Pierre v. Florida
Decision Date | 05 March 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-20421-BLOOM/Reid |
Parties | STEVEN BERNARD PIERRE, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon pro se Petitioner Steven Bernard Pierre's ("Petitioner") Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. [10] ("Motion"), filed on March 2, 2020. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied.
Petitioner initiated the instant action on January 30, 2020. ECF No. [1] ("Petition"). On January 31, 2020, this Court, in construing the Petition as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner resides in Haiti and therefore is not in custody as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) and § 2254(a). ECF No. [9] ("Order"). Petitioner now files the instant Motion, arguing that the Court erred in construing the Petition as a § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus because the Petition was actually a petition for writ of mandamus. ECF No. [10].
In his Petition, Petitioner argues that Florida state courts violated his rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Eighth Amendment by refusing to vacate his conviction, which was based on his unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent nolo contendre plea, and was only entered into due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the trial court's failure to advise Petitioner as to the immigration consequences of his plea. ECF No. [1] at 5-25. Accordingly, the Petition states: "In sum, the ultimate aim is to have the conviction vacated for immigration purposes." Id. at 25. Aside from the request that Petitioner's conviction be vacated, the Petition does not appear to seek any additional relief. See generally id.
"A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and 'a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). With this liberal construction in mind, the Court, in its Order dismissing the instant action, construed the Petition as one for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. [9]; see Habeas Corpus, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ) .
In his Motion, however, Petitioner now argues that the Court's interpretation of his Petition was erroneous because the Petition did not seek a writ of habeas corpus, but rather a writ of mandamus. See generally ECF No. [10]. Moreover, Petitioner's Motion contends that the Court has jurisdiction over the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), Article III, Sections 1 & 2 of the United States Constitution, and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv), (c). ECF No. [10] at 14.1 Thus, Petitioner's Motion requests that the Court "reinstate the action forthe post-conviction relief," through which Petitioner seeks to vacate his conviction for immigration purposes and to obtain a writ of mandamus requiring the "lower court(s)" (i.e., the Florida Third District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida) to provide proof that the trial court did not fail to properly inform Petitioner of the immigration consequences faced by taking a plea. Id. at 20, 25.
A writ of mandamus is "[a] writ issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by a lower court or a governmental officer or body, usu. to correct a prior action or failure to act." Mandamus, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Additionally, "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature ofmandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. "The traditional use of the writ [of mandamus] . . . both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction." Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1964) (footnote omitted) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) (some citations omitted).
"It requires no citation of authority to hold that the authority to grant a writ of mandamus does not give the court subject matter jurisdiction over the claim for which the writ is sought." Quanren Lin v. Holder, 333 F. App'x 454, 456-57 (11th Cir. 2009). Likewise, "federal courts have no general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties where mandamus is the only relief sought." Lamar v. 118th JudicialDist. Court of Tex., 440 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1971)2 (citing Haggard v. State of Tenn., 421 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1970); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966); Rines v. Pennsylvania, 285 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Pa. 1968)); see also Russell v. Knight, 488 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1973); Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cty. Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Beto, 469 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1972); Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2012); Carnage v. Sanborn, 304 F. Supp. 857, 858 (N.D. Ga. 1969) () .
As these principles make clear, this Court does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directing Florida state courts to perform their duties in this case. Lamar, 440 F.2d at 384. Thus, absent some independent basis that properly invokes the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, this Court lacks the authority to grant a writ of mandamus. Quanren Lin, 333 F. App'x at 456-57. Moreover, Petitioner's citations to (1) Article III of the U.S. Constitution, (2) a federal district court's jurisdiction to hear bankruptcy appeals, and (3) the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, fail to establish any valid basis for this Court's jurisdiction over the instant action. The Court properly dismissed the instant action in its January 31, 2020, Order. Even construing thePetition as a petition for writ of mandamus, the Court nonetheless lacks jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner's claims. Therefore, Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. [10], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on March 5, 2020.
/s/_________
BETH BLOOM
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (...
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