Pierce v. Dist. of Columbia

Decision Date11 September 2015
Docket NumberCiv. No. 13-cv-0134 (KBJ)
PartiesWILLIAM PIERCE, PLAINTIFF, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEFENDANT.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

WILLIAM PIERCE, PLAINTIFF,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEFENDANT.

Civ. No. 13-cv-0134 (KBJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 11, 2015


MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Public Version of ECF No. 82)

Incarceration inherently involves the relinquishment of many privileges; however, prisoners still retain certain civil rights, including protections against disability discrimination. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). Plaintiff William Pierce—who is profoundly deaf and communicates with American Sign Language—claims that prison officials in the District of Columbia violated his right to be free from unlawful disability discrimination in 2012, when Pierce was incarcerated in the District's Correctional Treatment Facility following his guilty plea to a simple assault that arose out of a domestic dispute with his then-partner. The District's prison staff was indisputably aware that Pierce was deaf; however, during the entire 51-day period in which Pierce was held in custody, no staff person ever assessed Pierce's need for accommodation or otherwise undertook to determine the type of assistance that he would need to communicate effectively with others during his incarceration. Instead, according to Pierce, the District's employees and contractors merely assumed that lip-reading and

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exchanging written notes would suffice, and they largely ignored his repeated requests for an interpreter to assist him in interacting with other people. As a result, Pierce asserts that he was forced to serve his prison time in abject isolation, generally unaware of what was going on around him and unable to communicate effectively with prison officials, prison doctors, his counselor, his teacher, or his fellow inmates. Pierce has filed the instant lawsuit against the District under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796, seeking damages for allegedly having been denied an effective means of receiving or imparting information at various critical points during his period of incarceration, including medical appointments, rehabilitative classes, and meetings with prison officials. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 22, 49-50.) Pierce also maintains that he was held in solitary confinement as punishment for his repeated requests for an interpreter, and thus, that the District's employees and contractors retaliated against him in violation of federal law. (See id. ¶¶ 30, 45, 51.)

Before this Court at present are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. (See Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. as to Claims I and II of the Compl., ECF No. 47; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 49.) The parties vehemently disagree about many of the facts related to this case—most notably, whether Pierce actually had the ability to communicate effectively through lip-reading and written notes, and also whether Pierce actually requested an interpreter as an accommodation for his hearing disability. But in this Court's view, only one fact is

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truly material to the question of whether or not Pierce was discriminated against on the basis of his disability and is thus entitled to summary judgment on his discrimination claims (Claims I and II of the complaint), and that fact is entirely undisputed: when Pierce first arrived at the prison facility, the District's employees and contractors did nothing to evaluate Pierce's need for accommodation, despite their knowledge that he was disabled. They did not ask Pierce what type of auxiliary aids he needed. They did not hire an expert to assess Pierce's ability to communicate through written notes or lip-reading as opposed to sign language. They did not even consult the Department of Corrections' own policies to figure out what types of accommodations are ordinarily provided to inmates with hearing disabilities. Instead, they figuratively shrugged and effectively sat on their hands with respect to this plainly hearing-disabled person in their custody, presumably content to rely on their own uninformed beliefs about how best to handle him and certainly failing to engage in any meaningful assessment of his needs. This Court finds that, in so doing, the District denied Pierce meaningful access to prison services and intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, Pierce is entitled to summary judgment and compensatory damages on Claims I and II of his complaint.

With respect to the District's motion for summary judgment on Pierce's retaliation claim (Claim III), this Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or not Pierce's placement in solitary confinement was an act of unlawful retaliation—Pierce contends that prison employees were responding to his repeated requests for an interpreter and the complaints he had made about the prison's

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failure to provide accommodations, while the District claims that Pierce was segregated from the general prison population in order to protect him from the violent threats of other inmates. Pierce's retaliation claim thus involves a genuine dispute of fact that is not appropriately resolved on summary judgment.

Accordingly, Pierce's motion for summary judgment with respect to Claims I and II of the complaint will be GRANTED, and the District's motion for summary judgment as to Claims I, II, and III will be DENIED. A separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will follow.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Basic Facts

William Pierce is a resident of the District of Columbia who is profoundly deaf and has other serious medical conditions. (See Pl.'s Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts"), ECF No. 48-1, ¶ 1; Compl. ¶ 4.) Pierce can make sounds that are audible, but he cannot speak words, and American Sign Language ("ASL") is his native language. (See Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 2, 3.)1 Pierce relies on ASL to communicate with others—either by interacting directly with other persons who are using ASL themselves, or through the use of a video conferencing device that involves a remote interpreter. (See id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Pierce cannot, and does not, use a traditional telephone; instead, he ordinarily uses ASL via videophone to communicate with hearing individuals. (See id.) Moreover, because Pierce's proficiency in reading and writing

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English is far below that of a hearing person, he rarely writes notes and only uses cellphone texting to convey simple, short messages. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Also, as with many deaf individuals, Pierce has limited lip-reading ability. (See id. ¶¶ 10-11.)

At some point prior to February of 2012, Pierce was involved in a domestic dispute with his then-partner, David Holder, after which Pierce was arrested and charged with simple assault. (See id. ¶ 46.) On February 1, 2012, a D.C. Superior Court Judge sentenced Pierce to 60 days in jail, and committed him to the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("DOC") to serve out his sentence in the District's Correctional Treatment Facility ("CTF"). (See id.; see also Def.'s Stmt. of Facts, ECF No. 50, ¶ 2.)2 Pierce was then incarcerated at CTF from February 2, 2012, until March 22, 2012. (See Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 51; Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 6.) He resided in three different units during his incarceration: Medical 96 while he was in general population, and then Medical 82 and the Special Management Unit when he was placed into protective custody. (See Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 50; Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 159-165.) Pierce was in protective custody from February 23, 2012, to March 7, 2012. (See Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 102, 112; Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 164, 172.)

It is undisputed that the District's employees and contractors were all fully aware that Pierce is deaf. (See Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 69; Def.'s Controverting Stmt. of Facts ("Def.'s Cont. Facts"), ECF No. 61, ¶ 69.) However, no prison staff member assessed whether, or to what extent, Pierce would need accommodations to ensure that he could communicate effectively with others during his incarceration. (See Hr'g Tr., ECF No.

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80, at 52:3-4, 53:1-12.) Furthermore, Pierce was not provided with a qualified ASL interpreter at any point during the entire 51-day period he spent in custody, including the 14-day period that Pierce served in solitary confinement-like conditions.

B. Disputed Issues

The parties vigorously disagree about how—and, more specifically, whether—Pierce was actually able to communicate effectively with prison officials, health care providers, teachers, and counselors during his incarceration. Pierce claims that he is not skilled at reading lips when people are speaking English, nor can he skillfully interpret notes that people have written to him in English. (See Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 3, 5, 7, 9, 11.) Accordingly, Pierce asserts that he needs ASL interpretation in order to communicate effectively with people who do not know ASL. (See id. ¶ 12.) The District disagrees, asserting that Pierce can communicate effectively in...

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