Pierson v. Holdridge

• Decision Date: 09 May 1914
• Docket Number: 18,834
• Citation: 140 P. 1032,92 Kan. 365
• Parties: FRANK PIERSON, Appellant, v. T. J. HOLDRIDGE, JR., Appellee
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

140 P. 1032

92 Kan. 365

FRANK PIERSON, Appellant, v. T. J. HOLDRIDGE, JR., Appellee

No. 18,834

Supreme Court of Kansas

May 9, 1914

Decided January, 1914.

Appeal from Kingman district court; PRESTON B. GILLETT, judge.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. FALSE REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY--By Officer of Corporation to Make Contract for Life Employment--Measure of Damages. In an action for false representation by an officer of a milling company that he had authority to bind the corporation by a contract to employ the plaintiff for life by way of settlement of a claim for personal injuries, the measure of damages is the loss occasioned the plaintiff through failure to secure a valid contract, and not the value of the claim for personal injuries.

2. SAME--Action Founded on Tort--Limitation of Action. An action for false representation of authority to make a contract is founded on tort. It is essentially an action for deceit, and the statute of limitations does not commence to run until discovery of the fraud.

John H. Connaughton, and Charles C. Calkin, both of Kingman, for the appellant.

George L. Hay, L. F. Walter, both of Kingman, and T. A. Noftzger, of Wichita, for the appellee.

OPINION

BURCH, J.

The facts furnishing the basis for this action were stated in the case of Pierson v. Milling Co., 91 Kan. 775, 139 P. 394. After the trial of that action the plaintiff determined to protect himself against the consequences of a possible final adjudication that the milling company was not bound by the contract for life employment negotiated by T. J. Holdridge, jr. Therefore he sued Holdridge for false representation of authority to act for the corporation. A demurrer was sustained to the petition, and the plaintiff appeals.

It is argued that the allegations of the petition are not sufficiently definite and certain to make out a cause of action. They do leave considerable to be desired, but liberally construed are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief.

It is further argued that the petition fails to state a cause of action because it is framed to recover damages for loss of the contract for life employment when the plaintiff's deprivation really consisted in loss of his right to prosecute an action for personal injuries. In this respect the theory of the petition is correct.

The action is one for deceit. The claim is that T. J. Holdridge jr., by conduct and statements, induced the plaintiff to believe that he had authority to bind the corporation by the life-employment contract. Relying on those representations the plaintiff released his cause of action for damages for personal injuries, suffered the statute of limitations to run against it, and obtained, as he supposed, a valid contract for life employment. Under these circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of his bargain. There are two rules on the subject of the measure of damages in such cases, but this court has chosen the more liberal one. (Speed v. Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436, 38 P. 496.) The question involved was elaborately...