Piepgras v. Chater
| Decision Date | 14 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1393,95-1393 |
| Citation | 76 F.3d 233 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 15104B Steven PIEPGRAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, David S. Doty, Judge.
Ethel Schaen, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
Charles R. Goldstein, Social Security Administration, Chicago, IL, for appellee.
Before HANSEN, JOHN R. GIBSON and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Steven Piepgras appeals from the district court's 1 order affirming an administrative law judge's denial of his application for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. Piepgras argues that the administrative law judge erred in rejecting the opinions of two of his doctors. He also argues that the judge erred by asking the vocational expert a hypothetical question which did not accurately state his impairments. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Piepgras is a thirty-nine-year-old man with a high school education and experience working as a janitor, laundry attendant, film developer, film projectionist, general clerk, cruise control installer, and fast food worker. Piepgras claims he has been disabled since December 19, 1990 due to diabetes. He also asserts that he suffers from a personality disorder, depression, and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which limits the use of his hands.
After conducting two days of hearings, the administrative law judge concluded that although Piepgras has severe impairments, he was not disabled and could still perform various jobs. The judge found that Piepgras suffered from "type I diabetes, [a] personality disorder, and an affective disorder." He also found that none of these impairments were disabilities which automatically qualified Piepgras for benefits under the Social Security Act. The judge determined, however, that these impairments did prevent Piepgras from performing the work he had done in the past. After describing Piepgras's impairments, age, education, and work experience to a vocational expert, the judge asked the expert if there were jobs which Piepgras could perform. The expert stated that Piepgras could perform light janitorial jobs and light jobs in packaging, stocking, order filing, and shipping and receiving, and that significant numbers of these jobs were available. The judge accepted the expert's statements and concluded that Piepgras was not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act.
The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration adopted the judge's decision as her final decision. The district court affirmed the Commissioner's decision, and Piepgras appeals.
Piepgras argues that the administrative law judge erred in rejecting the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Schultz.
We must affirm the administrative law judge's decision if substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports his decision. Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir.1995). We may not reverse merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Id. A treating physician's opinion deserves no greater respect than any other physician's opinion when the treating physician's opinion consists of nothing more than vague, conclusory statements. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1991).
Piepgras argues that Dr. Schultz concluded that Piepgras could not hold a job because of his diabetes. He contends that the administrative law judge rejected Dr. Schultz's conclusion in finding that Piepgras's diabetes was not disabling.
Dr. Schultz's opinion of Piepgras's condition consists of vague, conclusory statements. In three short letters submitted to the judge, Dr. Schultz stated that Piepgras has had "an extremely difficult time managing his diabetes" because he cannot maintain the proper diet. Dr. Schultz also stated that because of this difficulty in controlling his diabetes, Piepgras has had "great difficulty" in keeping a job. Dr. Schultz did not explain what he meant by "extremely difficult" and "great difficulty" in his letters and he did not testify at Piepgras's hearings. In a written medical assessment, Dr. Schultz stated that Piepgras's blood sugar levels affected his ability to lift, carry, walk, stand, and withstand temperature extremes. Dr. Schultz, however, provided no explanation as to how Piepgras's blood sugar levels affected his abilities.
The administrative law judge did not reject Dr. Schultz's opinion, but merely stated that the opinion did not support Piepgras's claims of pain, numbness, fatigue, loss of stamina, tingling, blurred vision, double vision, headaches, and inability to understand basic instructions. It is impossible to tell whether Dr. Schultz's opinion supports or contradicts Piepgras's claims because it contains no specifics concerning Piepgras's condition. We conclude that Dr. Schultz's opinion is of limited value due to its vagueness. Thus, Dr. Schultz's opinion deserves no greater deference than any other physician's opinion in the record. See Thomas, 928 F.2d at 259.
Dr. Hammarsten, a medical expert, testified that Piepgras should be able to do medium exertion work, provided it does not require fine work or prolonged reading. The record also shows that Piepgras performed a wide range of activities at the time he claimed to be disabled. Piepgras stated that he worked as a popcorn popper at a movie theater up to eight hours a day, two days a week, and that this job required him to stand for up to eight hours a day and to lift sixty-pound bags of unpopped popcorn and fifty-pound cans of popping oil. In addition to this part-time work, Piepgras stated that he cared for himself and his children, handled his family's finances, helped with grocery shopping, performed some household chores, entertained neighborhood children occasionally, and participated in church activities twice a week. Dr. Hammarsten's opinion and Piepgras's activities constitute substantial evidence supporting the judge's conclusion that Piepgras's diabetes was not disabling. In light of the substantial evidence which supports the judge's conclusion, the judge properly discounted the conclusory opinion of Piepgras's treating physician.
Piepgras argues that the administrative law judge improperly rejected Dr. Barron's opinion that Piepgras's mental problems prevented him from holding a job.
We must uphold the judge's conclusion that Piepgras's...
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