Pietila v. Congdon
| Citation | 362 N.W.2d 328 |
| Decision Date | 15 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. C5-83-591,CO-83-613,C5-83-591 |
| Parties | Loren J. PIETILA, Trustee for the Heirs of Velma K. Pietila, Decedent, Respondent (C5-83-591), Appellant (C0-83-613), v. Thomas E. CONGDON, Salisbury Adams and William P. Van Evera, Individually and as Trustees under the Will of Chester A. Congdon, Deceased, Appellants (C5-83- 591), Respondents (C0-83-613), First Bank (N.A.) Duluth, as Executor of the Estate of Elisabeth M. Congdon, Deceased, and William P. Van Evera, as Conservator of the Estate of Elisabeth M. Congdon, Deceased, and Congdon Office Corporation, Inc., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
There was not sufficient evidence introduced at trial to allow the jury to find that the negligence of any of the parties was a direct cause of the death of plaintiff's decedent.
Gerald J. Brown, Brown, Andrew, Hallenbeck, Signorelli & Zaller, P.A., Duluth, for trustees.
Bruess, Bye, Boyd, Andresen & Sullivan, David P. Sullivan, Duluth, for Pietila's.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
This wrongful death action arises out of the brutal murders of Elisabeth M. Congdon and her personal nurse, Velma K. Pietila, sometime during the late night hours of June 26, 1977, or the early morning hours of June 27, 1977. The plaintiff, as trustee for the heirs of Velma Pietila, alleges that one or more of the several defendants negligently failed to provide adequate security for Mrs. Pietila's protection. The jury found that the trustees under the will of Chester A. Congdon, the conservator of the estate of Elisabeth M. Congdon, and the co-conservators of Miss Congdon's person 1 all were negligent and that Elisabeth Congdon was not negligent. The jury determined, however, that only the negligence of the trustees was a direct cause of Mrs. Pietila's death. The trustees have appealed from the judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $225,000, and the plaintiff has noticed review of the determination that Elisabeth Congdon was not negligent and that the negligence of Miss Congdon's conservators was not a cause of Mrs. Pietila's death. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
This action is grounded on a theory of negligent failure to provide adequate security for the protection of Mrs. Pietila while she was working at Glensheen, an estate on the shore of Lake Superior at Duluth. Glensheen--with its manor house of 39 rooms and servants' quarters, several accessory buildings, lawns and gardens--was built shortly after the turn of the century by Chester A. Congdon. On Chester Congdon's death, Glensheen passed to Clara, his wife, for her lifetime, then to his trustees to be held pursuant to the trust created by his will until the death of the last survivor of Chester's six children. The will provided for the equal use of Glensheen by those of Chester's children and their families who chose to live in or visit Glensheen and also provided that, in the event of discord, unmarried children should have a right of occupancy to the exclusion of married children.
The youngest of Chester's children, Elisabeth, never married. Elisabeth and her mother resided in Glensheen until Clara's death in 1950. Elisabeth, who had lived in Glensheen since its completion when she was 14 years old, continued to make Glensheen her permanent home. Miss Congdon reared her two adopted daughters, Marjorie and Jennifer, there. In 1964 a massive stroke left Miss Congdon partially paralyzed and suffering from aphasia.
Despite her infirmities, Miss Congdon handled her own affairs until September 1974, when she petitioned for the appointment of William P. Van Evera, one of the trustees under her father's will, as the conservator of her estate and the appointment of her personal physician, Dr. Elizabeth Bagley, and her personal manager, Vera Dunbar, as co-conservators of her person. According to the testimony, Miss Congdon was urged to petition for the appointment of these conservators by family members who became concerned for her welfare after incidents involving her daughter, Marjorie Caldwell.
Until her death at age 83 years Miss Congdon remained at Glensheen in the around-the-clock care of private duty nurses. Velma Pietila served for many years as one of Miss Congdon's nurses. Although Mrs. Pietila, who was 66 years old, had retired from nursing a month earlier, she returned to Glensheen as a substitute nurse on the night of the murders.
There was very little evidence of the way the murders were committed. Although photographs of Glensheen, including a photograph of a broken basement window, were introduced, it was stipulated that the murders were committed by a "person or persons unknown, who gained unauthorized and illegal entry to the home known as Glensheen." The thrust of the plaintiff's case was that the trustees under Chester Congdon's will were the possessors of Glensheen. Directing our attention to Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972), in which we abolished the traditional distinctions between the duty a landowner owes to invitees and that owed to licensees, the plaintiff contends that as possessors of land the trustees were required to exercise reasonable care to protect Mrs. Pietila, an entrant to the land, from harm, including harm from the criminal activities of unidentified third persons.
