Pierce v. Providence Ret. Bd..

• Decision Date: 02 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2009–145–M.P.,2009–145–M.P.
• Parties: Scott PIERCEv.PROVIDENCE RETIREMENT BOARD.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

15 A.3d 957

Scott PIERCE

v.PROVIDENCE RETIREMENT BOARD.

No. 2009–145–M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 2, 2011.

Elizabeth A. Wiens, Esq., for Plaintiff.Kenneth B. Chiavarini, Esq., for Defendant.Present SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

Scott Pierce (Pierce or petitioner), filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari seeking our review of a Providence Retirement Board (board or respondent) decision that denied Pierce's application for accidental-disability retirement benefits. This Court granted the petition, and Pierce's case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on November 9, 2010, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this petition should not be decided summarily. After considering the parties' submitted memoranda and oral arguments, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and proceed to decide the petition at this time. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the decision of the board.

IFacts and Procedural History

During Pierce's more than twenty-six years of service as a firefighter for the City of Providence, he repeatedly injured his right ankle while at work. His most recent on-the-job injury occurred on or about June 29, 2006 ¹ when, wearing “full [firefighting] gear,” he “[b]anged [his] ankle while walking to [the] third floor” of the “Calart Flowers, [400] Reservoir Avenue,” building. Immediately after this 2006 injury, Pierce's ankle was surgically fused, and he was unable to return to work. Accordingly, on August 16, 2006, Pierce applied to the board for “accidental disability retirement” based on § 17–189(5) (the ordinance) of the Providence Code of Ordinances (Providence Code).²

As required by the ordinance, Pierce was examined in 2006 by three physicians, James E. McLennan, M.D. (Dr. McLennan), Randall L. Updegrove, M.D. (Dr. Updegrove), and Thomas F. Morgan, M.D. (Dr. Morgan), each of whom concluded that, because of employment-related accidents, Pierce was permanently disabled from performing his full duties as a firefighter. In relaying their assessments to the board, each physician checked a box on the board-supplied “Accidental Disability Questionnaire” (questionnaire) indicating that Pierce's “incapacity [was] the natural and proximate result of an accident while in the performance of duty.” The questionnaire then asked the physicians to certify “[t]he date of the accident” and “[t]he place of the accident.” Doctor McLennan responded that there were “multiple” accidents, the first in 1994, ³ and that these occurred at “work.” Doctor Updegrove stated that the first accident occurred in approximately 1994; the most recent accident occurred on June 29, 2006, and the place of the accident was “400 Reservoir Ave.” Lastly, Dr. Morgan attested that there were “multiple falls,” left the date of the accident blank, and in his narrative accompanying the questionnaire, stated that Pierce presented with “physical impairments” caused by “multiple injuries while on the job.”

Thereafter, Guy Geffroy, M.D. (Dr. Geffroy), the board's medical advisor, wrote to the physicians asking each to clarify his medical opinion by articulating whether “Pierce's incapacity is solely the result of the accident [on] 6/29/06 or whether it is because of his having multiple traumas.” ⁴ Doctor McLennan attributed Pierce's disability to “degenerative arthritis based on the trauma to the ankle starting [in 1994]” that “would have progressed * * * regardless of his duties.” The other two physicians, Dr. Updegrove and Dr. Morgan, respectively confirmed that Pierce's disability was “the result of the cumulative effect of multiple traumas” and that it was not possible “to identify a single isolated trauma that accounted for this disabling arthritis to [Pierce's] right ankle joint.”

On May 23, 2007, the board voted to deny Pierce's application for accidental disability retirement and wrote to Pierce advising him of its decision. The board's letter did not substantiate its determination with findings of fact or conclusions of law. As such, Pierce retired with a service pension on June 28, 2007, but proceeded in this Court to challenge the board's denial of his application for accidental-disability retirement.

On September 12, 2007, this Court granted Pierce's petition for a writ of certiorari, which permitted a review of the board's decision of May 23, 2007. After briefing and oral argument, we vacated the board's denial and held that “[t]he absence of findings by the board makes it impossible for us to review the board's decision and determine whether it was supported by legally competent evidence or included any errors of law.” Pierce v. Providence Retirement Board, 962 A.2d 1292, 1292–93 (R.I.2009) (mem.). This Court remanded “for a new hearing on Pierce's application for an accidental-disability pension” and “direct[ed] the board to issue a written decision setting forth its findings and conclusions.” Id. at 1293.

