Pierce v. Prescott

• Decision Date: 20 January 1880
• Citation: 128 Mass. 140
• Parties: Mary E. Pierce, guardian, v. Joanna K. Prescott
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

128 Mass. 140

Mary E. Pierce, guardian, v. Joanna K. Prescott

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

January 20, 1880

Argued January 9, 1879; October 3, 1878

Worcester. Appeal by Mary E. Pierce, guardian of Joanna K. Prescott from a decree of the Probate Court, requiring her to charge herself in her final account with certain sums of money not included therein, and disallowing certain alleged credits. Hearing before Endicott, J., who reported the case for the determination of the full court. The facts appear in the opinion.

Exception sustained.

J Hopkins, for the appellant.

W. W Rice & F. T. Blackmer, for the appellee.

OPINION

Colt, J.

The decree appealed from required the appellant to charge herself as guardian with money received from the administrator of the estate of her son, Edward N. Cutler. The latter died under age, not having married, and possessed at the time of his death of an estate, which came to him wholly by inheritance from his deceased father, William N. Cutler, the former husband of Mrs. Pierce. The amount in question was paid under a decree of distribution of the Probate Court in 1870, made upon the petition of the administrator of Edward N., which set forth the names of the supposed next of kin, with their places of residence and relationship to the deceased, and prayed that a distribution of the balance in his hands might be decreed by the court to be made among the persons named, or such others as might be proved to be entitled thereto according to law. Mrs. Pierce, the mother, was stated to be one of the next of kin. Annexed to that petition was an affidavit of the administrator, that the representations contained in it were true according to his best knowledge and belief; due notice to all parties interested was ordered and service thereof duly made. The intestate at the time of his death, and all parties represented to be interested, including Mrs. Prescott, were residents of the county; and no question is now made but that the Probate Court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, and that its jurisdiction was exercised in a legal manner. The decree of distribution was made as asked for, to the parties named as next of kin, and the money was paid by the administrator to Mrs. Pierce, to be held by her in her own right.

It is conceded that Mrs. Prescott after the death of Edward N. was the only living child of William N. Cutler, and it is contended that, as the property of which Edward N. died possessed, came from his father, Mrs. Prescott is now entitled, notwithstanding the decree of the Probate Court, to the whole of the estate of Edward N., under that clause of the statute which provides, by way of exception to the general rule, that the estate which comes to a deceased child by inheritance from a deceased parent shall descend in equal shares to the other children of the same parent, when the child dies under age and not having married; Gen. Sts. c. 91, § 1, cl. 6; and that the guardian should now be charged with it in her account. It is evident that this clause of the statute was overlooked by the administrator in drafting the petition on which the decree of distribution was made.

Upon the entry of the appeal in this court, the case was referred, by the consent of parties, to a master, to report the facts and his findings thereon, and the evidence requested by either party. The master found that the guardian was not bound to account for the amount received under the decree. The appellee excepted to this finding.

1. The decree of distribution was the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding to a judgment in a manner authorized and required by law, upon the evidence then before it, after due notice to all parties interested. It was the decree of a court now by the St. of 1862, c. 68, made a court of record. The immediate, direct and sole purpose of the judgment was to ascertain and determine who were the persons entitled to a distributive share; to that end it was necessary to ascertain who were next of kin, and whether the estate to be divided came from the father of the intestate. These were questions of fact, as well as law, and cannot be treated in any just sense as incidental and collateral only to the judgment to be rendered. They were the very thing adjudicated.

The power to grant administration, and to pass all decrees necessary in the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, is within the peculiar and appropriate jurisdiction of the probate courts of this Commonwealth. In England the same jurisdiction was formerly exercised by the ecclesiastical courts, and in Barrs v. Jackson, 1 Phillips 582, where this question was much discussed, Lord Lyndhurst held that the sentence of an ecclesiastical court, in a suit for administration which turned upon the question who were next of kin to the intestate, was conclusive upon that question in a subsequent suit in the Court of Chancery, between the same parties, for distribution. In Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125, payment to an executor named in a forged will, which had been proved and allowed in the prerogative court, was held a good payment in an action to recover the debt, brought by an administrator appointed after the proceedings had been set aside, because the spiritual court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and every person was bound to give credit to the probate till vacated. This rule is also recognized in more recent cases. Spencer v. Williams, L. R. 2 P. & D. 230. Wytcherley v. Andrews, L. R. 2 P. & D. 327.

The conclusive effect of the judgments of probate and other courts, exercising similar powers, upon all matters within their jurisdiction, is generally maintained in the several states. We refer to a few of the cases only. Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Pa. 234. Peebles' appeal, 15 S. & R. 39. Colton v. Ross, 2 Paige 396. Probate Court v. Van Duzer, 13 Vt. 135. McFarland v. Stone, 17 Vt. 165. Tebbets v. Tilton, 4 Foster 120. Clark v. Pishon, 31 Me. 503. Broderick's will, 21 Wall. 503.

The law is so laid down by this court, although it is sometimes said, as if in qualification of the rule, that, although the Probate Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, yet, if it clearly exceeds its powers or does an act prohibited by law, its decree may be avoided in collateral proceedings, as well as by appeal; but this is only one way of saying that where the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter is in any particular limited, then its decree is not binding, if it oversteps the limits fixed. Jenks v. Howland, 3 Gray 536. It is not in such case the indiscreet exercise of a power granted, but the doing of an act for which no power is given, or which is expressly prohibited. Smith v. Rice, 11 Mass. 507. Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 3 Allen 87, and cases there cited.

In Loring v. Steineman, 1 Met. 204, it was decided that a decree of distribution by the Probate Court after such notice as is prescribed by statute, or, if no statute requires notice, after such notice as the court in its discretion shall think proper to order, is so far conclusive as to protect the administrator, acting in good faith, in conforming to it, and further that it is the duty of that court to ascertain who are the persons entitled to distribution, and to decree distribution to them by name. In deciding these questions, said Chief Justice Shaw, "the court must be governed by those rules of evidence, and those presumptions of fact from circumstances, which are resorted to by all other tribunals in determining questions of fact." The possibility of mistake, he declared, cannot prevent the judgment from being so far conclusive as to protect all who are compelled to act under it. The distribution of an intestate estate was said to be analogous to proceedings in rem. The subject-matter, that is to say, the property, is within the jurisdiction of the court; and the judgment, by determining who are entitled to distributive shares, and extending to the entire estate, is necessarily conclusive, because nothing further is left to be distributed. And in the recent case of White v. Weatherbee, 126 Mass. 450, a decree of distribution was declared to be...