Pigg v. State, 34S02-9211-CR-924

• Decision Date: 23 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 34S02-9211-CR-924,34S02-9211-CR-924
• Citation: 603 N.E.2d 154
• Parties: Leonard PIGG, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 154

603 N.E.2d 154

Leonard PIGG, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 34S02-9211-CR-924.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 23, 1992.

Mark A. Ryan, Williams & Ryan, Kokomo, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Geoff Davis, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

KRAHULIK, Justice.

The State seeks transfer after the Court of Appeals granted Leonard Pigg, Jr., (Defendant-Appellant below) a new trial because he was not permitted to obtain the address of a State's witness during cross examination. Pigg v. State (1992), Ind.App., 591 N.E.2d 582.

The relevant facts are as follows. James Darden agreed to work as a paid confidential informant for the Kokomo Police Department in exchange for a plea agreement following his arrest for certain crimes. Working with the police, Darden allegedly made controlled purchases of cocaine from Pigg on December 12, 1988, and April 13, 1989. Thereafter, charges were filed against Pigg. At trial, Darden was called as a witness by the State. During cross-examination of Darden, Pigg's counsel sought to obtain Darden's current address. After Darden began to answer the question, the State objected on the grounds that Darden's address was irrelevant. Defense counsel argued that he was entitled to the information as a starting point for investigating what information might be available for impeachment. The State responded that Darden had worked as a confidential informant, his residence was irrelevant, and that Pigg had had the opportunity to depose Darden or seek whatever information was needed before trial. Without any further proceedings, the court sustained the State's objection. Following the jury trial, Pigg was convicted of two counts of Dealing in Cocaine, Ind.Code Sec. 35-48-4-1, class A felonies, and two counts of Maintaining a Common Nuisance, Ind.Code Sec. 35-48-4-13, class D felonies.

Pigg appealed, in part on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination had been infringed by his inability to question Darden about his residential address. Relying on Smith v. Illinois (1968), 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, and Crull v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 1195, the Court of Appeals held that because the State failed to show why the information sought would not be relevant and because reversible error flows directly from the refusal to allow such an inquiry without the appropriate showing, Pigg was entitled to a new trial.

In its petition to transfer, the State argues that the opinion of the Court of Appeals conflicts with two earlier decisions of this Court, Johnson v. State (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 1073, and Corbin v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 86. The State asserts that Johnson and Corbin stand for the proposition that, under all circumstances, the burden is on the defendant to show how he was prejudiced from the trial court's restriction of cross-examination. Even though we believe that Johnson and Corbin are factually distinguishable from Crull and the instant case, we grant transfer to resolve any perceived inconsistencies. In so doing, we affirm the grant of a new trial to Pigg.

We start with the basic proposition that one of the fundamental rights of our criminal justice system granted by the United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution is the right of a defendant to cross-examination. Sears v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 561, 563, 282 N.E.2d 807, 808. Although it is true, as a general rule, that the extent of cross-examination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, "wide latitude is allowed both sides in a dispute to ask pointed and relevant questions on cross-examination in an attempt to undermine the opposition's case." Id. Any doubt as to the legitimacy of a question on cross-examination should be resolved in favor of the questioner. Id.

The United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that asking a witness for his address is among the legitimate questions for cross-examination. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 131, 88 S.Ct. at 750, 19 L.Ed.2d at 959; Alford v. United States (1931), 282 U.S. 687, 691, 51 S.Ct 218, 219, 75 L.Ed. 624, 627; Crull v. State, 540 N.E.2d at 1198. As the Court in Smith stated, "[t]he witness' name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself." 390 U.S. at 131, 88 S.Ct. at 750, 19 L.Ed.2d at 959. Additionally, as this Court stated in Jackson v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 853, 855, "[w]hile a trial judge has discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination and only clear abuse of that discretion is reversible, it is well established that a Sixth Amendment issue is raised when the trial court prohibits defense counsel from cross-examining altogether a crucial witness for the State on an area concerning his credibility."

The State claims, however, that two other cases of this Court, Johnson, 518 N.E.2d 1073, and Corbin, 563 N.E.2d 86, require us to hold that, even if it were error for the trial court to have sustained the objection, Pigg is not entitled to a new trial because he has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by the evidentiary ruling. We do not agree.

Johnson and Corbin are factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Johnson, defendant sought a new trial because he was not permitted to elicit from a State's witness the witness's exact address. Following an in camera hearing, the trial court found that a reasonable fear existed that disclosure of the witness's home address would endanger his safety. The trial court ordered the defense to limit cross-examination to the witness's region of residence. Under these circumstances, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by restricting cross-examination. By comparison, here, there was no in camera hearing and, therefore, no basis upon which the trial court could have concluded that Darden's fears were reasonable.

In Corbin, this Court found no reversible error where, even in the absence of an in camera hearing, the trial court ruled that a witness's testifying to the city of his current residence, without giving the complete street address,...