Pierre v. Clarke, Case No. 2:19-cv-5836-JDW
| Decision Date | 19 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-5836-JDW |
| Parties | WILNER PIERRE, Plaintiff v. POLICE OFFICER CLARKE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Two Philadelphia police officers saw an Uber driver commit two traffic violations, so they pulled him over. At some point after the officers approached the car, the driver asked to speak to a supervisor. The officers ordered the driver out of the car and frisked him. They didn't find anything, but they still put him in handcuffs and made him wait in the backseat of their police cruiser for a supervisor to arrive. None of this is in dispute.
What is in dispute is why the officers did what they did. They say that the driver engaged in several suspicious acts. He tells a different tale. There is no eyewitness testimony and no useful video footage of the encounter. So the Court has to do what it does in every case with disputed evidence: take the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In this case, that means accepting the driver's version of events. When the Court accepts that version, many of the officers' reasons for frisking, handcuffing, and detaining the driver fall away. What's left does not justify the acts the officers took. The Court will therefore deny the officers' motion for summary judgment and leave a jury to resolve the competing factual narratives in this case.
On May 31, 2019, Philadelphia Police Officers Kevin Norton and Jason Clarke were driving below the speed limit on the 4800 block of Bingham Street in Philadelphia, looking for a wanted person. Wilner Pierre, an Uber driver, went around their patrol car by crossing into the oncoming traffic lane. The officers then saw him drive through a stop sign. Having seen enough, they stopped Mr. Pierre's car.
Before approaching Mr. Pierre's car, Officers Norton and Clarke ran Mr. Pierre's license plate through their system. There were no hits. The officers claim that while they were sitting in their car, they observed Mr. Pierre moving around a lot, reaching around in his car, and appearing frantic. Mr. Pierre denies moving around in his car, and video that the parties submitted is inconclusive. For purposes of this Motion, the Court therefore concludes that Mr. Pierre was not moving around the way the officers describe.
When the officers approached Mr. Pierre's car, he did not have his license, registration, and insurance information in hand. Officer Norton asked for that information. The officers contend that Mr. Pierre did not comply with their request and instead asked why the officers stopped him. Mr. Pierre disputes that and claims that he asked about the reason for the stop while he looked for the requested documentation. The video is inconclusive, but it suggests that Mr. Pierre was, in fact, looking through paperwork. Mr. Pierre then gave one of the officers his license and registration. Officer Norton asked if he had an insurance card. Mr. Pierre replied, "you still haven't told me why you pulled me over." (ECF No. 28-7 at 00:50-1:03.) Officer Norton said that he needed Mr. Pierre'sinsurance. At this point, Mr. Pierre asked to speak to a supervisor. The officers then told Mr. Pierre to exit his car.
After a brief back-and-forth, Mr. Pierre exited the car, but his passengers remained inside. The officers handcuffed Mr. Pierre and frisked him for weapons. Officer Norton told Mr. Pierre that he was not under arrest but that they were detaining him. At some point, however, Officer Clarke told Mr. Pierre that he was "going to jail." (ECF No. 29-4 at 41:10-17.) The officers did not find any contraband or weapons on Mr. Pierre. Nevertheless, they placed Mr. Pierre in the back of their police car to wait for a supervisor.
Next, the officers frisked Mr. Pierre's car and spoke to his passengers. They also radioed for a supervisor. They did not discover anything when they frisked the car, but they kept Mr. Pierre in the back of the patrol car until the supervisor arrived, about 30 minutes later. After Mr. Pierre finished speaking with the supervisor, Officers Norton and Clarke issued two traffic citations to Mr. Pierre for motor vehicle code violations, one for passing them in the oncoming traffic lane and one for failing to stop at the stop sign. In traffic court, a judge found Mr. Pierre guilty of failing to stop at a stop sign.
Mr. Pierre initiated this action on December 12, 2019. In his Amended Complaint, he asserts Federal and Pennsylvania state law claims against Officers Clarke and Norton: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) claims for false arrest and false imprisonment under Pennsylvania tort law. Officers Clarke and Norton filed this motion for summary judgment, arguing that the record does not support Mr. Pierre's § 1983 or state law claims and that they are immune from suit.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to seek, and a court to enter, summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quotations omitted). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.'" Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quotation omitted). However, "[t]he non-moving party may not merely deny the allegations in the moving party's pleadings; instead he must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a material fact." Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Where there is video footage related to the claims, the Court must not draw inferences that are "blatantly" inconsistent with the video evidence. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81.
Where a video of an incident exists, the Court cannot disregard that video and credit witnesses who offer competing versions of events. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 379-80. The decision only applies if the video blatantly contradicts a witness's version of events.See El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 333 (3d Cir. 2020). Where a video is subject to interpretation, a court must interpret it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The video of this incident is not conclusive. The camera points away from the interaction, so no one is visible in the video. Likewise, ambient noise masks some of the audio. The Court therefore interprets the video in the light most favorable to Mr. Pierre as the non-moving party.
To the extent that Mr. Pierre relies on the video to establish statements that his passengers made, Mr. Pierre fails to identify who made each statement in the video. The statements are therefore inadmissible hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a); see also United States v. Ligambi, 891 F. Supp. 2d 709, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
Although Mr. Pierre complains that the officers conducted two full searches of his car, the evidence does not support that. The law permits police officers to search the passenger compartment of a car under some circumstances, but only authorizes a more complete search of the whole car if probable cause exists. Compare Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983)("[A] search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief. . . that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.") with Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) ().
Mr. Pierre has not offered any testimony that any officer did anything other than look in the passenger compartment of his car. And, he admits he could not see what theofficers were doing when they looked in his car. That concession means he has no personal knowledge about any search of the car. Mr. Pierre points to statements that he heard his passengers make about the search (or searches) of the car. But as inadmissible hearsay, the passengers' statements cannot support Mr. Pierre's claims. He therefore cannot base a claim on the searches of his car.
Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'" 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that "'some person has deprived him of a federal right . . . [and] that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.'" Id. (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (alteration in original)).
Qualified immunity shields police officers from liability for civil damages brought pursuant to § 1983 "so long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). Officers seeking qualified immunity bear the burden of establishing the affirmative defense. See Halsey, 750 F.3d at 288. To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must determine (1) whether the officer violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established. Kelly v. Borough of...
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