Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. Reddick
| Decision Date | 24 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. A03A2296-A03A2299. |
| Parties | PIEDMONT HOSPITAL, INC. v. REDDICK et al. Reddick et al. v. Beers Construction Company. Reddick et al. v. Howell Rusk Dodson — Architects, P.C. Howell Rusk Dodson — Architects, P.C. v. Reddick et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, John E. Hall, Jr., Deborah S. Moses, Atlanta, for Piedmont Hospital, Inc.
Wasson, Sours & Harris, W. Hensell Harris, Jr., Andrea L. May, for Howell Rusk Dodson-Architects, P.C.
McIntyre & Pound, John C. McIntyre, Jr., Theodore E. Pound, Nancy B. Hewes, David A. Webster, Atlanta, for Reddick.
Alston & Bird, John I. Spangler, III, Laura L. Owens, Calvin T. Vick, Jr., Gary H. McNorrill, Atlanta, for Beers Construction Company.
James Davis died after contracting a fungal infection while being treated as a patient at Piedmont Hospital. Davis' sister, Mary Davis Reddick, filed suit individually, on behalf of Davis' estate, and on behalf of Davis' father, against the hospital, a construction company, and an architectural firm, alleging that construction work performed in or near the intensive care unit in which Davis was being treated "stirred up" dirt in the area, causing the deadly fungus aspergillus to become airborne and transmitted to Davis. The suit alleged that Piedmont Hospital, Inc., Beers Construction Company, and Howell Rusk Dodson-Architects, P.C., failed to take the minimal precautions necessary to protect patients from the known dangers presented by the aspergillus fungus when construction work is performed in hospitals.
Finding that Reddick failed to show that the actions of the architectural firm in drawing the plans were a proximate cause of Davis' death, the trial court granted summary judgment to the architectural firm. And finding that Reddick failed to show that Beers performed the work in the intensive care unit in which Davis contracted the infection, the trial court granted Beers' motion for summary judgment. In Case No. A03A2297, Reddick appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the construction company. In Case No. A03A2298, Reddick appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the architectural firm. In Case No. A03A2299, the architectural firm appeals from the trial court's failure to grant its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on two other grounds asserted by the firm. And in Case A03A2296, the hospital appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion to disqualify Davis' attorney based on two alleged violations of the rules of professional conduct.1
1. Reddick contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Beers Construction. We disagree.
To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.2 A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of the plaintiff's case.3 A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party's case; instead, the moving party may discharge its burden by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.4 If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on her pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.5
Viewed in a light most favorable to the respondent on summary judgment, the evidence shows that Davis entered the hospital seeking treatment for food poisoning. While a patient in ICU-Blue, Davis became infected with an airborne fungus known as aspergillus. The infection caused Davis to suffer from complications such as congestive heart failure and mitral valve vegetation. After suffering a massive stroke and cardiac arrest, Davis died at Piedmont Hospital.
The complaint alleges that Beers performed construction work without proper safeguards in place to protect patients, and failed to follow accepted industry standards and guidelines for patient safety during construction. The complaint cites literature stating that aspergillus fungus occurs in soil, water and decaying vegetation; that construction work "stirs up" the soil and releases aspergillus spores into the air; that dust and debris from construction activities in and around hospitals pose a grave threat to patients, especially those whose immune systems are weakened; and that it is important to maintain an environment as free as possible of aspergillus spores for patients who have suppressed immune systems.
Beers moved for summary judgment, pointing to an affidavit of Robert Osburn, Beers' manager for its construction projects at the hospital, showing that Beers did not perform any construction work in or near ICU-Blue, and that Beers did no work in the general vicinity of ICU-Blue during the period in which Davis was a patient. Beers also pointed to evidence that the areas in which it worked were physically separated from patient areas such as ICU-Blue, that the areas where Beers worked were sealed with protective plastic so as to contain construction debris, that the construction areas did not share a ventilation system with the areas occupied by Davis, and that airborne contaminants originating in Beers' work sites could not have reached the areas through the ventilation system.
In response, Reddick pointed to evidence that Beers hired Art Plumbing to do other renovation work in the hospital, that the hospital was a continuing client of Beers, and that a hospital nurse understood that Beers was going to do the construction work in ICU-Blue and saw Beers' workers in the hospital when Davis was a patient.
Reddick's evidence is not sufficient to show the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to Beers. The nurse does not allege that Beers did any work in or near ICU-Blue, and she lacked personal knowledge or details necessary to raise genuine issues of fact in this regard. Although she lists other areas in the hospital in which Davis also received treatment, and states that Beers was working in some of those areas, Reddick's complaint is clearly based on construction activity in ICU-Blue. There is no evidence that Beers performed construction work in ICU-Blue or that Beers hired Art Plumbing to work in ICU-Blue.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that Beers worked in ICU-Blue, there is an absence of medical evidence in the record showing that the fungal infection resulted from any act or omission of Beers (or the architectural firm). Reddick has argued that the aspergillus fungus is "ubiquitous" or everywhere, that it occurs in soil, water and vegetation, that persons with severely compromised immune systems are extremely susceptible to invasive aspergillus, and that Davis was severely immuno-compromised from steroid administration. Given that the aspergillus fungus is so prevalent, and patients with compromised immune systems are particularly susceptible to contracting the fungus, it was necessary for Reddick to point to medical evidence showing that it was indeed the construction activity which caused him to contract the infection. But no medical evidence of record has shown that the acts or omissions of Beers (or the architects) caused Davis to contract the fungal infection. A mere possibility of causation is not enough, and when the matter is one of pure speculation or conjecture, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment for the defendant.6
Beers pierced Reddick's allegation that Beers caused Davis' injuries, shifting the burden to Reddick to point to evidence supporting her allegation.7 This she failed to do. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Beers.8
2. Reddick contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Beers before she was able to undertake any significant discovery. Reddick sought to postpone any ruling on the summary judgment motion claiming she had not been able to undertake significant discovery. The trial court denied her request.
On appeal, we affirm a court's ruling on discovery matters unless the court clearly abused its discretion.9 The record shows that Reddick served her first discovery requests on Beers six months after she filed her complaint, and then sought no other discovery from Beers for another six months. Beers waited five months after answering the complaint before moving for summary judgment. And Beers gave Reddick additional time to respond to the summary judgment motion. The hearing on Reddick's motion for additional discovery time was not held until four months after it was filed.
The record shows that Reddick conducted very little discovery in the nearly one-year period between the date Beers filed its answer and the date the court granted Beers' motion for summary judgment. If Beers' responses were inadequate, Reddick could have moved to compel responses and for sanctions. In fact, the trial court expressly invited Reddick at the hearing to file a motion to compel. Reddick replied that a motion would be filed. But three weeks later, no such motion had been filed. It was then that the trial court ruled on the motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying Reddick's request under OCGA § 9-11-56(f).10 This enumeration presents no basis for reversal.
3. Reddick contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to expand the record on appeal to include discovery materials which were relied upon by the parties in arguing summary judgment,...
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