Pierce v. State
Decision Date | 13 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 69777,69777 |
Citation | 777 S.W.2d 399 |
Parties | Anthony Leroy PIERCE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal is taken from a conviction for capital murder. V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). After finding the appellant guilty, the jury returned affirmative findings to the special issues under Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. Punishment was assessed at death.
The appellant was convicted of intentionally causing the death of Fred Eugene Johnson during the course of committing and attempting to commit aggravated robbery. Appellant raises twelve points of error. He argues that one venireman was improperly excused for cause based on his bias against imposition of the death penalty. He argues that three other veniremen should have been excused for cause because of their inability to differentiate between "intentional" in the guilt/innocence stage and "deliberate" in the punishment phase. He argues that he should have been allowed to exercise his peremptory challenges retroactively. He argues that an architect's reconstruction of the lineup was erroneously excluded from evidence. He argues that expert testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony was improperly excluded. He argues that, on three occasions, evidence concerning a prior misidentification of the appellant was improperly excluded. Finally, he argues that the jury should have been given a special instruction during the punishment phase concerning the use of mitigating evidence. We affirm.
On August 4, 1977, Fred Johnson, the deceased, was working as manager of a Church's Fried Chicken restaurant. Brenda Charles was working as a cook and cashier that night, and Ron Cooks was working as a cook. After 9:00 that night, appellant entered the restaurant, approached the cashier, exhibited a gun, and demanded money from Johnson. Johnson put the money into a Church's chicken box and handed the box to Johnson. Appellant ordered the employees to lie on the floor. As appellant began to leave the restaurant, he dropped the box, spilling the money. He instructed Cooks to pick up the money. After Cooks had done this, appellant returned to the counter and told the deceased that he had been "laying to kill" him, and then shot the deceased. After this, appellant fled the store.
At trial, Charles testified that she recognized the appellant as the man who robbed and killed Johnson. In addition, she testified that she recognized appellant as a person who had been in the restaurant in the two months prior to the offense. Cooks also identified appellant as the man who robbed Johnson. Reginald Sanders, a twelve-year-old boy who observed the robbery through the front window of the store as he was passing by, testified that appellant was the man he saw committing the offense in the store and then running from the restaurant. 1
In his eighth point of error, appellant argues that the trial judge erred in excusing venireperson Helen Scott for cause. Appellant contends that Ms. Scott equivocated in her position that she could not answer all of the special issues "yes" because of her moral opposition to the death penalty. The State responds that Ms. Scott conceded that a person who does wrong should be punished, but maintains that she consistently expressed the view that she could not answer the special issues in such a manner that the death penalty would be imposed.
The voir dire examination began with the trial judge asking a few questions concerning the venireperson's feelings about the death penalty and how they would affect her ability to serve as a juror.
During the State's examination of Ms. Scott, she acknowledged that there might be circumstances which would merit the death penalty, but she stressed that she would not want to impose it.
Now, that man, you find out later, had killed some other people before, gone to the pen, and gotten out and then robbed somebody and went to the pen and gotten out and now he's out killing all these babies. He could be charged with a capital murder. If you were on the jury coming in involved in that case in light of your own personal feelings about capital murder, would you not--would you be able to sit on a jury in that case?
A: I know that's wrong and I think I understand what you're talking about, but it's just something about taking a person's life that it had been taught to me all my life and I just can't do it.
Eventually, the prosecutor asked Ms. Scott about how her feelings would affect her service as a juror.
Next, the prosecutor extensively explained the second special issue to Ms. Scott. After Ms. Scott said that she felt that she could answer the question in the abstract, the prosecutor put the question into terms of a capital case.
MR. GRIFFIN [Defense attorney]: Objection. Giving her--leading her toward the answer and also it is repetitive. We've gone over it four times now.
At this point, the State challenged Ms. Scott for cause based on her inability to answer the special issues. The judge withheld ruling until the appellant examined the venireperson.
Next, appellant's attorney attempted to rehabilitate Ms. Scott. He stressed the civic importance of serving as a juror and the fact that the jurors serve under oath to follow the law. Neither of these arguments caused Ms. Scott to retreat from her position that she could not answer the special issues in such a way that a death sentence would be imposed. Appellant's attorney also presented a hypothetical case in which the facts of the capital offense were brutal and the defendant had a terrible criminal record. Not even this hypothetical situation could persuade Ms. Scott that she could answer all of the special issues in the...
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