Thereafter, on January 28, 2009, and March 25, 2009, the board's medical disability subcommittee (subcommittee) revisited Pierce's application. During the first meeting, Dr. Geffroy summarized the subcommittee's issue with Pierce's case: “the only problem with granting accidental disability retirement * * * [is because the disability] was not the result of a single work related accident but [rather] a cumulative set of injuries.” Another subcommittee member echoed this sentiment at the second meeting when he agreed that denying Pierce's application was appropriate because there was no “single accidental occurrence resulting in the disability.” Accordingly, the subcommittee again recommended that the board deny Pierce's application. ⁵ Then, consequent to a majority vote, the board denied Pierce's application.⁶ A written decision adopting the subcommittee's findings and recommendation was completed by the board on March 25, 2009. The board determined that “[t]he independent physician reports and other evidentiary material * * * do[ ] not indicate that a specific accident was the cause of Pierce's injury.” “Rather, [it found that Pierce's] disability flows from numerous repeated injuries to his ankle, none of which could be said to be the natural or proximate cause of his incapacitating disability.” Finding that Pierce could not establish that he was “incapacitated as a proximate result of an accident as required by [the] ordinance,” the board denied his application. It is from this decision of the board that we granted certiorari for a second time.

IIStandard of Review

This Court reviews decisions of the board by a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, Article I, Rule 13(a); Sobanski v. Providence Employees' Retirement Board, 981 A.2d 1021, 1021 (R.I.2009) (mem.); Scolardi v. City of Providence, 751 A.2d 754, 755–56 (R.I.2000). In so doing, “our task is ‘to discern whether any legally competent evidence supports the lower tribunal's decision and whether the decision[-]maker committed any reversible errors of law in the matter under review.’ ” Sobanski, 981 A.2d at 1022 (quoting Pierce, 962 A.2d at 1292). When we review for the existence of “legally competent evidence” we look for “some or any evidence supporting the agency's findings.” Auto Body Association of Rhode Island v. State Department of Business Regulation, 996 A.2d 91, 95 (R.I.2010) (quoting Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 208 (R.I.1993)). When we evaluate questions of law, our review is de novo. Lynch v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 994 A.2d 64, 70 (R.I.2010) (citing Irons v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 973 A.2d 1124, 1129 (R.I.2009)). If an error of law is found, it must “so infect[ ] the validity of the proceedings as to warrant reversal.” Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 903 (R.I.2004) (quoting Kent County Water Authority v. State (Department of Health), 723 A.2d 1132, 1134 (R.I.1999)). Accordingly, if the board did not lack competent facts supporting its decision and did not commit legal errors “infect[ing] the validity of the proceedings,” this Court will affirm its decision. See id.; see also Sobanski, 981 A.2d at 1022 (citing Pierce, 962 A.2d at 1292).

IIIAnalysis

ARequirements for Receiving Accidental Disability Benefits Based on § 17–189

Before we delve into the merits of this case, a brief introduction to the City of Providence (city) Retirement System (system) is in order. Section 17–189 of the Providence Code lists the three retirement options available to members of the city's system: service retirement, ordinary-disability retirement, and accidental-disability retirement. Each type entitles a retiring member to a pension, but the amount of the pension differs depending on the type of retirement. See Providence Code § 17–189(2), (4), (6). For example, a recipient of ordinary-disability retirement receives a pension of no more than 45 percent of his final compensation, whereas the pension provided to a recipient of accidental disability retirement is equivalent to 66 2/3 percent of the member's final compensation. Id. § 17–189(4)(b), (4)(c), (6)(b). “The sole difference between accidental and ordinary benefits is the manner in which an employee becomes disabled, which accounts for the difference in compensation.” Connelly v. City of Providence Retirement Board, 601 A.2d 498, 500 (R.I.1992). In effect, the system bestows more lucrative benefits upon members who were disabled in the line of duty than upon members who were disabled outside of work.⁷ Not surprisingly, entitlement to accidental-disability retirement's greater benefits requires a member to meet criteria that are more discriminating than the other two retirement options. ⁸ Cf. Rossi v. Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, 895 A.2d 106, 111, 112 (R.I.2006) (explaining...