowell and James A. Lowell, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG J.

The plaintiff seeks in this action of tort to recover for personal injuries received by falling into a coal hole, while traveling on a public way in Boston. At about half-past 5, on the afternoon of a snowy day in early January, the plaintiff was walking along Arch street, when he saw the defendant's coal team at the sidewalk, and supposed that coal was being delivered from it into a coal hole. He went into the street to go around the horses' heads, but finding the street slushy, returned to the sidewalk. The plaintiff's testimony tended to show that the place was dark, that one could see an object, but could not tell a man's face, that he walked close to the side of the building, and could not see any coal, but saw something black on the sidewalk, close to the rear of the team and a man poking a few pieces of coal left in the cart, and while thus going close to the building, so that his shoulder was 4 or 5 inches from it, he fell into the coal hole, and that this hole was rectangular, 22 inches by 34 inches, while the ordinary coal hole is circular in shape, and 12 to 15 inches in diameter. The defendant strongly argues that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care, basing this contention largely upon his statement in cross-examination that he 'went around the team to avoid disaster. The disaster might have been a coal heap. * * * He didn't look to see if any coal hole was there.' Too much weight, however, cannot be attached to isolated expressions of a witness. His conduct as to due care must be determined in the light of all the circumstances, of action and omission, and of the knowledge that he had or ought to have had at the time as well as of detached scraps of testimony, which the jury may regard as the result of too severe stress or strategic skill in cross-examination and weigh accordingly. The jury might have found upon this evidence that the sidewalk was a more convenient and reasonable place for pedestrians than the street, in the then existing weather that the appearance of the sidewalk in connection with the cart in the dim light was such as to justify the inference, which the plaintiff testified he drew, that the delivery of the coal was finished, the lantern taken away, and the coal hole closed and that the plaintiff saw only the dark spot next the curbing, and walked as near as he conveniently could to the building, where coal holes are not commonly found. These conditions, if...

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1 cases
  • Dunham v. City of Lowell
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 6, 1909

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