The plaintiff equates legal title with possession, asserting that as the holders of title to Glensheen the trustees were occupants of Glensheen and, hence, subject to the duties imposed on the possessors of land. There is, however, no evidence that the trustees occupied Glensheen with the intent to control it or even that they had the right to do so. The interest of the trustees in Glensheen was, of course, subject to the terms of the trust created by Chester Congdon's will. While the will accorded the trustees "absolute power" to sell and convey Glensheen in fee, that "absolute power" was exercisable only with the concurrence of Chester's then surviving children. In 1968 the trustees--with Elisabeth's approval--conveyed Glensheen to the University of Minnesota, reserving to the trustees an estate measured by the life of Elisabeth Congdon, who was then the sole survivor of Chester's children. At best, control of the property was divided between the trustees and Chester's issue.
The plaintiff also contends that the trust instrument required the trustees to maintain Glensheen in good repair, thus imposing on the trustees the duties of a possessor of land. The will contains these directions with respect to the operation and maintenance of Glensheen:
During the life of my wife my said trustees shall maintain Glensheen in a good state of repair, and pay taxes, assessments and insurance thereon, as a part of the current expenses of my estate, and shall pay to my wife to defray the running expenses of Glensheen the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars per annum, in quarterly installments.
During the period in which said property is held in trust, the expenses of repairs, taxes, assessments and insurance shall be similarly defrayed, and the same allowance or appropriation made for running expenses, which latter fund shall be directly applied by the trustees to defray the running expenses of Glensheen except as a majority of my surviving children may from time to time agree upon one or more of their number residing in Glensheen, to whom such current expense fund shall be paid, and who shall take charge of its application, in which case such payments shall be made to such person or persons, who receipts for the same shall absolve the trustees from further responsibility therefor.
While the will imposed on the trustees the duty to maintain Glensheen in a good state of repair and to pay taxes and insurance during Clara's lifetime, after her death, when Elisabeth claimed the occupancy of Glensheen in her own right, the trustees' obligations were to defray--i.e., to pay--the expenses of repair, taxes, and insurance as part of current expenses and to provide $25,000 each year to defray the running expenses of Glensheen. After Mrs. Congdon's death, the trustees paid the current expense fund to the Congdon Office Corporation, which handled Miss Congdon's business affairs. Miss Congdon augmented the funds provided by the trustees by $50,000 each year in order to defray the actual running expenses of Glensheen.
No doubt the trustees had a right of entry to Glensheen, but in view of Elisabeth Congdon's occupancy of Glensheen, her unquestionable right to control both the use and disposition of the property during her lifetime and to order repairs at the expense of the trust, and in view of the absence of any express direction to the trustees to do more than pay the expense of repairs, the trustees cannot be said to have had that exclusive control over Glensheen which would justify characterizing them as possessors of land for purposes of tort liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 328 E. (1965); Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 232 N.W.2d 818 (1975).
Even if the will were construed to charge the trustees with the maintenance and repair of Glensheen after Mrs. Clara Congdon's death, we hold that the failure to prevent the murder of Miss Congdon and Mrs. Pietila did not constitute a breach of their obligations, whether those obligations were imposed by the will or arose out of the status of the trustees with respect to the land. The plaintiff asserts that the trustees were required to protect the physical integrity of Glensheen and its furnishings, that Glensheen was a 39-room mansion situated on large grounds and constructed at enormous cost, that the house and its furnishings demonstrated the presence of wealth, and that, therefore, an unauthorized or unlawful intrusion for wrongful purposes was reasonably foreseeable by the trustees.
The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fleming v. State
...class peculiarly needing the protection of the law and thus set apart, there could be no real protection.”).172 See Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Minn.1985) (referring to “[t]he extraordinary speculation inherent in the subject of deterrence of crime”); Goldberg v. Housing Author......
- Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC
-
Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 85SC209
...owner can look for guidance before the crime is committed and by which conduct can be measured after the crime occurs. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn.1985). Imposing liability upon business owners for failing to provide armed guards to prevent criminal acts of third parties i......
-
Soo Line R. Co. v. BJ Carney & Co.
...reasonable care and to maintain the premises so as to protect visitors from an unreasonable risk of harm. Cf. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 332-33 (Minn.1985) (noting common law duty in the context of criminal action). The discharge of hazardous wastes on the site could constitute a b......