Piechocki v. Alam

• Docket Number: Civil Action DKC-22-2887
• Decision Date: 18 September 2023
• Parties: VICTOR MICHAEL PIECHOCKI, Petitioner, v. MARIE-ROSE ALAM, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

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VICTOR MICHAEL PIECHOCKI, Petitioner, v. MARIE-ROSE ALAM, Respondent.

Civil Action No. DKC-22-2887

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 18, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

Petitioner Victor Michael Piechocki, currently confined at Spring Grove Hospital Center, filed the above-captioned Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Piechocki challenges the revocation of his conditional release from commitment after a finding of guilty but not criminally responsible, as well as his continued commitment to the Maryland Department of Health. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Although Mr Piechocki filed his Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Petition should have been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, because he is “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(a).^[1] The court will construe the Petition as such.

In response to the Petition, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss^[2] asserting that the Petition raises claims that have not been exhausted and that there remains an available state remedy for Mr. Piechocki to litigate those claims. (ECF Nos. 5; 5-1 at 13). Mr. Piechocki responded, and Respondent replied. (ECF Nos. 7; 8; 9). Having reviewed the papers, and finding no hearing necessary,Local Rule 105.6 the court DISMISSES the Petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.

I. Standard of Review

Before this court may consider the merits of claims raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, those claims must be exhausted before the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); see also, Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976) (“This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”). Thus, before filing a federal habeas petition, a petitioner must exhaust each claim presented by pursuing remedies available in state court. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521 (1982). The claim must be fairly presented to the state courts; this means presenting both the operative facts and controlling legal principles. See Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 289 (4^th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1194 (2001). Exhaustion includes appellate review in the Maryland Appellate Court (formerly Court of Special Appeals) and the Maryland Supreme Court (formerly Court of Appeals).^[3] See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987). The state courts are to be afforded the first opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions in order to preserve the role of the state courts in protecting federally guaranteed rights. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

Where a petitioner has failed to present a claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to hear it, whether it be by failing to raise the claim in post-conviction proceedings or on direct appeal, or by failing to timely note an appeal, the procedural default doctrine applies. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991) (failure to note timely appeal); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489-91 (1986) (failure to raise claim on direct appeal); Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 46 (1972) (failure to raise claim during post conviction); Bradley v. Davis, 551 F.Supp. 479, 481 (D.Md. 1982) (failure to seek leave to appeal denial of post conviction relief). A procedural default also may occur where a state court declines “to consider the merits [of a claim] on the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural rule.” Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 260 (4^th Cir. 1999).

As the Fourth Circuit has explained:

If a state court clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of a habeas petitioner's claim on a state procedural rule, and that procedural rule provides an independent and adequate ground for the dismissal, the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 73132 (1991). A procedural default also occurs when a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust available state remedies and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1.

Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4^th Cir. 1998).

If a procedural default has occurred, a federal court may not address the merits of a state prisoner's habeas claim unless the petitioner can show (1) both cause for the default and prejudice that would result from failing to consider the claim on the merits, or (2) that failure to consider the claim on the merits would result in a miscarriage of justice, i.e. the conviction of one who is actually innocent.^[4] See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96; Breard, 134 F.3d at 620. “Cause” consists of “some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in state court at the appropriate time.” Breard, 134 F.3d at 620 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Even where a petitioner fails to show cause and prejudice for a procedural default, a court must still consider whether it should reach the merits of a petitioner's claims in order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995).

II. Procedural History

A. Criminal Charges and Commitments

In 2002, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Mr. Piechocki was found guilty but not criminally responsible of first-degree assault and committed to the Maryland Department of Health (“MDH”). (ECF No. 1-2 at 2). In 2006, the court ordered his conditional release, which was revoked in 2008. (ECF No. 1-2 at 2) Mr. Piechocki was granted conditional release again in 2013. (ECF No. 1-2 at 2).

Mr. Piechocki was indicted on assault charges on March 12, 2018, and held in the Baltimore County Detention Center pending trial. (ECF No. 1-2 at 10-12). On March 16, 2018, the State's Attorney for Baltimore County filed a petition for revocation of Mr. Piechocki's conditional release in the 2002 case, alleging that he had violated conditions of his release and is no longer eligible for conditional release. (ECF No. 1-2 at 14). A hospital warrant was issued on March 15, 2018. (ECF No. 1-2 at 17).

The Circuit Court found Mr. Piechocki not competent to stand trial for the 2018 assault charges and committed him to MDH for treatment on February 27, 2019. (ECF No. 1-2 at 21). He was transferred to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center (“Perkins”) on March 7, 2019. (ECF No. 1-2 at 21).

The hospital warrant for the petition to revoke Mr. Piechocki's conditional release in the 2002 case was executed on March 26, 2019. (ECF No. 1-2 at 23). A hearing was held on April 4, 2019, after which an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) recommended that Mr. Piechocki remain committed to MDH for care and treatment. (ECF No. 1-2 at 26-37, 40-50). Mr. Piechocki filed exceptions to the ALJ's report, but the Circuit Court denied the exceptions and adopted the ALJ's report. (ECF No. 1-2 at 52-56, 58).

The court found Mr. Piechocki competent to stand trial in the 2018 assault case on March 13, 2020, and remanded him to Perkins to maintain competency. (ECF No. 5-3). The assault charges against Mr. Piechocki were nolle prossed on November 11, 2020, and he was ordered released from the commitment in the criminal case. (ECF Nos. 5-2 at 17; 1-2 at 66).

Mr. Piechocki remains in custody of the Maryland Department of Health at the Spring Grove Hospital Center pursuant to the order revoking his conditional release in the 2002 case. (ECF No. 1).

B. Challenges to Commitment

After the Circuit Court accepted the findings of the ALJ and revoked Mr. Piechocki's conditional release on his 2002 case, he filed an application for leave to appeal that order in the Appellate Court of Maryland. (ECF No. 5-4). Mr. Piechocki argued that 1) the order was deficient because it improperly placed the burden on petitioner to show that he is not a danger to himself or others; 2) the ALJ did not consider the jurisdictional issues raised by petitioner, including that the hospital warrant was served over one year after its issuance; and 3) the ALJ's application of the requirement that Petitioner notify his monitory upon arrest was unconstitutional. (ECF No. 5-4 at 4-5). Mr. Piechocki's application for leave to appeal was denied as untimely, and there is no evidence that he filed any further appeals. (ECF No. 5-5).

In addition, Mr. Piechocki filed two writs of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. (ECF No. 1-2 at 68, 126). On December 16, 2020, Mr. Piechocki filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that because the 2018 criminal charges had been dismissed against him, there is no legal authority to continue to hold him in custody. (ECF No. 1-2 at 68-69). Mr. Piechocki filed a supplement to that petition on June 9, 2021, additionally claiming that he cannot be held on the 2002 commitment because the five-year period of conditional release expired before the hearing and the order revoking his conditional release took place. (ECF No. 1-2 at 73-74). The petition was denied on June 9, 2021. (ECF No. 1-2 at 113). Mr. Piechocki did not further pursue this petition.

Mr Piechocki filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on March 11, 2022. (ECF No. 1-2 at 126). In this petition, Mr. Piechocki made numerous claims including: he was not competent at the hearing to revoke his conditional release and that the hearing should not have proceeded until he was competent, (ECF No. 1-2 at 131-132); he suffered undue prejudice as a result of the delay in...