Pierce v. State

Decision Date02 July 1973
Docket NumberNo. 27996,27996
Citation199 S.E.2d 235,230 Ga. 766
PartiesBobby PIERCE et al. v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The evidence of force and intimidation was sufficient to authorize the convictions of rape.

2. It was not error to allow the sister of the prosecutrix to relate some of the particularities of the complaint made by the prosecutrix to this witness, since the declarations were made so shortly after the commission of the crimes as to constitute a part of the res gestae.

(a) The testimony of this witness in regard to the physical condition of the prosecutrix when the witness saw her immediately after the crimes was admissible.

Theodore S. Worozbyt, Garland & Garland, Atlanta, for appellants.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Isaac Jenrette, Morris M. Rosenberg, James H. Mobley, Jr., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Daniel I. MacIntyre, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

MOBLEY, Chief Justice.

Bobby Pierce and Willie Daniel appeal from their convictions of rape. They were indicted and tried jointly. Each was given a sentence of one and one-half years.

A motion for new trial on the usual general grounds was filed. In an amendment to the motion it was asserted that it was error to allow in evidence the particularities of the complaint of the prosecutrix, over the objection of the appellants.

The errors enumerated are: (1) the overruling of the motion for new trial; (2) the admission in evidence of the particularities of the complaint made by the prosecutrix; and (3) the denial of the motion for directed verdicts of acquittal.

1. It is urged by the appellants that the evidence did not show force, either actual or constructive, in the perpetration of the

alleged rapes. The appellants admit that they had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, but contend that she did not offer any resistance to them.

The prosecutrix testified: The appellants were strangers to her. She is a married woman, with two children. On the date of the alleged crimes, at about 1:00 a.m., she left her home after an argument with her husband, and started walking to her sister's home, expecting her husband to follow her. She was clad only in underclothes and a housecoat. When she had gone a short distance, a car passed her in which two men were riding. They asked her if she wanted to ride and she refused. Another car was following behind this car, containing five men, and they asked her if she wanted to ride, and she refused. Two men then got out of the second car, and crossed the street. She gave them her pocketbook and told them that she didn't have any money. They insisted that she ride, and when she refused, they grasped her arms and took her across the street and pushed her into the back seat of the first car. One of these men got in the car with her. She begged them to leave her alone. The man from the second car stayed in the back seat of the first car until they turned the corner, and then got out of the car. One of the appellants then got in the back seat with her. He asked her what she was doing out that time of night and she told him that she had had an argument with her husband and was going to her sister's house. They drove for about ten or fifteen minutes. She again begged them to leave her alone and let her go. They drove into a garage in an old service station. One of the appellants told her to get out of the car, and when she refused, he caught her by her arm and pulled her into the back room of the service station. He told her to take off her clothes and she refused. She begged and pleaded with them to leave her alone. He pulled off her clothes and told her to lie down. When she refused, he put his hands on her shoulders and told her to lie down, and she did. She was afraid. She was begging him to leave her alone. Both men had sexual intercourse with her. When the second one had finished, the first one threw her clothes to her and told her to put them on and asked where she wanted to go. She told them to go on about their business and leave her alone. They said they were not going to leave her there for somebody else to come along and do the same thing. They inquired where her sister lived, and took her within about two blocks of her sister's home. She ran to her sister's house and told her sister to call the police. Her sister called the police and they came out. The reason she did not fight with the men was that she was afraid of them. She did not know them, and did not know whether they were on drugs, or what kind of maniacs they were. She had a husband and family and wanted to live.

'While rape is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will . . . and consent however reluctant is fatal to a conviction for rape . . . yet consent induced by force or fear and intimidation does not amount to consent in law and does not prevent the intercourse from constituting rape.' Willingham v. State, 201 Ga. 339(1), 39 S.E.2d 751.

The present case does not show the degree of force frequently found in crimes of rape, or the violent threats often made. However, there was evidence of force, and the circumstances provided ample ground for...

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12 cases
  • Rucker v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1986
    ... ...         6. "The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on circumstantial evidence. As the State points out, although most of the evidence adduced was in the nature of direct evidence, there was also some circumstantial evidence. Pierce v ... State, [230 Ga. 766, 199 S.E.2d 235], supra at 770. Moreover, it is well settled in Georgia law that absent extraordinary circumstances not obtaining in the instant case, it is not harmful error to give a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence even if none is actually present in the ... ...
  • Sears v. State, 73349
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 17, 1987
    ...Vol. 2, Criminal Law, and we find no error in this regard. See Core v. State, 238 Ga. 448(3), 233 S.E.2d 200 (1977); Pierce v. State, 230 Ga. 766(1), 199 S.E.2d 235 (1973). 5. The victim's testimony relating an earlier, unindicted act of molestation upon her by appellant was properly admitt......
  • State v. Claflin
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • November 6, 1984
    ...Ariz. 432, 636 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1981); Collins v. State, 365 So.2d 113 (Ala.) cert. denied, 365 So.2d 116 (1978); Pierce v. State, 230 Ga. 766, 199 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1973). Finally, on this issue, the State's "expert" testified that such behavior was consistent with and could be indicative o......
  • State v. Stettina
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1981
    ...Carr, 451 F.2d 652 (3rd Cir. 1971). So is testimony concerning the victim's condition immediately after the incident. Pierce v. State, 230 Ga. 766, 199 S.E.2d 235 (1973); People v. Walls, 33 Ill.2d 394, 211 N.E.2d 699 The prosecutrix's claim in the instant case that the act occurred without......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The Georgia Roundtable Discussion Model: Another Way to Approach Reforming Rape Laws
    • United States
    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 20-3, March 2004
    • Invalid date
    ...For example, in Georgia, case law holds that consent induced by force or fear does not constitute consent, see, e.g., Pierce v. State, 199 S.E.2d 235, 236 (Ga. 1973), and that a victim who is incapacitated by drugs or alcohol may be incapable of consent, see, e.g., Evans v. State, 21 S.E.2d......

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