Pierce v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 14 November 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-863
• Parties: PERRY PIERCE, Plaintiff, v. P. BAILEY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

PERRY PIERCE, Plaintiff,
v.
P. BAILEY et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-863

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

November 14, 2022

OPINION

SALLY J. BERENS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This is a civil rights action brought by a county detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997).

Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is

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fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[1]

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Bailey and Herbert. The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendant Robbinson. Plaintiff's personal capacity excessive force claim against Defendant Robbinson remains in the case.

Discussion

T. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Berrien County Jail (BCJ) in St. Joseph, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Sheriff P. Bailey,

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Lieutenant Unknown Herbert, and Sergeant K. Robbinson. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)

Plaintiff alleges that on January 29, 2022, Defendant Robbinson assaulted him by spraying mace in his eyes “for unlawful reasons.” (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff could not see out of his left eye for three days. (Id.) He submitted a grievance regarding the incident to Defendant Bailey but did not receive a response. (Id.) Plaintiff contends he did not receive a response because “there is no proper grievance proce[]dure to properly redress prisoner complaints.” (Id.)

Plaintiff attempted suicide on June 2, 2022, and was sent to the hospital, where he was placed in the mental health ward. (Id.) When he returned to BCJ, Defendant Herbert placed him in a suicide holding cell. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff contends his placement in that cell “disregard[ed] the actions of the mental health [personnel] who had [released him] from the mental health facility because [he] had no more suicide [tendencies].” (Id.) Defendant Herbert told Plaintiff that he would not be going back to general population because he had tried to commit suicide. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he has been denied all rights that general population receives. He avers that he stays in the cell for 24 hours a day without exercise. (Id.) He cannot access his personal property and can only shower every other day. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that the lights stay on all day, “den[y]ing [him] proper sleep.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Bailey said he would investigate the issue, but he has not heard back. (Id.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts claims regarding his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. The Court also construes Plaintiff's complaint to assert claims related to the grievance procedure at BCJ. Plaintiff seeks $20,000 from each Defendant. (Id., PageID.5.) He also wants Defendants to institute a “proper grievance procedure for prisoner[s] to properly redress their complaints.” (Id.)

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II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1 983

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is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

A. Official Capacity Claims

As noted above, Plaintiff sues Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Official capacity lawsuits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). An official capacity suit is to be treated as a suit against the entity itself. Id. at 166 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)); see also Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). “[I]ndividuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent,” and the suit is not against the official personally. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Graham, 473 U.S. at...