Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Washington

• Decision Date: 10 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 73524,73524
• Parties: PIEDMONT AVIATION, INC. et al. v. WASHINGTON et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 847

353 S.E.2d 847

181 Ga.App. 730

PIEDMONT AVIATION, INC. et al. v. WASHINGTON et al.

No. 73524.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 10, 1987.

George L. Pope, Jr., Lyman M. Delk, Jr., Cameron D. Simpson, Atlanta, for appellants.

Melvin Robinson, Jr., Donald M. Shivers, Atlanta, for appellees.

BIRDSONG, Chief Judge.

We granted this workers' compensation appeal to determine whether the ALJ erred in "disbelieving" the claimant's admissions in judicio. The claimant injured his back while lifting a tool at Lockheed Georgia Company on May 11, 1984. He did not report the injury, and the next day, May 12, he went to his second job with an unrelated employer (Piedmont Aviation, Inc.) where he allegedly pulled his back moving luggage. On May 15, the claimant returned to work at Lockheed and reported the May 11 injury incurred at Lockheed; he subsequently remained off work from Lockheed for 1 1/2 weeks and was treated by Lockheed's doctors. On May 14, he notified his Piedmont supervisor of the May 12 injury incurred at Piedmont. He then made this claim against both Piedmont and Lockheed.

During the proceedings, the claimant responded to Lockheed's request for admissions and made these denials: "(1) I admit that I was an employee of Piedmont Airlines on 5-12-84, but deny that I was injured on the job accident [sic] on that date.... (2) I admit that I was an employee of Piedmont Airlines on 5-12-84, but deny that I was able to perform my normal job duties at Piedmont Airlines upon reporting to work on 5-12-84.... (3) I deny that I injured my back while lifting at Piedmont Airlines on 5-12-84, but admit I was unable to perform my normal duties at Lockheed Georgia Company as of 5-23-84 because of job related injury at Lockheed Georgia Company on 5-11-84.... (4) I deny that I injuried [sic] my back at Piedmont Airlines on 5-12-84, but admit that I was unable to perform my normal job duties at Piedmont Airlines as of 5-23-84 because of back injury at Lockheed Georgia on 5-11-84.... (5) I deny that my job at Piedmont Airlines on 5-12-84 was substantially heavier work than my employment at Lockheed Georgia.... (6) I deny that all disability and medical expenses subsequent to 5-12-84 were caused by any accident at Piedmont Airlines...."

At no time was a motion to withdraw or amend these responses ever made. At the hearing, under cross-examination by Piedmont's counsel, the claimant equivocated on or varied some of these admissions. The administrative law judge held the claimant's admissions "for the most part, must be disbelieved," found he suffered an aggravation of a preexisting condition on May 12 at Piedmont, did not suffer a disabling injury at Lockheed on May 11, and held Piedmont liable for all benefits. The Board of Workers' Compensation and the trial court affirmed. Held:

1. Claimant's admissions in judicio as to matters of fact against Lockheed's interests are not binding on the employer Lockheed, inasmuch as the interests of the claimant and Lockheed are not joint, but are adverse. OCGA § 24-3-31(2); Boswell v. Blackman, 12 Ga. 591(1) (1852); Kirk v. Barnes, 147 Ga.App. 423, 249 S.E.2d 140 (1978).

2. However, the claimant's admissions in judicio against his own interests as to both Lockheed and Piedmont, as the case may be, are binding upon the claimant.

The award in favor of the claimant cannot be sustained by "any evidence" which contradicts the claimant's solemn admissions in judicio. In Albitus v. Farmers, etc., Bank, 159 Ga.App. 406, 407, 283 S.E.2d 632 (1981), we held that a matter admitted in response to requests for admission under OCGA § 9-11-36, "is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.... In form and substance an admission under [§ 9-11-36] is comparable to an admission in pleadings or stipulation of facts and as such is generally regarded as a judicial admission rather than an evidentiary admission.... [U]nless allowed to be withdrawn by the court, [it] is conclusive whereas an evidentiary admission is not conclusive but is always subject to be contradicted or explained.... [A]nswers to requests for admissions are not on the same footing in the eyes of the law [with other evidence]." Such admissions are binding, and "evidence is not admissible to controvert matters admitted in response to request for admission. [A]ny evidence inconsistent with the binding effect of the admission could not be considered by the trial court...." Id., p. 407. Some difficulty may arise by the nomenclative designation of admissions as being either "evidentiary" and "judicial"; but an evidentiary admission is in fact merely "an item in the mass of evidence," while a judicial admission has been described as "a waiver relieving the opposing party from the need of any evidence." 4 Wigmore Evid., § 1058 (3d Ed.1940). That is to say, a solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradicted by other evidence unless it is withdrawn or amended on formal motion. Albitus, supra; see generally, Green, Ga. Law of Evid. § 238 (2d ed. 1984).

In Stone v. Lenox Enterprises, 176 Ga.App. 696, 697, 337 S.E.2d 451 (1985), it was confusingly stated as a...