Piedmont Operating Co. v. Cummings
| Decision Date | 03 October 1929 |
| Docket Number | 19198. |
| Citation | 149 S.E. 814,40 Ga.App. 397 |
| Parties | PIEDMONT OPERATING CO. v. CUMMINGS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 1929.
Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Rule that principal is bound to extent of authority apparently conferred on agent has no reference to situation in which person affected by acts of agent does not deal with agent in reliance on authority which principal has apparently conferred on agent.
Where employee injures third person while operating automobile without actual authority from employer, injured person is not injured as result of dealings with driver as agent of employer or in reliance on any authority to operate automobile which employer has apparently but not actually conferred on employee, and cannot recover damages against employer where employee had no actual authority to operate automobile.
In action against defendant operating hotel to recover damages for injuries by bell boy of hotel while operating automobile where evidence raised inference that bell boy had no actual authority from defendant to drive automobile, but that it was apparently within scope of driver's business to take automobiles belonging to guests of hotel to garage, charge that principal is bound to extent of apparent authority knowingly conferred on agent, and not by actual authority and that principal may knowingly permit person to hold himself out as agent, but that principal must have knowingly permitted bell boys to make delivery of cars, was prejudicial error, since it instructed jury as matter of law that course of dealing proved would establish such agency.
Where guest registering at hotel was informed that bell boy would look after storage of his automobile and bell boy took charge of automobile and helped door man in unloading automobile for guest, and there was custom known to authorities of hotel for bell boys to take automobiles to garage, inference was authorized that bell boy, in taking charge of automobile for guest and driving it to garage, had actual authority from authorities of hotel to do so, and was acting as authorized agent for hotel authorities.
Where there is evidence from which fact of agency may be inferred declarations of agents as to facts tending to establish agency when made as part of res gestæ are relevant and admissible.
In suit against hotel company to recover damages caused by negligent operation of automobile driven by bell boy of hotel, statement by bell boy immediately after accident, and while under arrest, that he had ticket from hotel to take car to garage, was admissible as part of res gestæ.
Statement by driver of automobile that he had ticket from employer to take automobile to garage, admitted in evidence in suit against employer as res gestæ, was admissible, not as statement of contents of ticket, but as statement of fact that person making declaration was acting as agent for employer.
Where witness on direct examination testified to material matter in conflict with former testimony known to attorney introducing witness, and examining attorney was entrapped by witness' former testimony, court properly permitted attorney for purpose of impeaching witness to question witness with reference to former statements and prove such statements, and properly charged on law as to impeachment of witnesses.
Rule that principal is bound to extent of apparent authority that he has knowingly conferred on agent has no application in case of tort.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; E. D. Thomas, Judge.
Suit by W. H. Cummings against the Piedmont Operating Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Frank Maloney and Sutherland & Tuttle, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Underwood, Haas & Gambrell, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
Syllabus OPINION.
1. The rule that a principal is bound to the extent of the authority which he has apparently conferred upon his agent has no reference to a situation in which a person affected by the acts of the agent does not deal with the agent in reliance upon the authority which the principal has apparently conferred upon him. 2 C.J. 575. Where an employee, in operating an automobile without actual authority from the employer, runs over another person and injures him, the injured person is not injured as a result of any dealings which he has had with the driver of the automobile as the agent of the employer, or in reliance upon any authority to operate the automobile which the employer has apparently, but not actually, conferred upon the employee. Where the employee, when operating the automobile and causing the injury, had no actual authority from his employer to operate the automobile, the injured person cannot recover for damages resulting from the...
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