Pietrycka v. Simolan

• Decision Date: 23 February 1925
• Citation: 127 A. 717,102 Conn. 42
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: PIETRYCKA v. SIMOLAN.

127 A. 717

102 Conn. 42

PIETRYCKA v. SIMOLAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 23, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; John W. Banks, Judge.

Action for personal injuries by Walter Pietrycka against Stanislaw Simolan. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. No error.

The plaintiff's evidence tended to prove that he was a passenger in the defendant's automobile by invitation and that the defendant was operating the automobile, which was overturned because of his negligence, and thereby the plaintiff, who was at all times in the exercise of due care was injured. The defendant's evidence tended to prove that he was operating his car with due care under the surrounding circumstances. An amendment to the complaint set out the negligence complained of as follows:

" Said negligence of the defendant consisted in operating said automobile so controlled by him recklessly and at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic and use of said highway at said time and place, and in such a manner as to endanger the life and limb of the plaintiff."

To these allegations the defendant pleaded a denial.

Cornelius J. Danaher, of Meriden, for appellant.

Herbert Wescott Fisher and A. Storrs Campbell, both of Hartford, for appellee.

CURTIS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

This case was previously before us. Pietrycka v. Simolan, 98 Conn. 490, 120 A. 310. In the complaint, as amended, three grounds of negligence are alleged. Each is an act of reckless driving forbidden by statute. None of them is an allegation of conduct claimed as constituting common-law negligence. The three statutory grounds of action are: Operating a motor vehicle upon a highway of the state (1) recklessly; (2) at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway; (3) so as to endanger the life and limb of the plaintiff.

The accident occurred on July 27, 1921. The statute then in force, which contains prohibitions as to reckless driving, is section 25 of chapter 400 of the Acts of 1921, which went into effect 26 days before the accident, and reads as follows:

" Reckless Driving. No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway, the intersection of streets and weather conditions, or so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person."

The slight inaccuracy in the amendment to the complaint, in setting forth the second allegation of statutory reckless driving, the court remedied in its charge, which was as follows in regard to these grounds of negligence alleged:

" In regard to the statute concerning reckless driving: If you should find that the defendant, at the time in question, was operating his car recklessly, or at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway, the intersection of streets and weather conditions, or so as to endanger the life or limb of the plaintiff, then he was operating it in violation of the statute, and, if the plaintiff's injuries were directly or proximately caused by such violation, your verdict must be in

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