Corbin v. State

• Decision Date: 27 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 86S00-8808-CR-713,86S00-8808-CR-713
• Citation: 563 N.E.2d 86
• Parties: Ralph CORBIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 86

563 N.E.2d 86

Ralph CORBIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 86S00-8808-CR-713.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 27, 1990.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Gary Damon Secrest, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Justice.

A jury trial resulted in the conviction of appellant of Murder. He was sentenced to a term of sixty (60) years.

The facts are: In late 1985, David Fording was killed by severe blunt- and sharp-force injuries to his head and torso. The autopsy report indicated evidence of prior injuries including numerous fractures to the decedent over a period of time.

David, who was a 35-year-old retarded man, had been living with his mother, Hazel Fording, and appellant prior to his death. All three had lived together in Lafayette, Indiana before moving to Warren County outside Williamsport, Indiana. Appellant admitted repeatedly hitting David causing his ear to swell and the loss of a tooth. In addition, other witnesses testified regarding beatings of the victim.

One day after Thanksgiving in 1985, Hazel noticed a hole in David's head when he was ordered by appellant to the outside cellar for punishment. Hazel later took David from the cellar and put him to bed. That evening David died. Appellant loaded David's body in the trunk of his car, drove to the barn, and buried him under the floor in the barn.

During the period when David was missing, concerned relatives contacted authorities and a missing person investigation was undertaken. Hazel and appellant, throughout this period, claimed David had decided on his own to leave, and they had given him bus money. Approximately one year later in November of 1986, David's body was discovered in the barn.

Appellant contends the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. Appellant claims he is not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. He contends the State failed to prove he acted voluntarily or intentionally and failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any act committed by him caused David's death.

This Court will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Butler v. State (1989), Ind., 547 N.E.2d 270.

Under Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-4-1(b), the burden is on appellant to prove insanity by a preponderance. Thus appellant's argument concerning voluntariness necessarily placed on him the burden of proving involuntariness as an affirmative defense. Therefore, because appellant had the burden, he is appealing from a negative judgment. From the record in the instant case, it is evident that the trier of fact had sufficient evidence upon which to base its decision. We find no error.

With regard to appellant's claim of intent, this Court has stated that so long as the offender is capable of conceiving a design, he will be presumed in the absence of contrary proof to have intended the natural consequences of his own acts. See Cowans v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 327, 412 N.E.2d 54. The necessary intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the circumstances of the acts involved. Norman v. State (1989), Ind., 539 N.E.2d 937. Intent to kill can be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily injury. McMurry v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 1202.

The medical evidence shows that David's fatal injuries were caused by blunt force and a heavy, sharp instrument, with the blunt-force injuries being consistent with being beat with a hammer. Testimony was presented to the jury that appellant had struck David around the time of his death on his neck and spine with a hammer. The autopsy revealed that David received numerous blows to his head with any one being sufficient to cause his death. Testimony also presented at trial by witnesses and appellant revealed numerous beatings by appellant upon David.

The record also reveals the existence of threats made by appellant to the victim. These threats could be considered by the jury in arriving at its verdict. See Brown v. State (1987), Ind., 503 N.E.2d 405; Bixler v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 1093, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 834, 106 S.Ct. 106, 88 L.Ed.2d 86.

There was substantial evidence of probative value including the threats, pattern of beatings, nature of the injuries, and the use of a blunt-force instrument from which the trier of fact could have concluded that appellant intended to kill David. We find no error.

Appellant contends that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not responsible by reason of a mental disease or defect.

In making its determination on sanity, a jury may consider lay or expert opinion to determine a defendant's mental capacity at the time of the offense. Baxle v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 561.

Indiana Code Sec. 35-41-3-6 reads as follows:

"(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.

(b) As used in this section, "mental disease or defect" means a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception, but the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct."

In the instant case, four psychiatrists testified regarding appellant's condition. One psychiatrist testified that he felt appellant had an organic brain syndrome and that he did not understand the severity and grossness of his actions. Another doctor testified that he felt appellant was sane and did not suffer from a mental defect at the time of the commission of the crime. The third doctor testified that he felt appellant had some mental abnormalities but that he could appreciate the wrongfulness of the act and was sane at the time the act was committed. The fourth doctor testified that appellant had a chronic psychotic condition and an anti-social personality trait.

From the testimony presented at trial, it is apparent that experts had a difference of opinion with regard to appellant's sanity at the time of the offense. In addition, lay witness testimony also showed a difference of opinion with regard to appellant. The jury had the benefit of these conflicting opinions plus appellant's own testimony. We will reverse the trial court on a finding of sanity "only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion and the trier of fact has reached an opposite conclusion,...." Green v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1169, 1171. We would not be justified invading the province of the jury in this matter. We find no error.

Appellant contends he was denied the right to adequately cross-examine State's witness, David York.

On cross-examination, York refused to give his street address in Lafayette.

In support of appellant's argument, he cites the case law holding that a defendant is presumptively entitled to cross-examine a government witness as to his address. See Smith v. Illinois (1968), 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956; Crull v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 1195; and Johnson v. State (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 1073.

This Court stated in Johnson:

"Since the trial judge is in the best position to observe the trial proceeding, the trial judge should control the extent of cross-examination and accordingly will be reversed only on an abuse of discretion. Marbley v. State (1984), Ind., 461 N.E.2d 1102, 1107. To show an abuse of discretion, a defendant must demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the court's actions. Id." Id. at 1075.

In the instant case, unlike Crull, appellant made no request for an in camera hearing to determine reasonableness of refusal to disclose. We hold that the ruling in Johnson is dispositive of the issues in this case. In the instant case, David York's testimony was consistent with others who testified regarding prior instances between the appellant and the victim. These instances included prior injuries to the victim and threats by appellant to kill the victim. In addition, appellant nowhere in his argument demonstrated how he was prejudiced by the lack of the residential address of the witness. We find no error.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence that he had committed a prior battery upon his former wife.

As the State properly notes, when the insanity defense is pled, the appellant opens up his conduct for examination. See Miller v. State (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 794.

In Brown v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 173, 176, we said that when dealing with an issue of improper evidence during an insanity defense:

"Even where we have found that evidence of this sort is irrelevant and even prejudicial, we find it reversible only if we determine the evidence had a substantial influence on the jury's verdict."

In the instant case, appellant objected during trial to the testimony of appellant's former spouse regarding a prior offense of battery committed upon her. However, as the State indicates, this evidence would tend to show appellant's mental state and the ability of appellant to go into a rage. We find no error in admitting the testimony.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that this testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial, it does not appear to have had a substantial influence on the jury's verdict. The record in the instant case reveals testimony presented by others regarding appellant's behavior toward the victim and his prior threats. There was no reversible error in admitting this testimony.

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made which were obtained in a custodial interrogation without first having been given his Miranda advisement. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

Miranda warnings apply in the context...